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Abstract 
This t he is examines the theoretical and empirical aspects of financial market 
volatility. Financial markets are essentially volatile. Huwever j excess volatility 
n1ay impair t he smooth functioning of the financial system and economic perfor-
mance. Volatility that ·was evident in financial markets during t he recent financial 
crisis and even n1ore recentlyj during the European debt crisis , has attracted re-
nevved interest in studying volatility. The most prominent feature of t his crisis 
,, as its widespread effects on t he financial markets of developed count ries , while 
leaving emerging market s as t he success stor) . 
The main obj ectives of t his t hesis are twofold. The first is to quant ify and 
investigate he nature of t he factors behind t he t ransmissien of volatility on and 
among financial n1arkets during t he crisis of 2007- 2011 , wit h a special fo cus on de-
veloped coun ries . Bot h analytical and empirical modeling approaches are used. 
The anal ical approach in Chapter 2 is built up on t he herd behavior of interna-
ional inve tors; using t he role of carry raders ' as a conduit . P articular a tent ion 
is given o 1nodeling t he v.ra} in which pri -ate signals on 1nargin requirements 
lead some in e tors to change heir decision , and how their strategic behavior 
ransm1 hocks aero s coun ries . Chap er 3 adopts an empirical approach using 
a la en fac or methodolog . and aims o explore he t ransmission mechanisms 
of he cri i hrough equit r and bond market over different phases of the cri-
1s of 2007- 2011. The fac or n1odel in particular specifie contagion channels 
hrough cro -count r and cro -market contagion linkage after controlling for 
other form of fundamen al hrough he fac or t ructure. 
The e ond objecti -e of t he t hesis is to exan1ine whether and huw succe full} 
emerging marke cen ral bank attempt o hield t heir dome tic currency market 
fro1n ex ernall r ourced financial market -olatili - t hrough foreign exchange inter-
\ en ion. T o empirical approache . t he generalized autoregre ive heteroskeda -
Vl 
ticity approach in Chapter 4 and t he latent factor approach in Chapt r 5i ar 
used to explore t he significance and effectiveness of foreign exchange interv ntion 
using a unique data set of daily intervention obtained from the Central Bank of 
Sri Lanka . 
Overall , t his t hesis finds strong evidence for the t ransmission of asset rnar-
ket volatility across developed countries during the crisis of 2007- 2011. Through 
herd behavior and the feedback effects in asset prices and exchange rates , financial 
markets can be destabilized during crises . Financial 1narket contagion is another 
significant channel through which the stability in the financial syste1n can be 
compromised, and several channels of contagion are identified and estimated for 
different phases of the crisis. However , the relative in1portance of each contagion 
channel varies depending on the source asset market and the phase of t he cri-
sis. Turning to emerging market responses to periods of global volatility, foreign 
exchange intervention is found to be an effective policy instrument for shielding 
against external shocks, as is evident for Sri Lanka. Intervent ion is aimed to 
"lean against the wind" to reduce volatility and to accumulate international re-
serves. The central bank responds to global movements in currency markets when 
intervening, rather t han movements specific to t he domestic currency market . 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
The efficient market hypothesis asserts that prices of financial assets should re-
flect all available information , and should therefore always be consistent with 
economic fundamentals (Fama, 1970). However , volatility evident in financial 
markets has forced economists to re-examine the validity of this hypothesis (Scott , 
1991 ; Malkiel , 2003 , 2005; Chiang et al., 2010). This thesis studies the theoretical 
and empirical aspects of financial market volatility. 
JVIodeling financial market volatility has been a significant area of research , 
. 
and much work has been done to measure, model and understand the volatility 
transmission mechanism. 1 Linkages between national currency, stock and bond 
markets with the markets in the rest of the world , and the speed of the transmis-
sion of volatility across markets are the main reasons that volatility is a central 
focus of financial economics (So et al. , 1997; Fleming et al., 1998; Mitra, 2011). 
The policy interest in this area is clear, as understanding the precise causes and 
consequences of financial n1arket volatility is essential for designing policies that 
can effectively reduce such volatility, which in turn has implications for general 
econon1ic growth and stability. 
Financial market volatility increases sharply and spills over across markets 
during crises (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010 ; Schwert , 2011 ; Diebold and Yilmaz , 
2012). The crisis of 2007-2011 has generated a renewed interest in n1easuring , 
modeling and understanding how the volatility in one asset market influences 
1 Poon and Granger (2003) provide a review of the literature. 
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the volatility of related assets markets , both ·within and across national bord rs. 
Unlike past crises in emerging economies, the recent turbulence of the financial 
market originated in the core of the world economy- that is , in the United Stat s 
(US) financial markets. Subsequent concerns regarding the solvency of financial 
institutions , the availability of credit and the decline in investor confidence led 
the US crisis to spread to other segments of the global financial ystem. 
The crisis of 2007-2011 is considered the worst crisis since the Great Depression 
in early 1930s (Crotty, 2009). A notable feature of this crisis is its widespread 
effects on the financial markets of developed countries (Lane and l\!Iilesi-Ferr tti 
2010). Although more virulent effects were anticipated, e1nerging 1narkets are 
the success story of the crisis (Yap et al. , 2009; Arieff, 2010; Collier , 2010; Green 
et al. , 2010). Therefore, it is important to investigate the 1nechanism of the 
transmission of volatility across developed countries, and the policy tools used by 
emerging economies to mitigate the adverse effects of sudden shocks tem1ning 
from international financial 1narkets. 
The main objectives of this thesis are twofold. The first is to quantify and 
investigate the nature of the factors behind the transmission of volatility to and 
among financial markets during the crisis of 2007-2011. A special focus is placed 
on developed country asset markets. The second is to examine whether and how 
successfully e1nerging market central banks are able to shield domestic markets 
from externally sourced financial 1narket volatility. A focus is placed on foreign 
exchange 1narkets. 
This thesis addresses three important economic concepts with regard to fi-
nancial market volatility during the crisis of 2007-2011: the herd behavior of in-
ternational investors, the trans1nission 1nechanism of financial contagion, and the 
effects of foreign exchange intervention. The next Section discusses these pecific 
concepts, ·while the methodological approaches developed to answ r the e que -
tion are summarized in Section 1.3. A brief outline of the th si is provided in 
Section 1.4. 
1.2 Key Objectives 
The key objective of this the i can be con idered in tv10 parts. The fir. part 
consists of Chapter 2 and 3. in which the transmission of th financial cri i aero s 
1.2 Key Objectives 3 
international asset markets is studied. From this perspective, Chapter 2 develops 
an analytical framework to explain how a shock arising in one country transmits to 
another country, even if there is no interdependence or direct links to the changes 
in the economic fundamentals in the crisis affected country. Chapter 3 empirically 
studies the relative strengths of the channels of volatility transmission mechanisms 
during different phases of the recent crisis , using a model of cross-country and 
cross-market financial contagion. The second part , which consists of Chapters 4 
and 5, empirically studies the effectiveness of foreign exchange intervention, which 
is often used as an important policy tool in offsetting currency market volatility 
in emerging economies. This Section discusses these specific objectives of the 
thesis along the three concepts- herd behavior, financial contagion and foreign 
exchange intervention. 
Herd behavior Herd behavior refers to agents ,vho change their behavior 
to follow the preference of the majority (Gale, 1996; Smith and S0rensen, 2000). 
"Rational herding" can occur in situations with information externalities when 
agents' expectations are svvamped by the information derived fron1 observing oth-
ers' actions . In this thesis, particular interest is placed on developing a model that 
co1nbines : i) the roles of shocks to t he haircut or margin requirements on collat-
eralized assets; ii) strategic behavior of international investors; and iii) feedback 
effects between asset prices and t he exchange rate in the investment recipient 
country. These three concepts play important roles in triggering financial crises, 
but have not been con1bined in the existing literature to explain the transmission 
mechanism parsimoniously. Chapter 2 of this thesis fills that gap in the literature. 
The analytical framework is developed under a popular investment strategy 
of currency carry trades as the mode of investment. In the case of a sudden shock 
arising in the rest of the vvorld , investors receive private information that is not 
perfect. This information leads investors to change their behavior. At its core, 
the analytical fra1nework attempts to demonstrate how individually rational deci-
sions of investor become irrational collectively shifting the investment recipient 
country to a bad equilibrium that creates a crisis. 
Financial contagion The financial crisis literature has often claimed that 
crises threaten the stability of the international financial system. One of the 
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channels through which tability can be compromised is financial mark t conta-
gion (Allen and Gale , 2000; Caramazza et al. , 2000· Dungey et al. , 2011). De pite 
little agreement on ·what "contagion" precisely means in finance it is ·widely ac-
cepted t hat the transmission of shocks may be attributed to addit ional chann ls 
or to unant icipated excessive co-movements t hat cannot be observed in tranquil 
periods (Dornbusch et al. , 2001 ; Dungey et al. , 2011 ). These additional channels 
are often ten11ed as "contagion'' (JVIasson , 1999a,b ; Dornbusch et al. 2001 ; Forbe 
and Rigobon, 2002 ; Dungey et al. , 2011 ) . 
Considering contagion as a residual process as in /[asson (1999a b) and Forbes 
and Rigobon (2002), an empirical latent factor model is specified in Chapter 3 
to exan1ine the effects of contagion during the financial crisis. In addit ion to 
investigating the existence of financial contagion , several other important aspects 
related to t he global spread of the crisis are also examined. In t his context this 
Chapter aims to understand the channels of the contagion trans1nis ion mecha-
nisn1. !Iotivated by the total duration and t he widespread nature of the cri i of 
2007-2011 , this t hesis particularly explores how the contagion t ransmission mech-
anis1ns change t hroughout t he crisis. In other words , it investigates t he relative 
in1portance of t he channels t hrough which t he various phases of the crisi are 
transn1itted across n1arkets and across borders. Exploring the changing rol of 
the contagion transmission mechanism in different pha es of a crisis is i1nportant 
in the policy context as it allovvs design of appropriate policy measures. However i 
little has previously been done in t he literature to compare pha es of a particular 
cns1s. 
Foreign exchange intervention As the spread of the recent financial cri-
s1 i different to the cri e in t he context of emerging 1narket . it i naturally 
lending it elf to an inve tigation of the effectivenes of policy in truments leading 
to-\Yards the stability of the external ector of e1nerging market . D pite the cur-
rent debate on the role of n1onetary policy in the face of the recent cri i . pric 
tability ren1ain the primary objectiYe of n1on tary polic). Thi often include 
the ext ernal \-alue of the don1e tic currency. particularly for emerging e onom1e . 
Foreign exchange inter\-ention i one among a \Yide range of in rument availabl 
for central bank to achie\-e their ultin1at purpo e of price abili (Bofing r. 
2001 ). 
1. 3 Methodological Approaches 5 
Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis aim to study the efficacy of foreign exchange 
intervention by the central banks in emerging economies, based on two main goals 
of intervention: reducing economic costs associated with exchange rate volatil-
ity and accumulating international reserves. The case study is for Sri Lanka. 
Additionally, Chapter 4 investigates vvhether the central bank focuses only on a 
"leaning against the wind" policy to reduce volatility, rather than on a particular 
exchange rate target. Chapter 5 focuses on the factor structure of the exchange 
rate volatility to identify its sources, and to examine the econo1nic significance 
of foreign exchange intervention. Both the non-crisis period and the crisis period 
are considered in assessing the ability of the central bank to achieve its aforemen-
tioned objectives. 
1.3 Methodological Approaches 
Both theoretical and financial econometric techniques were applied in addressing 
the issues raised in this thesis. The methodological approaches used are briefly 
discussed in this Section. 
Global game approach The global game approach in game theory is the 
framework adopted in Chapter 2 to develop an analytical framework for the finan-
cial crisis, which is not directly linked to changes in economic fundamentals , but 
unfolds and amplifies as a result of changes in investors ' behavior. The global 
game methodology has been used to analyze bank-runs and currency crashes 
driven by investors ' herd behavior (Morris and Shin, 1998; Goldstein , 2005). Un-
der the assun1ption of uniform distribution of noisy signals, the 1nodel is solved 
for the threshold level of the size of the haircut , at which the investors make their 
decision to roll over or unwind their carry trade positions. The solution is then 
used to determine the equilibrium level of asset prices and the exchange rate in 
the carry trade recipient country, as in Shin (2005), and to shovv how the crisis 
in one country pushes another country to a bad equilibrium. 
Latent factor model The latent factor approach in the tradition of Bekaert 
et al. (2005) , Dungey and l\!Iartin (2007) and Dungey et al. (2011) is applied in 
this thesis: i) to explore the contagion transmission mechanism across financial 
6 Introduction 
markets during the crisis of 2007-2011; and ii) to investigate th effects of foreign 
exchange intervention. The latent factor methodology provides a parsimoniou 
modeling approach that addresses econon1etric issues such as heteroskedasticity, 
endogeneity, and omitted variable bias as highlighted in Forbes and Rigobon 
(2002). Especially, it can be used to model financial linkages when th sizes of 
these linkages are difficult observe directly. In the latent factor approach, returns 
on financial assets are expressed as linear functions of latent factors. Importantly, 
this specification can be used to decompose the volatility of each asset return 
depending on the role each factor plays in contributing to asset market volatility. 
Chapter 3 of the thesis applies the latent factor approach to investigate the 
transmission mechanisms of the crisis of 2007-2011 , linking international asset 
markets. The model is specified in a way that captures the contagion transmission 
mechanism over three phases of the crisis: the US sub-prime crisis of 2007-2008; 
the global financial crisis of 2008-2009; and the European sovereign debt crisis of 
2009-2011. Further , different source asset markets are used in each phase of the 
cns1s. 
The latent factor specification is again applied in Chapter 5 to model ex-
change rate volatility with foreign exchange intervention. Taking Sri Lanka as 
the case study, models are run separately for t he non-crisis period, and for the 
crisis period. In each period , a model for non-intervention days and a n1odel for 
intervention days are jointly estimated. The factor structure provides a conv -
nient n1ethod of identifying sources of currency market volatility by decompo ing 
Sri Lankan rupee/US dollar exchange rate returns. The application of th la-
tent factor approach facilitates an assessment of the econon1ic significanc of the 
effects of intervention. 
Exponential G ARCH methodology Chapter 4 empirically tests the asyn1-
metry in foreign exchange markets with foreign exchange int rvention on the ba-
sis of GARCH n1odels initiated by Engle (19 2) and Engl and Bollerslev (19 6). 
The GARCH specification is applied because of its ability to capture th eff ct 
of intervention on the conditional mean and volatility of exchange rater turn in 
a parsin1onious structure. This model can be sp cifically used to identify wheth r 
the Central Bank of Sri Lanka has been ucce ful in achi ving it obj ctive of 
interv ntion- that is ; to reduc xchange rate volatility and accun1ulat interna-
1.4 Thesis Outline 7 
tional reserves. 
Using Sri Lanka as the representative country, this Chapter investigates the 
efficacy of foreign exchange intervention in non-crisis and crisis periods , while 
exploring whether intervention plays a vital role in shielding against the effects 
of externally sourced shocks. In this Chapter , GARCH(l ,1), TGARCH(l ,l) and 
EGARCH(l ,l) models, which are specified to represent the economic fundamen-
tals and the asymmetries of the foreign exchange market in Sri Lanka are com-
pared. The EGARCH(l ,l) model is found to be the most appropriate model that 
fits the data. The main advantage of the EGARCH specification, proposed by 
Nelson (1991) , is that it does not require restrictions to be imposed to ensure non-
negativity in the variance, even if negative variables or parameters are included 
in the variance equation. 
1.4 Thesis Outline 
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 analytically ex-
plains the transmission of t he initial effects of the crisis through unwinding of 
carry trades , which are driven by sudden changes in investors' behavior. Chap-
ter 3 empirically investigates the spread of financial contagion across the devel-
oped country asset markets during the crisis. Chapter 4_ examines the effectiveness 
of foreign exchange intervention emerging economies, assessing whether the cen-
tral bank has been successful in achieving its short- and medium-term objectives 
of intervention. Chapter 5 extends this analysis by further investigating to iden-
tify the sources of exchange rate volatility with and without foreign exchange 
intervention, and to assess the economic significance of the effects of interven-
tion . Both Chapters 4 and 5 are based on the experience of the Central Bank 
of Sri Lanka. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the thesis by revisiting the research 
questions and su1nmarizing the main findings. This Chapter also discusses some 
policy implications and offers suggestions for possible future research. 

Chapter 2 
Carry Trades and Financial 
Crisis: An Analytical Perspective 
2.1 Introduction 
IVIany countries have experienced inflovvs of foreign exchange driven by the carry 
trade during the last decade. Countries such as Australia, Iceland , New Zealand 
and South Africa are among them. The currency carry trade is a speculative 
financial operation that consists of an investment in a high interest rate currency, 
such as the Australian dollar or the Icelandic krona ( "the investrnent currency" ) , 
' financed by borrowing in a low interest rate currency, such as the Japanese yen or 
the Svviss franc ( "the funding currency") . This strategy is based on the underlying 
motivation of exploiting profit opportunities presented by the persistently low 
cost of funds in one market segment combined with high returns in another , and 
possibly also by exchange rate variations. 
The greater vulnerability to financial crises in the context of a sudden un-
winding of carry positions is a vexing issue for the carry trade economies. One 
explanation given for this observation is investors ' herd behavior. Herd behavior 
is the tendency for individual carry traders to mi1nic the actions of a larger group .1 
Herd behavior highlights the possibility that changes in international investors ' 
behavior act as a channel of transn1itting the market turmoil across financial mar-
kets and across national borders. As explained by Calvo and lVIendoza (2000), 
in the presence of information asymmetries , the cost of gathering information 
1See Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000) and Cipriani and Guarino (2005) for an overview of 
the theoretical and empirical research on herd behavior in financial markets. 
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specific to the investment recipient country could lead to h rd behavior, v n if 
investors ; make rational decisions. Dividing investors into two groups namely in-
formed and uninfonned, t hey suggest that uninformed investors find it 1 s costly 
to follow the actions of informed investors . Therefore, if informed inv stor move 
to withdraw investment from t he recipient country; unfonned investors also t nd 
to follow them, resulting in capital flight. 
Carry traders ' actions towards taking precautionary hoarding measures under 
imperfect infonnation in distress situations play a major role in trans1nitting a 
shock to the investment recipient country. Carry traders , such as banks or other 
financial institutions , require capital to structure a carry trade in another country 
and usually borrow money from each other at a low interest rate, often using 
high yielding securities as collateral. The value of this collateral may exceed the 
amount of cash deposited in exchange for the collateralized asset . The difference 
between t he market value of the security and the collateralized asset is called the 
"haircut". When t here is a financial distortion , currency traders receive private 
signals about the i1npact of such a shock on funding constraints: t his take th 
form of an increase in the size of the haircut ( Gorton and Nietrick 2009). 
The 1nain goal of t his Chapter is to provide a t heoretical explanation for cur-
rency bubbles and crashes, using t he role of carry traders as a conduit. Special 
interest is placed on understanding the transmission of shocks across develop d 
country financial markets during the init ial stages of t he crisis of 2007-2011. In 
this Chapter, carry traders are assumed to be uninformed noise trad rs , whose 
deci ions are irrational in the sense that their behavior doe not nece sarily de-
pend on uch an opti1nization behavior. oise trading can lead to herd b havior , 
a relatively uninforn1ed investors tend to imitate the behavior of other inve tors. 
In the presence of a financial crisis, investor imitating each oth r can burst a 
speculative bubble. 
The model developed in this Chapter integrate several trand of the financ 
and game theory literature. In particularl , thi Chapter con ribute to th x-
i ting literature by i) extending the theoretical fran1e,vork of feedback ffe t 
b t\Yeen a et price and exchange rate a pre ented in hin (200. ) : ii) inte-
grating the concept of trat gic beha ior aero curr nc - carr trader . or the 
global game approach in ~Iorri and hin (199 ) and Gold tein (2005): and iii) 
the haircut applied to collateral di cus ed b Gorton and I rick (2009) and Gai 
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et al. (2011). The proposed model parsimoniously explains how a liquidity shock 
in one country induces a severe crisis in another country. 
This model explores the view that pecuniary externalities amongst carry 
traders generate a unique equilibrium path with endogenous causes for finan-
cial crises. After introducing small exogenous noise , this model shows that a 
liquidity shock in the form of a shock to the size of the aggregate haircut leads 
both the asset prices and the exchange rate in the carry trade economy to de-
crease sharply. Liquidity shocks influence the behavior of carry traders in two 
ways. First is the direct effect. A shock to the aggregate haircut increases pre-
mature liquidation by some carry trades, inducing a sale of assets, thus driving 
down both asset prices and the exchange rate in the carry trade recipient country. 
Second is the strategic effect. As the withdrawal of funds by some carry traders 
raises the cost for the other carry traders in the market , an increase in the haircut 
leads them to foreclose their positions, following the herd. This foreclosure leads 
the investors in the carry trade recipient country to sell even more of their illiquid 
assets. As a consequence, asset prices and the exchange rate may decrease more 
than proportionately to the withdrawal of funds , triggering a financial crisis. 
A comparative static analysis shows that a negative shock to the interest 
rate differential also has the potential to trigger a liquidity crisis in the domestic 
market and amplify a financial crisis in the carry tra~e recipient country. The 
policy in1plications suggests that the interaction between the size of the haircut , 
information and investors' behavior has the potential to destabilize carry trades, 
creating a financial crisis. Therefore , in addition to setting up adequate supervi-
sory and regulatory mechanisms, it is important to control the extent of currency 
and maturity mismatches of financial institutions in order to prevent the adverse 
effects of sudden capital flights. 
The rest of this Chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 gives the 1no-
tivation to the study by drawing out the circumstances surrounding the recent 
carry trade collapse in Iceland. Section 2.3 relates this Chapter to the existing 
literature. Section 2.4 develops the model. Section 2.5 establishes the equilibrium 
asset price and the exchange rate in the carry trade country, using the equilibrium 
outcome of the global game among carry traders. Section 2.6 analyzes how an 
exogenous liquidity shock and a shock to the interest rate differential affect the 
equilibrium in the carry trade recipient country. Section 2. 7 concludes. 
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2.2 Motivation 
This study is motivat ed by t he stylized evidence on t he unwinding of t he carry 
t rade of t he Icelandic krona in 2008. This event attracted 111uch attent ion giv n 
its alleged role in t riggering the financial crisis in Iceland. 
Iceland has a history of high inflation , and the Icelandic Cent ral Bank , which 
adopted inflation t argeting in 2001 , kept official interest rates at a high level to 
curb an investment and consumption boom ( Aksentic et al. , 2008) . The effects of 
raising interest rates by the Central Bank of Iceland in response to high inflation 
led to a vicious circle of an appreciating exchange rat e and fur t her capital inflows 
(Plantin and Shin , 2010). The behavior of the interest rat e different ial and t he 
norninal exchange rat e of the krona against a selection of major currencies are 
depict ed in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 . 
The unwinding of carry trades dramatically increased in Iceland , following 
t he US sub-prime crisis. As carry traders called back their posit ions in Iceland , 
Icelandic banks not only had t o sell their asset s at fire sale prices , but also had 
t o repay their foreign loans even when the foreign currencies were surging in 
price. Repatriation of foreign currencies made the krona weaker , and in addit ion , 
t he interest rate differential between the krona and ot her currencies decreased as 
t he Icelandic Cent ral Bank cut its official interest rate in order to stimulat t he 
economy. Finally, t he currency bubble in Iceland burst as t he Icelandic banking 
systen1 collapsed and a large fr action of t he business sector b cam insolvent , 
resulting in a severe financial crisis. 
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Figure 2 .2: Selected Quarterly Exchange Rates of the Krona, 2001 to 2010. Notes: 
Exchange rates are depicted against euro, GBP, USD and yen (source: Datastream). 
2.3 Literature Review 
This Chapter unifies three strands presented in the literature: i) liquidity and 
dynamics of arbitrage by capital or margin-constrained speculators; ii) static 
coordination games with private information (global games); and iii) the balance 
sheet approach to financial crisis. 
The literature on liquidity and dynamics of arbitrage by margin-constrained 
carry traders shows that how shocks can be amplified, and result in a financial cri-
sis when liquidity evaporates. Traders provide market liquidity, and their ability 
to do so depends on the 1nargin constraint ( or the haircut) applied to collateral. 
This concept is clearly docu1nented in Gorton and J\!Ietrick (2009) and Gai et al. 
(2011). Increases in the size of the haircut are reflected in the withdrawals from 
the securitized banks. The haircut on securities used as collateral reflects the 
market risk of the collateral. As Shin (2005) explains , if assets are marked-to-
market , there is a potential for endogenously generated financial distress that 
leads to a collapse of asset prices, as well as the exchange rate. 
Brunnenneier and Pedersen (2009) explore the extent to which the capital 
and 1nargin requirements of carry trades depend on the liquidity of assets , and 
the i1nportant role played by liquidity constraints in amplifying financial shocks. 
Similarly, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) argue that small shocks can result in large 
effects because of the role of collateral. A shock that lowers asset prices lowers 
the value of collateral, leading to a decline in net worth and less ability to borrow. 
Consequently, asset prices further decline leading to further decline in the value 
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of collateral in a dovvnward spiral. The existing literature also indicates pisodes 
of fire sale pricing, and even destabilizing price dynamics as a re ult of a n ga-
t ive shock t hat t ightens speculators' margin constraints (Kyle and Xiong, 2001 · 
Xiong, 2001). However , whether the amount an investor can borrow against 
securities can be used as given is still debatable. For exan1ple, I{ iyotaki and 
l\!Ioore ( 1997) and Geanakoplos ( 2010) present two different views regarding this 
particular issue. 
The literature on the theoretical aspects of the global games with incornplete 
information is drawn on the type space of a player is whole determined by their 
own actions , the actions of others and noisy signals about the underlying state. 
With strategic complementarities, global ga1nes often have a unique equilibrium, 
as small noise in players' perception of the game's payoffs makes the game domi-
nance solvable (l\!Iorris and Shin, 2001). l\!Iorris and Shin ( 1998) use the n1ethod of 
global games based on the theory developed by Carlsson and Van Damme (1993), 
to show that non-common knowledge holds a unique equilibriu1n , depending on 
the value of fundamentals. Applying the global game approach in t he context of 
bank runs , Goldstein and P auzner (2005) solve for t hreshold values of switching 
strategies for both bank depositors and for foreign creditors . Plantin and Shin 
(2010), recently explore a unique equilibrium that exhibits t he classic pattern 
of the investment currency appreciating for extended periods , followed by sharp 
depreciations. 
Angeletos and Werning (2006) and Hellwig et al. (2006) have argued that if 
private information is aggregated in a large 1narket , the global ga1ne approach 
may fail and the 1nodel may be characterized by multiple equilibria. How v r, 
Plantin and Shin (2010) justify the application of the global game approach in 
the context of foreign exchange markets for two reasons. First the a su1nption of 
sequential trades better describes a 'decentralized over-the-counter 1narket" such 
as the foreign exchange market . Second, as the equilibrium uniqu ness do . not 
rely on the pr sence of insider with accurate private information, the distinction 
bet-ween private and public inforn1ation is imn1aterial thus appropriate in th 
case of foreign exchange 1narkets (Plantin and Shin , 2010 , p.7). 
The third tr and of literature on which this Chapter draw on how th balanc 
heet po ition of the recipient country is affected as inve tor · pull back h ir po-
ition . leading to a financial cri is. According to thi approach inv tor obs rve 
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performances of t heir investments, and if t here is a uncertainty on t he liability 
side of t he balance sheet of t he recipient count ry, t hey may decide to foreclose 
t he investments . The recipient country t hen has to repay its loans in t he foreign 
currency. This induces a fire sale of illiquid assets and depreciates t he exchange 
rate . This idea of balance sheet approach goes back t o t hird generation models 
of currency crises (Chang and Velasco, 2001 ; Edwards and Frankel, 2002). Shin 
(2005) shows how t his feedback effect of market prices, t he so-called "liquidity 
black holes", leads t o foreclose investments, creating twin crises; a currency crisis 
and a banking crisis. forris and Shin (2004) have also developed a formal model 
to capt ure this pheno1nenon. 
2.4 The Model 
The first st ep of the n1odel e1nploys the global game fr amework to ident ify t he 
t hreshold level of t he aggregat e haircut size, where t he actions of carry t raders are 
strategic complement. This threshold level of the aggregate haircut at which t he 
carry traders make their decision t o roll over t heir investment is t hen incorporated 
in t he feedback model of 1narket prices t o identify t he equilibriun1 asset prices and 
t he exchange rate in t he investment recipient count ry in Section 2.5. In setting 
up t he model, t he US dollars is used to represent t he funding currency, and t he 
Icelandic krona to represent t he invest1nent currency. That is, t he n1odel assumes 
currency carry t raders borro-w in US dollars at a low interest rate and invest in 
Iceland in order to exploit t he interest rate different ial. 
In t he n1odel t he economy consists of tvvo types of players: i) currency carry 
traders in\ esting in Iceland ·who usually take t he fonn of financial inten11ediaries . 
There are n1ult iple ent it ies of t his type in t he economy; and ii) a single Icelandic 
con11nercial bank. The carry traders are ident ified as a continuu1n of risk-neutral 
investors vvit h unit mass . Each carry t rader holds some amount of wealth ( an 
endowment) to t ransforn1 or invest to produce a stream of returns ( Gai and 
Trivedi 2009) . In t his n1odel it is assun1ed t hat each carry trader borrows US 
dollars from another carr t rader at a zero nominal interest rate ( r = 0) , and 
invests in Icelandic krona assets at a non1inal rate of r* > O. 
The model is a t hree period static n1odel where periods are given b} t = 0 
1 and 2. The order of events in t he economy leading to a liquidity crisis is 
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Currency traders 
borrow money 
from domestic 
short-term 
creditors using 
high yielding 
securities as 
collateral 
Currency 
traders hold 
units of 
Icelandic 
krona (invest 
in carry trade) 
Private 
signals about 
the haircut 
are observed 
by currency 
traders 
Shock is realized 
(i.e. sub-prime 
crisis) 
t=O ____ _____. ... 
Liquidity 
dries up 
Fall in asset 
prices and 
depreciation of 
the exchange 
rate trigger 
Cun-ency traders 
foreclose carry 
positions in 
Iceland and get a 
certain payoff 
unwinding Liquidity 
carry positions cns1s 111 
Unwinding 
carry trades 
leads to a fire 
Iceland 
sale of assets in 
Iceland 
t=l ~-----1---------- t=2 
Figure 2. 3 : The Order of Events in an Economy Leading to a Liquidity Crisis. 
depicted in Figure 2.3. Carry traders structure their carry trades in period t = 0. 
That is , they hold some amount of Icelandic krona assets. Once the sub-prirne 
shock is realized , carry traders receive private signals about the haircut. At th 
end of period t = l, each trader decides whether or not to roll over their funds 
in Icelandic krona assets until the end of period t = 2, based on the liquidity 
condition of its respective balance sheets. If the carry traders decide to foreclos 
at the end of period t = l , they only receive some portion of the expected amount 
which is less than the amount they would receive if they roll over wh n all th 
other carry traders continue to do so. However , they receive nothing if they 
rnistakenly decide to roll over when all the others pull back their invest1nent. 
The return on an investinent in Icelandic krona ( ¢1 ( e)) financed by borrowing 
in US dollars is denoted by: 
(2. 1) 
·where, R = (r* - r) = r* i the interest rate differential between Iceland and the 
US. The return on investment is adjusted by the exchange rate defin d as unit 
of krona per US dollar. Thus a high value of e corresponds to aw ak krona. Th 
depreciation of th investment currency is 6. e = ei -eo . The key assumption her is 
ea 
that the net return to inve tment increases with the appreciation of krona/ dollar 
exchange rate. 
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 pre ent th co1nposition of th balanc he t of a r p-
2.4 The Model 17 
resentative carry trader and the Icelandic commercial bank, respectively. The 
total liabilit ies of t he carry trader i ( L[) are comprised of retail deposits ( Lf) , 
short-tenn borrovving (Lr), and capital (L7) . The total assets of the carry trader 
i (A[) are comprised of n1ortgage backed assets ( assets which can be used as 
collateral) (Af) Icelandic krona assets (A7r), and fully liquid assets such as cash 
and government bonds (AD . These fully liquid assets can be used as collateral to 
obtain financing for invest1nent without t he risk of a haircut. 
Table 2.1: Representative Balance Sheet of Carry Trader i, in US Dollars. 
Assets 
1 ortgage backed securities 
Krona assets 
Liquid assets 
Liabilit ies 
Af Retail deposits 
A7r Short-term borrovving 
A~ Capital/Net vvealth 
Table 2.2: Si1nplified Balance Sheet of an Icelandic Commercial Bank, in Krona. 
Assets 
Don1estic assets (1 x p) Afce 
Liabilit ies 
Do1nestic liabilit ies Lfce 
Foreign liabilit ies Lfce 
The total liabilit ies of the Icelandic comn1ercial bank (Lfce) are comprised of 
domestic liabilities ( Lfce) and foreign currency liabiliti:s ( Lfce) which is equal to 
e ~ A7r. The total assets of the Icelandic commercial bank ( Afce) are con1 prised 
of 1 unit of domestic assets (Afce) and O units of foreign assets , v.rhere p is the 
a set price. 
Carry trader are assumed to be uninformed noise traders who have no infor-
1nation other than the price reflec s information of informed investors. Further i 
it is as urned that carry traders always try to maxi1nize their investn1ent in carr 
trades knovving that there is a risk of early foreclosure. Traders need capital to 
tructure carr} trades in Iceland. 'v\ hen carry traders bu - securities ; they can 
u e the e ecurities as collateral to borrow against. Howe"\ er: the} cannot borrow 
the entire n1arket value of the security. Thus , carry traders finance the difference 
between the market value of the ecur1 and the collateralized asset (the haircut) 
b} other ource of funding. 
The n1odel a un1e that the amount in ested b the carr trader i in the 
Icelandic comn1ercial bank b} a of the carr trade i A7r. Thi in e tment i 
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financed by short-tenn borrowing from other domestic carry traders using n1ort-
gage backed securities ( Ayi) as collateral, along with their ovvn capital. It is 
assumed that the aggregate haircut associated with Ayi to obtain finance for a 
carry investment is denoted by h. I o haircut risk is applicable when liquid assets 
Ai are used as collateral for financing purposes. At the san1e time , the mod 1 
allows for the possibility of an individual lender-specific haircut , hi . Therefore , 
the 1naximum amount of short-term borrowing that can be obtained by the carry 
trader using Ayi as the collateral asset is: 
(1 - h - h·)A~ 
'l 'l ' 
(2.2) 
·where hi, h E (0, 1). The remainder , (h + hi) Ayi, should be financed by the carry 
trader ·with its own capital. Fro1n the balance sheets of the two key players , it is 
clear that L A7r = ( Lfce) / e. The model assumes that the carry trader can use 
the Icelandic krona assets they hold , A7r, as collateral to raise funds. These assets 
are also subject to the same aggregate and idiosyncratic haircuts. Therefore , the 
maximum amount of funding that the carry trader can obtain using krona assets 
as collateral is (1 - h - hi)A7r . 
Haircuts in the economy are determined by the participants in th market 
and are subject to change ( Gorton and JVIetrick , 2009). The extent of funding 
available to a carry trader is determined by the variations in the value of the 
haircut , and varies as the value of the haircuts fluctuates. The variations in the 
haircut depends on t he amount of funding availabl to a lending institution, as 
the haircut determines the maximum permissible leverage ratio of the borrower 
(Adrian and Shin, 2011). For example, if the haircut is 2 percent ; the carry trad r 
can borrow only 98 dollars for 100 dollars worth of securities , that is, the carry 
trader has to invest 2 dollar worth of equities. The maximum 1 v rage ratio in 
this case is 50. However , if the haircut increases to 4 percent in the cas of an 
adverse shock hitting the economy reducing the value of asset , the carry trader 
1nust either sell assets or raise n1ore equity to finance the gap. Th permitt d 
leverage ratio now halves to 25. A consequence of thi is that the carry trad r 
must either raise new equity by doubling the equity or reduce 1 verage by elling 
half of the as ets or do a combination of both ( Adrian and Shin 2011). 
Haircuts are as ociated with funding constraints. The mor carry traders 
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borrow in US dollars from the other carry t raders in the market, t he more relaxed 
t he funding constraint , as the margin ( or the haircut) drops. If a carry trader 
invests in Iceland , the cost of borrowing for the other carry traders decreases. This 
encourages the other carry traders to invest in Iceland , causing the price of assets 
to increase and the value of the krona to appreciate . Therefore, the funding cost of 
maintaining the carry trade position depends on changes in the value of collateral 
in t he funding currency (Gai and Trivedi , 2009). The sensitivity of the value of 
collateral to the flow of funds suggests that traders' decisions are strategically 
interrelated. The greater the flow of funds into high-yielding Icelandic krona 
assets, the greater the flow of profit that carry traders can earn , as carry traders 
create positive externalities for each other when they invest their endowment in 
such assets. 
Let the aggregate haircut h for the carry trader i be a function of the fraction of 
carry traders who foreclose their investment in Iceland Z at the end of period t = l: 
-h=h+ , z, (2.3) 
-
where , > 0, h > 0 and O < Z < 1. The parameter 1 measures the sensitivity 
of unwinding carry trades to the aggregate haircut , and therefore the sensitivity 
to the funding constraint in the domestic market. If , = 0, the fr action of carry 
. 
traders who foreclose their investment in Iceland is insensitive to the funding 
constraint , and h = h is the fundamental or the base value of the haircut. How-
ever, if , > 0, there are negative network ext ernalities , where the carry trader 's 
decision to roll over its investment in Iceland is dependent on t he actions of the 
other carry traders, thereby decreasing the price of assets . If all the carry traders 
decide to roll over t heir funds in Iceland until the end of t he period t = 2 ( l = 0) , 
the aggregate haircut is equal to its fundamental value i. e, h = h. However , if 
, is large enough , even a small fraction of carry traders fleeing from Iceland can 
have a significant impact on the haircut , and thus the funding constraint. 
The carry t rader 's decision on foreclosing carry trades in Iceland basically 
depends on the liquidity condition of the balance sheet. On the whole , the carry 
trader "Will remain liquid in each period provided that t he amount of collateral 
available to raise funds is sufficient to cover the short-term borrowing the carry 
trader has to repay. The carry trader has to finance the haircut from its own 
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capital given any idiosyncratic liquidity shock JV!i. Therefore , the carry trad r is 
liquid if: 
A~ + ( 1 - h - h ·) A 7:L + ( 1 - h - h ·) A ~r > L ~r + M · 
'l 'l 'l 'l 'l - 'l i · (2.4) 
As Lr = Af, simplifying the above equation gives: 
Az - (h + h·)A":L + (1 - h - h-)A~r - l'vf. > 0 
'l 'l 'l 'l 'l 1, _ • (2 .5) 
Exogenous liquidity shocks , or shocks to aggregate or idiosyncratic haircuts, have 
the potential to trigger a liquidity crisis for the carry trader i, if that carry 
trader is unable to raise enough funds to 1naintain the liquidity condition in 
Equation (2.5). More importantly, a sufficiently large shock to the aggregate 
haircut has the potential to trigger widespread liquidity stress , not only among 
carry traders, but also in Iceland. 
If the carry trader does not meet the liquidity condition in Equation (2 .5), an 
action needs to be taken to avoid defaulting on required payments Lfce . There 
are few options: the carry trader can increase the interest rate on new liabilities 
in order to obtain sufficient new funding ; liquidate fixed assets in a fire ale; 
hoard liquidity by withdrawing loans 1nade to the other carry traders; or hoard 
liquidity by unwinding carry trades in Iceland. The first two options are the least 
attractive as they may reduce the carry trader 's future profitability and weaken 
its capital position. Thus the carry trader may prefer to withdraw t he loans mad 
to the other carry traders , or to unwind carry trades in Iceland. 
To keep the model simple, it is assumed that carry the trader i call back its 
carry positions in Iceland. As a result of this unwinding, the carry trader will 
lose a portion of the carry investment. In other words, the carry trader will only 
get a fraction of the exp ected amount , which i less than what would be receiv d 
at t he end of period t = 2 if the proj ect succeeded . The an1ount that th carry 
trader receives due to the foreclosure decision can be stated as a function of the 
exchange rate change and the interest rate differential: 
(2.6) 
·where O < () < 1 is t he foreclo ure fr action ; e0 is th exchange rat pr vailing a 
the time th carry trader i inve ted in the Icelandic co1nmercial bank and e1 is 
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the exchange rate at the t ime the carry trader receives the return on investment in 
Iceland. Here e represents the proportionate a111ount that each carry trader gets 
fro111 unwinding its position in Iceland. The ith carry trader 's liquidity condition 
with premature liquidation can be ·written as : 
The simplified balance sheet of the Icelandic commercial bank given in Table 2.2 
shovvs that (Afce - L fcJeo = L fce = A}r. Simplifying Equation (2.7) , and linking 
with the net vvorth of t he Icelandic commercial bank using the fact that (Afce -
LfcJe0 = A}r the liquidity condit ion of the carry trader i can be stated as: 
L ( ) m ( [ e 1 - ea * e 1 J ) (AP d ) Ai - h + hi Ai + l - h - hi + e ea + r ea ice - Lice ea - JV!i > 0. 
(2 .8) 
From Equation (2 .8) it is clear that the foreclosure fraction e is also a key de-
terminant of the strength of the amplification of shocks in the model. The lower 
the value of e the larger t he shocks that can hit the liquidity condition of the 
carr rader. In principle t he proportionate amount that each carry trader gets 
from unv inding i s position in Iceland depends on the net worth of the Icelandic 
commercial bank, and how much liquidit} a carr trader needs to raise to meet 
the liquidit condition. If e = l the carr trader v\ ill ·recei\ e the entire amount 
in ested and the profit earned on that in ·estment withou any loss. Hovvever j 
a the other extreme, e = 0 correspon9-s to an entire loss of the carr} trade and 
he carr trader v ill receive nothing from inves ing in the Icelandic commercial 
bank. If one large carry trader flees from Iceland , this raises the costs for all the 
other arr - traders , and thus ma lead the other carry traders to foreclo e their 
1n estn1ents in he carr} trade country. 
Carr rader mo e into carr trading if and onl if they belie ·e li < l0 . 
c ording to Equation (2.1) , carr rader n1ove into carr rading whene\ er the 
expec ed profi i po itive. Carr} rader in ·e in Iceland ·when the intere t rate 
differential is grea er han zero (r* - r > 0). Therefore , the net profit is positive 
v\ hen ( e1 - e0 ) < 0. In o her , ord , the net fio-\Y of the carr trade increa e 
if he krona apprecia e . A rong exchange ra e implie a higher dollar \ alue 
of calla eral and a lo"\\rer co t of borrowing, and occur "·hen l1 < l0 . Thus . 
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carry traders move into the carry trade market in Iceland if th y believ that t h 
fraction of carry traders who would flee in the next period will be small r than 
in the current period , or that the fraction of carry traders ·who hold krona in th 
next period ·will be greater than in the current period. 
2.5 Equilibrium 
This Section establishes the equilibrium asset pnce and the exchange rate in 
Iceland , using the equilibrium outcome of the global game among carry traders. 
2 .5.1 Equilibrium of the aggregate haircut 
N oisy signal Suppose that the carry trader receives a noisy signal xi about 
liquidity, that is about the aggregate or idiosyncratic haircut , in the face of tight-
ening credit supply in a period of financial n1arket distress. Then: 
(2 .9) 
where the noise terms or the idiosyncratic component of the ith carry trader 's sig-
nal hi is independent and identically distributed ( i . i .d. ), and has uniforrn den ity 
over the interval [-c:,c:J . Note that hi and h j (i-/= j) are independent, and hi is 
independent of h. The co111111on term of the signal h has a uniform ex ante distri-
bution. Signals {xi} are also uniformly distributed over the interval [h-c:,h+c:J, 
that is, Xi rv 1l[h - E, h + E]. 
The objective of the carry trader i i to maximize the expect d profit. Th 
strategy that the carry trader follows to reach this target is a decision rule that 
maps each realization of the noise signal Xi to an action i.e. , the roll over decision. 
The equilibriun1 of this sub-game is a profile of strategies (Morris and Shin 2006). 
Therefore, th trategy followed by the carry trader i based on the information 
available maximizes the expected profit, as all the other carry trad rs in the gam 
follovv a similar strategy in their ovvn profile. Following forris and hin (199 ) 
the model solves for an quilibrium in terms of threshold trat gie '', which ar 
strategie where a carry trader has a critical realization x* . If the r alization of 
.'Y i is above x * . then the carry trader i will foreclo e investment , and if xi i below 
.i; * : then the carry trader i will roll over. This implie that there i a thr hold 
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level h*, below which carry traders will continue to invest . 
Critical level of the signal ( x* ) and the threshold level of the size 
of the haircut (h* ) The next step involves solving for the critical signal x*, 
and t he threshold level h* simultaneously. The mass of carry traders who flee are 
those with signals to the right of x* : 
Therefore , at the critical state: 
l = h + E - x* 
2c: 
(2 .10) 
(2. 11) 
Now there is one equation with two unknowns , h* and x*. If the carry trader 
rolls over the funds in Iceland, the net gain is: 
- ea, (2.12) 
and if the carry trader forecloses, the net gain is only a fr act1on of 1r1 ( e), denoted 
by ()1r 1 ( e) . If the carry trader rolls over when others flee, the carry trader loses 
everything. Conditional on x, h is uniformly distributed over the interval [x -
E, x + c:] . Therefore, the expected payoff from rolling over , condit ional on getting 
a signal x is: 
h* -(x - c:) x+c: -h* 
1r1(e) · + 0· , 2E 2c (2. 13) 
and the payoff from foreclosing is non-random and given by ()1r1 ( e) . 
At t he switching point x* , carry traders are indifferent to rolling over and 
foreclosing. Therefore, at x* : 
(2 .14) 
or 
h* - x* = c:(2() - 1). (2.15) 
Solving Equations (2.11) and (2 .15) gives: 
h* = h + re. (2. 16) 
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That is there is a threshold level of t he aggregate haircut. Above this thr shold 
carry traders do not meet t he liquidity condition stated in Equation (2 . ) and 
thus unwind carry trades in Iceland , and below the t hreshold t he opposite holds. 
Equation (2 .16) shows that the threshold level of the aggregate haircut is dir ctly 
proportional to the amount that the carry t rader receives at foreclosure at t he end 
of the period t = l. In other words , the threshold level of t he aggregate haircut 
is an increasing function of the marginal cost of the premature liquidation. It is 
important to note that h* does not depend on the size of the noise term, c. The 
switching point x* in terms of the threshold level of the margin requirement or 
the aggregate haircut is: 
x* = h* - c: (2() - 1). (2 .17) 
This implies that: 
h* = x* + c: (2() - 1). (2. 18) 
The net effect of the equilibrium of the global game depends on t he inter-
play between fundamental uncertainty, which is the uncertainty concerning the 
state of nature h , and strategic uncertainty, which is the uncertainty concerning 
the actions of other investors. In the limiting case where t he carry traders are 
perfectly inforrned about the collateral constraint which t hey face ( c -+ 0) , the 
switching point x* is exactly equal to the critical level h* . Thus, t here is no 
fundamental uncertainty. However , the strategic uncertainty is unchanged even 
when the private signals beco1ne common knowledge . 
Solving Equations (2 .16) and (2. 17): 
x* = h + () ( r - 2c) + c . (2 .19) 
With sufficiently small c, the switching point x* is an increasing function of t h 
cost of pre1nature liquidation. It is also necessary to verify t hat t he switching 
strategy around x* is the optimal strategy for one carry trader wh n used by all 
the other carry traders . If xi > x*, fewer carry traders will hold Ic landic krona 
a s t , indicating an increas in l. Thu the optimal strat gy i to foreclo e. 
Conversely, if xi < x*, the optimal trategy is to move into the carry rad . 
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2.5.2 Equilibrium asset prices and the exchange rate 
The solut ion for t he threshold level of t he haircut at which the carry traders 
take their decision to roll over or unwind t heir carry trade positions in Iceland 
can now be used in analyzing how asset prices and t he exchange rate in Iceland 
respond to t he liquidity shock in the US using t he methodology of Shin (2005). 
In the presence of a financial market t urmoil j informed investors re-balance their 
portfolio to mini1nize possible losses. Carry traders get information from informed 
investors and adjust their expectations depending on t he t hreshold level of t he 
haircut h*. If one large carry t rader withdraws from Icelandj t he increased 
cost of holding carry posit ions leads some other carry traders to withdraw t heir 
positions as ·well. As carry tradersj decisions exhibit strategic complementarityj 
or as t he reaction an1ong carry traders is reinforced , t hey begin to follow t he 
herd. The model in t his section attempts to show t hat due to the strategically 
complementary nature of t his behavior , carry tradersj attempt to take t he 1nost 
safe action in the period of financial stress causes t he exchange rate of t he krona 
to depreciate against t he US dollar j and t he price of illiquid assets in Iceland to 
fall j leading to a currency crisis . 
Decision on foreclosing the carry investment Consider t he carry trader is 
-
decision. A carry trader now knovvs t he fundamental _value of the haircut h and 
the idiosyncratic con1ponent of t he haircut hi . Also consider the threshold level 
of the aggregate haircut in Equation (2.16) obtained by solving the global game. 
Thi implies that there is a threshold level of the aggrega e haircut h* above 
-
vvhich the carry trader forecloses its investment in Iceland . If h* is close to h + "'/( 
the carr traderjs liquidit) constraint tightensj and thus it ends to pull back the 
carr positions in Iceland. If all carry traders flee fro1n Iceland j t he aggregate 
haircut reaches the upper level h + . At the other extremej if no one flees j the 
- -
aggrega e haircut reaches the lower limit h. Therefore, if h* < hi the carry trader 
v\ ill cer ainl roll over funds in Iceland. However t he carry trader flees from 
-
Iceland if h* > h + Therefore the carr) trader re1nains liquid if h * < h + . 
- -
\1 hen h < h* < h + the carr t rader is uncertain about his inves ment strat-
e0 - and he foreclo ure deci ion will be taken depending on t he thre hold value 
of the haircu . The relationship between t he foreclo ure fr action and he haircut 
is shown in Figure 2.4. The up -ard sloping portion of t he foreclosure curve l i 
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l (foreclosure fraction) 
1 
o------_------ h (haircut) 
h h+y 
Figure 2.4: The Proportion of Carry Traders Who Foreclose Their P ositions. 
assumed t o be linear and is given by: 
l = f + ch , (2 .20) 
·where f and c are positive const ants. 
Total sale of illiquid asset s If all carry t raders cont inue to invest in Ice-
land , t he total sales of the illiquid asset s S by t he Icelandic commercial bank is 0. 
However , carry t raders tend t o foreclose t heir posit ions depending on t he t hr sh-
old value of t he haircut when h* > h. The Icelandic co1nrnercial bank has li1nit d 
discretion ·when carry t raders refuse to roll over t heir posit ions in Iceland. Given 
t he foreclosure decision of some of t he carry t raders , t he Icelandic con1mercial 
bank has to raise enough funds to repay t he carry traders. The bank has to sell 
it s illiquid assets to 1neet its funding needs if its net worth is less than some fixed 
t hreshold A. From the balance sheet , total assets of the Icelandic co1nmercial 
bank are Afce , and total liabilit ies are Lfce + L fce. Noting that Lfce = L A7r , t he 
le landic commercial bank sells its illiquid asset s if Afce / e < L A7r + Lfc / + A. 
Denoting L A7r = A kr , the decision rule of the Icelandic co1n1n rcial bank can 
be writt n a : 
(2.21 ) 
Assuming t hat t he fixed threshold A is uniformly di t ribut d ov r an interval 
[At. Au] and total holding of illiquid a s t by the Icelandic comm r ial bank i 
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a, the total sales S can be expressed as : 
0 if Af ce / e > A kr + L fee / e + Au 
S = (f + ch)e/ Afce if (f + ch)e/ Afce < a and Afce / e < Akr + Lfce/ e + Az 
a otherwise. 
(2 .22) 
The amount of assets that should be sold to raise enough funds is determined by 
the dollar value of illiquid assets held by the Icelandic commercial bank over its 
foreign currency liabilities to t he carry traders. The total krona value of sale of 
illiquid assets is Afces' and the total dollar value of the sales is Afces I e. 
Equilibrium asset price Illiquid assets are sold in the domestic market 
in Iceland. The demand for Icelandic krona asset is assumed to be linear and 
negatively sloped (slope=-b), and given by: 
Afce = Afce - bS. (2 .23) 
The equilibrium price of the assets is determined within t he domestic market in 
Iceland. The equilibrium price of t he illiquid assets is Afce in krona, if there is 
no foreclosure by t he carry traders. If carry t raders foreclose t heir positions , the 
equilibrium price will be lower t han t he equilibrium price , Afce · The relationship 
between the exchange rate e, and t he asset price Afce is t hen derived by combining 
the total sale equation (2.22) and t he demand function (2.23): 
Afce if Afce/ e > Akr + Lfce/ e + Au 
A~ce - Afce - b((f + ch) e/ Afce ) if (f + ch) e/ Afce < a and Afce/e < Akr + Lfce/e + Az 
Afce - ba otherwise . 
(2.24) 
This equation links the exchange rate with t he asset price and the relationship is 
depicted in Figure 2.5. 
According to the Equation 2. 24 the price of the illiquid assets is a function of 
the exchange rate and the haircut. When h* < h, there is no foreclosure by carry 
traders thus no need for selling the illiquid assets by the Icelandic commercial 
bank. In other words , t he Icelandic commercial bank remains liquid. Therefore , in 
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~------'-------------- e ( exchange rate) 
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(Akr + (Lfcef e) + Au (Akr + (Lfcef e) + Al 
Figure 2.5: Variation of Asset Prices with respect to the Exchange Rate . 
the region Afcel e > Akr + Lfce/ e + Au, the sale of illiquid assets S = 0. Therefore, 
the price of the illiquid assets is equal to Afce. However , when carry traders call 
back their positions as h increases, the Icelandic commercial bank has to sell its 
illiquid assets ( S > 0). Consequently, the price of the illiquid assets in Iceland 
decreases. This , in turn, affects the liquidity level of the carry trader. Putting 
it another ·way, a decline in the price of the illiquid assets in Iceland rnakes 
it difficult for the carry trader t o 1naintain the liquidity require1nents given in 
Equation (2.8), or to tighten the liquidity constraints or , to increase t he haircut. 
This is due to the decrease in the expected return of the carry trader . If it is 
difficult for t he carry trader to meet t heir liquidity require1nents , it will foreclo e 
more investments, forcing the Icelandic co1n1nercial bank to further sell its illiquid 
assets . 
Shin (2005) explained that the increased sale of illiquid assets under such a 
situation i more than proportionate to t he foreclosure by the creditor banks , as 
t he do1nestic bank has to sell a greater a1nount of do1n stic assets to rai e t he 
sa1ne an1ount of dollars when the exchange rat depreciat s. In t his Chapt r , 
increasing the haircut in t he US triggers prematur liquidation by carry trader , 
thereby inducing a fire sale and r ducing t he price of as ets in Iceland . Thu , 
the price of illiquid a set declines fast r than expected as t he exchang rat 
depreciat s and as t he aggregate haircut incr a e . Thi decline in price continu 
until the ntir illiquid as et ha been sold on the market , tha i until S = a. 
t thi point . Afce = Afce - ba. This cenario i illu trat d in Figur 2.5 and t he 
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locally concave portion of t he Afce ( e) curve corresponds to the sharp decline in 
asset prices when t he haircut increases. 
Equilibrium exchange rate The relationship between the exchange rate 
and the asset price can also be derived from t he equilibrium condition in the 
foreign exchange market. Given t he foreclosure decision by the carry trader i, 
the krona/ dollar exchange rate e is assumed to be an increasing function of short-
term sale of krona. The linear short-term demand curve is expressed as: 
e =e+TS, (2.25) 
where T > 0. If t here is no sale of the illiquid assets by t he Icelandic commercial 
bank, t he exchange rate is equal to e, a constant . In other words , if none of the 
carry traders foreclose their investments in Iceland, e = e. The elasticity of the 
krona/ dollar exchange rate , or the degree of short -run illiquidity in the foreign 
exchange market in Iceland is measured by parameter T. A larger T indicates 
that even a small amount of sale of the illiquid assets leads the exchange rate to 
depreciate. A consequence of t he exchange rate depreciatio~ for the carry trader 
is a decline in the payoff from premature liquidation. 
Given the foreclosure decision in Equation (2 .20) , a relationship between the 
exchange rate and the asset price can be derived as: 
e 
e = e + i[f + ch]e/Afce if (f + ch)e/ Afce < a and Afce/e < Akr + Lfce/e + Az 
otherwise. 
(2.26) 
Solving the above exchange rate equation, and differentiating with respect to Afce 
gives: 
ae 
8Afce 
-Te(f + ch) 
[(Afce - T(j + ch)]2 < O. (2 .27) 
Equation (2.27) shows that the reduction of price of the illiquid assets as the 
Icelandic commercial bank sells assets leads the exchange rate to depreciate. 
Equilibrium during a period of financial market stress Following Shin 
(2005), the equilibrium in the illiquid asset market (2.24) and the equilibrium in 
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the foreign exchange market (2 .26) can be plotted together in the (Afce ) spac 
by taking t he inverse of t he Afce ( e) denoted by Afce -l ( e) . This relationship i 
depicted in Figure 2.6. The equilibrium asset price and the equilibrium exchang 
rate is determined at E , the point where the Afce-1(e) and e(AfcJ curv s inters ct. 
e ( exchange rate) 
e + 'TI-------, 
e E 
---------------Afce ( asset price) 
At: - ha At: ice ice 
Figure 2.6: Determination of the Equilibrium Asset Prices and the Exchange Rate. 
As previously discussed, the margin requirement or the haircut plays an im-
portant role in triggering financial shocks. When there is a shock to the haircut , 
the n1argin requirement increases, making it difficult for t he carry trader to rnain-
tain a healthy level of liquidity. Thus , the carry trader pulls back its investm nt 
in Iceland. This raises the cost for t he other carry traders , and triggers th 
withdrawal of carry investn1ents . As the sale of the illiquid as ets i more than 
proportionate to the foreclosure , t he decline in the price of the illiquid as ets , and 
the depreciation of the exchange rate is sharper compared to the model dev loped 
by Shin ( 2005) . 
When the liquidity shock or the shock to the aggregate haircut is large enough, 
th carry trader cannot me t the liquidity requirements. Thus , premature liqui-
dation following the liquidity shock pushes the conomy to a situation of di tr 
If a large fraction of carry traders pull back their invest1nent due to the increas 
in the haircut ( S > 0) the asset price deer a e . A low as et price induce further 
elling of the illiquid a set , putting pressure on th exchang rate and ightening 
th liquidity con traint . Thi further decreas s the a et pric . Th equilibriu1n 
in the period of financial market s re impli s lovv valu for both the exchang 
rate and the do1ne tic curren . Thi ituation i depicted in Figur 2. 7 and th 
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e ( exchange rate) 
e 
\1 
i 
l....- - -
(Afce)-1 (e) 
E 
..__ __ =-;,p-:-;-. ---,-_---:t:::::-----?i""lfce ( asset price) 
Aice - ba Aice 
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Figure 2. 7: Equilibrium Asset Prices and the Exchange Rate During a Period of 
Financial Market Stress. 
new equilibrium point is E'. In summary, the increase in the size of the haircut in 
the face of an exogenous shock leads carry traders to foreclose carry investments, 
causing the price of the illiquid assets in Iceland to collapse, and the exchange 
rate to depreciate sharply. 
2.6 Comparative Statics 
A set of comparative static results can be used to analyze how a shock affects 
the equilibrium in the asset and the foreign exchange 1narkets. 1\!Iore specifically, 
this Section examines the comparative statics effects of i) a liquidity shock or a 
shock to the .aggregate haircut, and ii) a shock to the interest rate differential. 
2.6.1 Shock to the aggregate haircut 
This Section examines how the foreclosure of carry trades, sale of illiquid assets, 
equilibrium asset price, and equilibrium exchange rate are affected by a sudden 
change in the aggregate haircut level. Now consider the foreclosure equation 
given in Equation (2.20). The fraction of carry traders who forecloses at the end 
of period t = l is a function of the aggregate haircut h. Differentiating Equation 
(2.20) with respect to h gives: 
az 
8h = C. (2.28) 
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As c is a positive constant , t here is a posit ive linear relationship bet \ve n t he 
aggregate haircut and t he fr action of carry t raders who flee from Iceland in t h 
face of t ightened liquidity constraints . 
The total sale Equation (2.22) clearly shows t hat an exogenous liquidity shock 
or a shock to t he aggregate haircut induces a sale of illiquid assets in Iceland as : 
(2.29) 
Next , t he change equilibria in t he asset n1arket and t he foreign exchange market 
in Iceland in response to an exogenous increase in the aggregate haircut applied 
to collateral is discussed. In t his regard , co1nparative statics of asset price A fce, 
and t he exchange rate e with respect to t he size of t he haircut h are analyzed. 
Con1parative statics for t he downward sloping port ion of t he den1and funct ion 
shown in Figure 2.5 is given by: 
-bceAfce 8Afce 
8h (Afce )2 + bce(Afce - h) · 
Si1n ilarly, different iating Equation (2.26) wit h respect to h gives: 
ae 
8h 
Equat ions (2.30) and (2 .31) show t hat: 
-AP TCe ice 
a Afce AP h d ae 0 
ah < 0 as ice > ' an ah > . 
(2.30) 
(2.31) 
Accordingly, an exogenous shock to t he aggregat e haircut applied to collat ral 
has t he potential to decrease asset prices , and to depreciate the krona and t he 
US dollar rate. As t he aggregat e haircut increases, t he fr action of carry t rader 
·who foreclose t heir carry posit ion increases . This induce t he sale of illiquid 
as ets in Iceland . pu hing do-wn t he asset price and depr ciating t he exchang 
rate . A a consequence of t his exchange rat depreciation , t he profi t t hat a arr 
t rader can earn declines. Thus. on1e carr t rader ma no m et t h ir liquidit 
requiren1ent . The ·will unwind t heir po ition , inducing a al of a et and 
dri\·ing do,Yn the as et price and t he , alue of t he dom t ic curr ncy v n fur h r. 
Equation (2. 30) and (2.31) together with Figur 2. 7 uggest t hat t h 1narginal 
increa e in the aggr gate haircut ma} lead to t he a pric and t h dom 
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currency to decline more than proportionately. This decline reflects two sepa-
rate effects. The first effect is the direct effect. An increase in the aggregate 
haircut makes it difficult for some individual carry traders to maintain its liq-
uidity requirement, thus causing them to call back their investment in Iceland. 
This premature liquidation leads the Icelandic commercial bank to sell its illiquid 
assets and pay back the required amount in dollars , resulting a decrease in the 
equilibrium asset price and an exchange rate depreciation. 
The second effect is the strategic effect. It arises from the herd behavior of 
carry traders. The increase in the haircut applied to collateral leads the carry 
trader to foreclose its carry positions in Iceland. Withdrawal by one carry trader 
raises the cost for other carry traders in the market , forcing some the other carry 
traders to flee from Iceland. Due to the strategic complementary nature of carry 
traders' behavior , they tend to follow the herd. As more carry traders flee from 
Iceland, the Icelandic commercial bank has to sell more of its illiquid assets. That 
is , there is an asset fire sale. As the aggregate haircut and sale of assets increase, 
the asset price in Iceland decreases more than proportionately. At the same 
time, the exchange rate depreciates as the Icelandic commercial bank converts 
krona into US dollars. Therefore , an exogenous liquidity shock, or a shock to the 
aggregate haircut amplifies the widespread liquidity constraints not only among 
carry traders, but also in the carry trade recipient country. 
2.6.2 Shock to the interest rate differential 
The carry trade is a popular trading technique in the foreign exchange market that 
seeks to capitalize on the interest rate differential between currencies. However, 
if the interest rates of the currencies involved in the carry trade are variable, it 
creates a risk to the currency carry trader, as any increase in the interest rate of 
the funding currency or a decrease in the target currency, reduces the expected 
return on holding carry positions. Therefore, how the change in interest rate 
differential R affects the equilibrium asset price , and the exchange rate in Iceland 
needs to be analyzed. 
Consider the carry trader 's return given in Equation (2.12) , where r 0. 
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Differentiating Equation (2.12) with respect to the interest rate diff r ntial R: 
(2.32) 
Thus the carry trader 's return increases as the interest rate differential increas s 
and as long as the exchange rate does not depreciate. With the increase in the 
interest rate differential , the carry trader's balance sheet strengthens, n1aking it 
easier to meet the liquidity condition. Therefore, the carry trader will roll over the 
investment in Iceland. It reduces the cost for the other carry traders for holding 
the carry positions. Consequently, a lesser number of carry traders will flee from 
Iceland. If the premature liquidation is reduced, the sale of the illiquid assets by 
the Icelandic comn1ercial bank decreases, resulting an increase in the price of the 
illiquid assets in Iceland, while reducing the pressure on krona/ dollar exchange 
rate. This scenario promotes more carry traders to invest in Iceland. On the 
other hand, a decrease in the interest rate differential causes sudden unwinds of 
carry trades , creating a financial crisis in the carry trade country. 
2. 7 Conclusion 
In this Chapter, a theoretical explanation was given for the transmis ion of a 
financial crisis across national borders through the change in international in-
vestors' behavior. The motivation of the Chapter was drawn from the spread of 
the financial crisis across developed countries, which began in 2007, and the rol 
of carry traders ·which ·was a conduit of the spread of the crisis. A model vva 
developed in vvhich positive externalities an1ong carry trader gen rated a uniqu 
equilibrium vvith endogenous triggers of currency bubbles and era hes. Th ana-
lytical framework explained how a shock to the aggregate haircut on collateraliz d 
a set caus d liquidity in countries vvith low interest rat s to dry up uddenl 
carrying the potential for a financial crisi in countrie with high intere t rate . 
This Chapter extended the feedback effects betvv n the a s t pric and h 
exchange rat s in the carry trade r cipient country developed b hin (2005) in 
hYo ,Yays. First. it introduced the haircut on collateralized as t . a d rib d 
by Gorton and J\Ietrick (2009) . into the n1odel to explain ho,v funding con train 
played a n1ajor role in un,Yinding carr) trade po ition . econd . th mod 1 em-
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ployed the global game method, or the herding behavior of carry traders as in 
1\!Iorris and Shin (1998) and Goldstein (2005) to describe the rationale behind the 
carry trader's behavior , and also to propose a causal mechanism for the sudden 
unwinding of carry trades that marked the recent crisis. With these extensions, 
the model was solved in order to obtain equilibrium in both the asset market and 
the foreign exchange market in the carry trade recipient country. 
The model showed that there is a threshold level of the aggregate haircut , 
above which carry traders never roll over their investment in carry trade coun-
tries. Further , it explored how liquidity shocks or shocks to the size of the ag-
gregate haircut on collateralized assets dried up liquidity among carry traders , 
forcing them to unwind carry investments and amplifying financial crises in carry 
trade recipient countries by driving down asset prices and depreciating exchange 
rates. That is , due to the herd behavior of carry traders' and the feedback ef-
fects between asset prices and the exchange rate during the financial crisis, the 
financial markets become destabilized. The model also showed that a negative 
shock to the interest rate differential between two currencies had the potential to 
trigger financial crises in countries with high interest rates. 
The possible policy implications highlight the need for financial sector reforms 
based on the global nature of the crisis. The interactions between the size of the 
haircut , information available to investors and investors ' herd behavior have the 
potential to destabilize carry trades , creating a vicious cycle which drives down 
market prices sharply. The results that emerged from this Chapter highlight the 
necessity of setting up adequate supervisory and regulatory mechanisms , and en1-
phasize the need for controlling the extent of currency and maturity mismatches 
of financial institutions in order to prevent the adverse effects of sudden capital 
flights , that is a characteristic of the unwinding of carry trades. 

Chapter 3 
Financial Contagion and Asset 
Market Volatility During the 
Crisis of 2007-2011 
3.1 Introduction 
Although various explanations may be offered, it is widely accepted that the 
widespread transmission of financial crises is due to unanticipated excessive co-
movements or additional channels that arise only during crisis periods (Dornbusch 
et al., 2001; Dungey et al., 2011). These additional channels are termed "con-
tagion" in financial economics (Masson, 1999a,b; Dornbusch et al., 2001; Forbes 
and Rigo bon, 2002). Understanding the contagion transmission mechanism of a 
financial crisis, as well as the vulnerabilities and systemic risk in the global fi-
nancial system, is in1portant when contemplating financial 1narket , institutional , 
and macroeconomic reforms to foster a recovery and to prevent such crises in the 
future. 
The volatility that was evident in financial markets during the recent financial 
crisis, and even 1nore recently during the European sovereign debt crisis, has 
renewed interest in studying the existence and the strength of contagion across 
financial markets. A prominent feature of the crisis of 2007-2011 was the quick 
spread of the effects of the financial market turmoil on and among asset markets in 
developed countries. Therefore , the objective of this Chapter is to investigate the 
mechanisn1s involved in financial contagion across the equity and bond markets 
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of five developed countries : Australia, Europe, J apan, t he UK and the S during 
the crisis of 2007-2011. 
A growing body of literature has attempted to investigate the existence of 
contagion , and to quantify t he strength of financial contagion across market . 
So1ne early cont ribut ions are Sharpe (1964), King and vVadhwani (1990) Engle 
et al. ( 1990) and Bekaert and Hodrick ( 1992). Since t hen , a large body of e1n piri-
cal studies has evolved in t his line of study. Dornbusch et al. (2001 ) P ericoli and 
Sbracia (2003), Gallo and Ot ranto (2008) and Dungey et al. (2011 ) review t he 
literature. The early studies mainly concent rated on t he international transmis-
sion of shocks for a single asset class (e.g., Eichengreen et al. 1996; Dungey and 
fart in , 2004; Forbes and Rigobon , 2002 · Van Royen 2002 ; Favero and Giavazzi, 
2002 ; Dungey et al. , 2005) . However , cross-market contagion has attracted more 
attent ion recent ly (e.g ., Hartmann et al. , 2004; Ito and Hashimoto, 2005· Dungey 
et al. , 2006; Dungey and Niart in , 2007; Dungey et al. , 2011 ). Notably, Ehrmann 
et al. (2011 ) simultaneously modeled four asset classes- stocks, bonds, money 
markets and exchange rates- in a single fr amework. 
Several 1nethodologies have been used to test for contagion. These may vary 
from simple statistical methods, such as changes in correlation coefficients and 
adjusted correlation tests (Forbes and Rigobon , 2002), and outlier tests (Favero 
and Giavazzi, 2002) to more comprehensive approaches, such as ARCH/GARCH 
models: Vector Autoregression models (VAR) and latent factor models (Billio 
and Caporin, 2010; Dungey et al. , 2011 ) . Forbes and Rigobon (2002) noted that 
en1pirical models should account for heteroskedasticity, endogeneity, and omitted 
variable problems of contagion. These features are often di regarded in the earlier 
literature. In an attempt to build an appropriate methodological framework 
overco1ning the e issues. many studies try to identify the relative str ngths of th 
variance of country-specific shocks. and global or common hocks weigh ed by 
factor loadings (Billio and Caporin. 2010). 
The e1npirical analysis presented in this Chapter i develop d u ing a latent 
factor approach. The latent factor model i one of two commonl u ed approache 
in identifying common hock (Billio and Caporin: 2010). The oth r approach i 
the AR 1nodel. ,-:hich elect a et of ob ervable variable to xplain common 
hock ( e.g .. For be and Rigobon. 2002: Favero and Giavazzi. 2002: P aran and 
Pick. 2007: de Bandt et al .. 2010). In the latent factor approach . ho k ar 
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explicitly modeled as a set of latent factors , and the model can be specified to 
allow for potential linkages arising from contagion. Dungey et al. (2011) presents 
a collection of papers t hat examine the role of contagion using the latent factor 
approach . Closest to the current Chapter is Chapter 5 of Dungey et al. (2011) . 
Studying contagion transmission mechanisms in different phases of a crisis is 
important, at least for the crises that are characterized by extended durations 
of financial stress, such as the crisis of 2007-2011. However, little has been done 
in the literature to compare phases of a particular crisis. This Chapter , not 
only identifies the existence of contagion , but also explores how the channels of 
financial market contagion change throughout the crisis, by splitting t he total 
crisis period- from July 2007 to December 2011- into three distinct phases . 
In this Chapter, each equity and bond return is specified as a linear combi-
nation of common , market, country, idiosyncratic and contagion factors. Two 
additional channels , which appear only during the crisis are identified as the po-
tential channels of financial contagion linking international asset markets. These 
two channels are the market · and idiosyncratic channels. The market channels 
transmit the effects of a shock originating in a specific class of asset market 
globally to individual assets market in all countries. The idiosyncratic channels 
represent direct contagion links from the source asset market to the other asset 
markets, nationally and internationally. An important feature of the proposed 
empirical n1odel is that source crisis markets change during different phases of 
the crisis, to accurately capture contagion effects at each point in t ime. 
The findings of this Chapter provide several insights. First , asset markets in 
developed countries are highly suscept ible to contagion during all t hree phases of 
the crisis. Second, most bond markets are vulnerable to t he effects of contagion 
trans1nission from equity markets globally, while equity 1narkets are found to 
be less affected by the transmission of contagion from the global bond market . 
Third, all of the idiosyncratic contagion channels are at play in transmitting the 
effects of t he crisis of 2007-2011 , albeit to different degrees. Finally, and most 
importantly, no single channel dominates t he contagion transmission mechanisms 
over the t hree phases of t he crisis. This suggests t hat the channels of contagion 
trans1nission vary across asset markets , depending on the phase and the source 
of the crisis. Overall , t his Chapter establishes that the transmission mechanism 
of financial contagion dyna1nically evolves even within a crisis . 
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T his Chapter is organized as fo llovvs. The order of events during t he thr e 
phases of t he crisis of 2007-2011 is briefly discussed in Section 3.2. Th en1pirical 
characteristics of t he data are analyzed in Section 3.3. A latent factor model of 
contagion is specified in Section 3.4, and t he estimation method is presented in 
Section 3.5. Section 3.6 discusses t he empirical results , and Section 3.7 concludes. 
3.2 Chronology of the Crisis of 2007-2011 
The sample period used in this Chapter extends from July 01 , 2004 to December 
30 , 2011. In t he empirical analysis, t he period is first divided into a non-crisis 
period and a crisis period. The crisis period is again divided into t hree phases to 
exan1ine t he possible channels of contagion during: i) t he US sub-prime crisis, ii) 
t he global financial crisis , and iii) the European sovereign debt crisis. 
The non-crisis period is chosen from July 01 , 2004 to July 16, 2007. This 
period was a relatively benign period in t he vvorld economy, characterized by low 
volatility, low inflation and strong economic grovvth. The phases of t he crisis 
period are: 
Phase I: The US sub-prime crisis from July 17, 2007 to September 12, 200 
P hase II : The global financial crisis fro1n September 15, 2008 to June 30 , 2009 · 
P hase III: The sovereign debt crisis in Europe fro1n J uly O 1, 2009 to Dec mber 
30 , 201 1. 
The crisis that sten1med from t he US sub-prime mortgage and credit 1nark t i 
referred to as P hase I. This phase begins from the dat e when Bear Stearn in 
t he S officially announced their failure. Th sub-prim crisi deepen d during 
t h period from inid-2007 t o September 2008 and its effect pr ad in t he form 
of a severe economic dovvnt urn . The sub-prime cri is began as a con equen e 
of t he con1plexity of financial innovation in t he S financial mark t, and t he 
failure of financial regulators and credit rating agenci . The cri i ~ a vid n 
by t he harp cont raction in liquidit experienced b financial in t it u ion in t h 
S. \Yhen rolling o er inves ors· po it ion . A t he con ern over h olv n of 
financial in titution increa d. t he crisi pread aero o h r d v loped ount ri . 
uch a t he K. during t h fir t ear of it d v lopment . The na ionaliza ion of 
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Northern Rock bank in t he UK is an example of the spread of t he crisis into other 
developed countries (Bordo, 2008; Hodson and Quaglia, 2009). 
The second phase of the crisis is dated from September 15, 2008 , in line with 
the collapse of Lehn1an Brothers in the US. The crisis, which affected developed 
econo1nies , started to spread globally through all parts of t he financial sector fol-
lowing t his collapse . The sudden failure of investors ' confidence, large liquidation 
of investments and t he collapse of stock 1narkets quickly brought t he financial 
market stress to unprecedented levels. The end date of phase II is in line with 
the National Bureau of Economic Research (NEER) announcement that the US 
recession ended in June 2009. 
Once t he crisis reached Europe, count ries in the European region started to 
experience substant ial economic downturns. Emerging as a result of the exposure 
to unstable fiscal policies, including measures taken to control the depth and 
the breadth of the initial phases of the crisis and issues specific to countries in 
this region, fears of a sovereign debt crisis in Europe developed among investors 
around t he world. The intensity of the European debt crisis increased after 
early 2010, ·when countries such as Greece, Italy and Spain faced severe problems 
in refinancing t heir debts. Even to date, uncertainties are- spreading over the 
European region. Therefore phase III of t he crisis in t his Chapter- the period 
fro1n July 01, 2009 to December 30, 2011- represents t he European debt crisis. 
3.3 Equity and Bond Data 
Contagion across financial n1arkets during t he crisis of 2007-2011 is empirically 
exa1nined by using daily excess returns on equit ies and bonds for Australia (AU) , 
Europe (EU) , Japan (JP) , the UK (UK) and the US (US). Excess returns on 
equity are calculated fro1n equity indices , and are expressed in US dollar tenns. 
Data corresponding to German financial n1arkets are used to represent Europe. 
This covers the non-crisis period and the three phases of the crisis , as explained 
in Section 3.2. All of the data are obtained from Thomson Financial Datastrea1n. 
A detail description of the data used in this Chapter is given in Appendix A .. 1. 
The five countries selected in this Chapter belong to three time zones: Asia-
P acific \iVestern Europe and the US. Kleimeier et al. (2008) suggested that tin1e 
zone align1nent is required ·when actual trading hours differ across 1narkets. One-
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day lagged excess returns on the US assets are used in this Chapter to account 
for this time zone problem. 1 Daily excess returns on equities xf t are calculated 
) 
as : 
xf t = [ln(rft ) - ln(rft_ 1 )] - ln(rbst-i), and 
' ' ' ' 
(3. 1) 
daily excess returns on bonds x~ t are con1puted as: 
) 
b ( b b ) b xit = -n rit -ri t-1 -rust- 1, 
' ' ' ' 
(3 .2) 
where i = AU, EU, JP, UK, US, and rs and rb are equity indices and bond yields, 
respectively. [ln(rf t) - ln(rf t-i)J is the first difference of the natural logarithn1s 
) ) 
of the equity indices and (rf t - rf t-i) is the first difference of the bond yield 
) ) 
with maturity of 10 years ( n = 10). Bond returns are calculated as the negative 
first difference of bond yields tin1es the maturity. 2 Excess returns are calculated 
by subtracting the returns on the 10-year benchmark US Treasury bond yield 
(rbs t) from each series. The percentage excess returns are used in the empirical 
) 
analysis, and are presented in Figure 3.1. The shaded regions correspond to the 
three phases of the crisis. 
Figure 3.1 shows that the volatility of the excess returns of the assets increases 
during the total crisis period compared to the non-crisis period. This i also 
evident fron1 the descriptive statistics of the excess asset returns in the non-crisis 
and crisis periods as shown in Table 3.1. The standard deviations show that 
the volatility of the excess equity returns increased by at least 71 percent , while 
the volatility in the excess bond returns increased by at least 57 percent during 
t he total crisis period, compared to the non-crisis period. Additionally, all th 
average excess asset returns are positive during the non-crisis period , wherea , 
except for the UK bond returns , they are negative during th total crisis period. 
A comparison of the summary statistics in the three pha es of th cri i show 
a substantial reduction in the average excess return of all the equity markets 
during phase I and II. The standard deviations of th exce s equit ie in all other 
countries are found to be higher than that of the US during t h e two pha es 
of the crisi . This hows t hat equi y markets in other countrie have been mor 
1 One-day lagged excess returns on the US assets are used in this Chapter as no ignificant 
change could be ob erved in the results , even if differen lag were u ed as uggest d b Ba 
et al. (2003) . 
2S e Ca1npbell et al. (1997) for 1nore inforn1ation about calculation of re urn on bonds. 
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Figure 3.1: P ercentage Daily Equity and Bond Excess R eturns ; Expressed in US dol-
lars , July 2004 to Decen1ber 2011. Iote: The shaded regions correspond; respectively; 
to the US sub-prime 1nortgage and credit crisis (July 17, 2007-Septeinber 12 j 2008); 
the global financial crisis (September 15 ; 2008 to June 30 j 2009) and the sovereign debt 
crisis in Europe (July 01 2009 to Decen1ber 30 , 2011) . 
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Table 3.1: Descript ive Statistics of Excess Equity and Bond Returns (perc nt). 
Excess Equity Returns Excess Bond Return 
1\/Iean TVIax lVIin Std. Mean Max Min Std. 
dev. d V . 
Non-crisis period: July 01 , 2004-July 16, 2007 Observations: 792 
AU 0.107 3.381 -4.484 1.042 0.001 1.703 -1.654 0. 579 
EU 0.109 3.732 -4.555 1.099 0.002 1.386 -1. 893 0. 406 
JP 0.045 3.529 -5.247 1.151 0.004 1.402 -1.465 0.462 
UK 0.076 3.009 -3.699 0.859 0.001 1.415 -1.222 0.373 
us 0.042 2.924 -3.469 0.775 0.006 1.889 -1. 882 0. 567 
Crisis period: July 17, 2004-December 30 , 2011 Observations: 1164 
AU -0.052 10.938 -15.888 2.509 -0.007 4.660 -4.802 0.942 
EU -0.060 12.531 -11.783 2.453 -0.003 3.614 -5.062 0.640 
JP -0.054 14.689 -14.603 1.964 -0.019 3.551 -4.702 0.755 
UK -0.067 12.457 -11. 850 2.269 0.003 3.269 -5.202 0.680 
us -0.038 12.269 -8.907 1.735 -0.014 . 5.383 -5.502 1.033 
Crisis phase I: July 17, 2004-September 12, 2008 Observations: 304 
AU -0.151 6.696 -8.236 2.234 -0.027 2.370 -2.755 0.871 
EU -0.122 8.602 -8.559 1.789 -0.030 3.614 -3. 791 0.630 
JP -0.135 5.769 -8.333 1.738 -0.030 2.046 -2.218 0.693 
UK -0.160 7.586 -6.195 1.898 -0.014 1.906 -2.944 0.620 
us -0.108 4.631 -3.556 1.407 -0.055 2.564 -2.319 0. 897 
Crisis phase II: September 15 , 2008-June 30 , 2009 Observations: 207 
AU -0.119 10.938 -15.888 4.000 -0.002 4.660 -4.802 1.333 
EU -0.137 12.531 -11.783 3.742 0.031 2.448 -5.062 0.914 
JP -0.054 14.869 -14.603 3.253 -0.002 3.551 -4.702 1.057 
UK -0.166 12.457 -11. 850 3.630 0.033 3.269 -5.202 1.015 
us -0.152 12.269 -8.907 2.984 -0.017 5.383 -5.502 1.444 
Crisis phase III: July 01 , 2009-December 30 , 2011 Observations : 653 
AU 0.01 5 7.659 -8.339 1.961 0.001 2.550 -2.542 0. 17 
EU -0.006 7.918 -9 .193 2.194 -0.002 1.780 -1.740 0.529 
JP -0.016 7.667 -10.253 1.460 -0.002 2.083 -2.240 0.663 
UK 0.008 6.398 -7.166 1.826 0.001 1.890 -2.160 0.566 
us 0.031 4.613 -7.256 1.275 0.006 3.083 -3. 61 0.932 
volatil than the US equity market. Excess equity returns of Australia, th UK 
and th US resume to being positive in phase III of the crisis. The standard 
deviations of all excess equity returns during phase III are low r than that of 
phase II , but are still higher than t he 11011-crisi period . 
Although all average exce s bond returns are negative during the crisi phas I 
Europ and the K report po itive average excess bond returns in phas II. In 
phase III : except for Europe and J apan all the oth r exces bond r turns ar 
po i ive on av rag . Again , standard deviation of exce bond return in all 
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three phases of the crisis are considerably larger compared to the non-crisis period. 
However , as was the case in equity markets , the standard deviations in phase II 
are higher than those of phase I and III. Similarities that can be identified in 
the movements in equity and bond markets during different episodes in the crisis 
highlight the co-movements in financial variables. 
All the excess equity and bond returns used 1n the empirical analysis are 
demeaned and adjusted for any dynamics. The strategy followed is to use the 
residuals obtained from a simple 10-variate VAR(l) as the filtered data. The use 
of demeaned residuals obtained from a VAR analysis is a standard in models of 
contagion as a control for market fundamentals and cross-market interdependence 
(Favero and Giavazzi, 2002; Forbes and Rigobon, 2002; Dungey et al. , 2011). 
3.4 Factor Model Specification 
This Section develops an empirical latent factor model of contagion which is built 
on the framework of Bekaert et al. (2005); Dungey and 1\/Iartin (2007) and Dungey 
et al. (2011) to identify the relative strengths of additional transmission channels 
that link international asset markets during crises. This framework is related to 
the theoretical model of Kodres and Pritsker (2002). In Section 3.4.1 , a latent 
factor model of excess returns of equities and bonds for the non-crisis period is 
specified. The non-crisis model assumes that the volatility of excess asset re-
turns can be captured through a "common" factor, which affects all equity and 
bond markets sin1ultaneously; a set of "market" factors , which affect equity and 
bond markets separately; "country" factors , which are common to both markets 
within the same country; and "idiosyncratic" factors , which are specific to each 
asset market in a particular country. The non-crisis specification is augmented in 
Section 3.4.2 to specify the model of contagion during the three phases of the cri-
sis, assuming that contagion transmits from additional market and idiosyncratic 
channels that appear only during the crisis period. All the factors are assumed 
to be independent stochastic processes with zero mean and unit variance. 
3.4.1 Non-crisis model specification 
This Section specifies a latent factor n1odel of excess asset returns for the non-
crisis period. Denoting the exc ss return on asset j in country i at t in1e t during 
the non-crisis period as xi t, the model of excess asset returns can be presented 
' 
as a linear combination of four factors given by: 
x{,t = a{At + f3{ Bf + ({Ci,t + v{Uft, i = AU, EU, JP, UK and US, j = s , b, 
(3.3) 
where s and b refers equit ies and bonds , respectively. Under this specification, 
the variable At represents the common factor that affects all excess asset returns 
in all countries , but with different parameter loadings for each market in each 
country. The term Bf captures shocks common to asset j , and Ci,t is the country 
factor that represents the effects common to country i. The set of idiosyncratic 
factors specific to each individual asset in a particular country is given by Uf t . 
) 
The loadings of these common, market, country and idiosyncratic factors are 
. . . . 
. . 1 b J (3) ;-J d J given , respective y, y ai, i , '-::i i an vi . For example, excess returns on the 
Australian equities can be specified as: 
and excess returns on t he US bonds can be expressed as: 
b b A (3b B b ;-b C s Ub Xus,t = aus t + us t + \ US US,t + Vus US,t · 
3.4.2 Crisis model specification 
In t his Section, t he non-crisis model is extended to specify the factor model of 
contagion during t he three phases of t he crisis. nlike t he xisting m pirical 
studies. distinct sets of countries are used as sources in diff rent phase of t he 
crisis. Among the countries used in t his Chapter , t he S t he K and Europ 
are most likely to be t he sources of shocks. Therefore, contagion i as urned to b 
transmitted through the US and the K idiosyncratic equity and bond n1arket 
channels during the first two phases of t h crisi , and t hrough th S and t he 
European idio yncratic equity and bond market channel during pha III. 
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The effects from the US; t he UK and Europe are not specified simultaneously 
in a single model in order t o avoid practical issues in estimating t he model, given 
t he large number of parameters required t o be estimated in t he complete system. 
The specification of t he rnodel also allows for t he market and idiosyncratic pa-
rameters to exhibit structural breaks between t he non-crisis and crisis periods . 
The inclusion of structural breaks captures general increases in volatility in asset 
markets globally and individuall . The crisis n1odel is specified assuming t hat 
contagion does not t ransmit t hrough common and count ry factors. 
Model specification for phases I and II of the cr1s1s The US and 
he UK are con idered t he source count ries when specifying t he factor model of 
contagion for t he first t wo phases of the crisis . In t he model; x i, t are the excess 
returns on asset j in count ry i at t ime t during t he crisis period : r;, represents 
contagion effects and a t i lde over t he relevant parameter represents structural 
break . 
Consider t he coun n es t hat are chosen as source count ries during the first 
t v\ o phases of t he crisis; t hat is ; t he UK and t he US. Excess returns on equity 
marke of t he e o coun ries during phase I and II of t he- crisis are specified , 
re pee 1 el j as : 
s _ s A _1_ ( (3 s _L 8- s ) B S , .,. s E b , r s c . _1_ ( s 1 -s ) us 
xuK.t - a u K t I UK 1 , UK t I r;,u K ,b t I s u K UK .t I VuK I V u K u K ,t 
(3.4) 
- s A + ( /3s I e-s )B S I .,.s E b I ,s C _L ( s _L - s ) U s 
.t - a u t u s I u s t I r;,u .b t I s u s u s ,t I Vu s I Vu s us,t 
(3.5) 
Exce re urn of t he K and t he -s bond markets are expressed: re pectively: 
a: 
b b , ( B b _1_ 8-b ) E b 1 .,. b B S I r b c , ( b 1 -b ) u b X K .t =Q K t T . -K I I -K t 1 K,UK . t 1 SUK UK ,t T UK 1 VU K UK. t 
t '-""b u s I .,. b u s 1 .,. b u b d T iv K , -K -K ,t I K, -K ,U s ·s.t I K,U K. U b - .t · an ; 
_l_ ( b 
,t I 'U -
(3.6) 
-b ) U b + Vu s s.t 
(3.7) 
Exce re urn on equi ie and bond of the other countrie - u ralia : J apan 
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and Europe- are specified as: 
+ s ub + ,,.s ub "'1i ,U Kb U K ,t "'1i ,U S b U S ,t, and , (3 . ) 
for i = AU, E U and JP. (3.9) 
The market factor Bf is modeled assuming t hat increased volatility during t he 
crisis is due t o contagion, as well as structural breaks. The effects of t ructural 
breaks in the asset market s are captured by j3f . The parameter "'1f 6 measures 
' 
t he contagion effects of bond market shocks on each count ry's equity 1narkets , 
while t he cont ribution of the contagion effect s from the equity market factor to 
t he bond market s is measured by "'1f s · The effect s of t he idiosyncratic contagion 
' 
channels from the UK and US stock markets t o t he other markets are represented 
. . 
by "'1i u K s and "'1i uss, respectively. Similarly, t he cont ribut ions of t he bond market 
' ' 
. . . 
idiosyncratic factors are given by "'1ru Kb and "'1i ,usb' respectively. Finally, vi K and 
vis are t he structural breaks t hat represent unexpected changes in t he UK and 
US asset markets, respectively, during phases I and II of t he crisis. 
For simplicity, t he set of equations given in Equations (3.4)- (3 .9) can be sum-
marized as : 
(3. 10) 
where A and 1' contain new factor loadings of t he market and idiosyncratic factor 
aft er introducing structural breaks ·and contagion channels. 
Model specification for phases III of the cr1s1s The next st ep is to 
specify a factor model of contagion for the third phase of th crisis. The sa1n 
procedure as in phases I and II is applied , however , with two main change . Fir t , 
t his model assu1nes that the US and Europe are th ourc countries . Thus, the 
K equity and bond market sp cifications given in Equations (3.4) and (3.6) are 
replaced by t he European a set market specificat ions Xeu,L and x~U,Li u h that : 
(3.1 1) 
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b us + b us + ,,.b ub 
+r;,EU,EU5 EUt K,Eu,uss US,t K,EU,USb US ,t · (3. 12) 
Second ; t he idiosyncratic UK equity and bond 1narket channels of contagion are 
replaced by the idiosyncratic European asset market channels for the recipient 
asset n1arkets . That is; all t he idiosyncratic UK contagion channels given by 
. . 
r;,{ u K s and r;,i ,uKb in Equations (3.8) and (3 .9) are replaced by r;,i,Eus and r;,i ,Eub 
for j = s b and i = AU; JP and UK: 
and; (3.13) 
b bA ((3 b (3-b) B b b B S r bc + bub + b us + b us 
xi,t = ai t + i + i t + K,i,s t + Si i,t vi i,t K,i ,EU5 EU,t K,i ,U ss u S,t 
b ub ,,. b ub 
+r;,i ,EUb EU,t + K,i ,USb US,t; for i = AU, JP and UK. (3.14) 
Additionally Equations (3 .5) and (3.7) for the US equity and bond markets novv 
take the form: 
s s A + ((3s + (3- s ) B S + ,,.s E b I rs C + ( s _J_ -s ) us Xus,t = aus t us us t r;,us,b t I s us us,t Vus I Vus us,t 
+ IL"S us + IL"S us I IL"S ub 1 11US EU 5 EU,t ' 11US,EUb EU,t I 1 11US,USb US,t and ; (3.15) 
b _ b A + (Bb + 13- b ) E b+ ,,.b B S + (b c _J_ ( b I -b ) ub Xus t - aus t , us us t r;,us,s t us us,t I Vus I Vus us,t 
+ IL"b us + IL"b us I IL"b ub 111US,EU 5 EU,t 1 11US,US 5 US,t 1 1 11US,EUb EU,t · (3.16) 
3.5 GMM Estimation Method 
Generalized method of moments ( G NINI ) is used to estimate the non-crisis model 
and he n1odels of contagion as specified in Section 3.4. G1/f[VI provides a uni-
fied fran1ework for inference in econometrics; and is a computationally efficient 
me hod of obtaining consisten and asymptotically normally distributed esti1na-
ors of he parame ers . G1!I1I estimation does not require any extra information 
aside from t ha contained in he moment condit ions. The estin1ation in -olves 
co1npu ing he unknov\ n parameters b equating t he t heoretical mo1nents of the 
model o he empirical 1nomen s of he data in both t he non-crisis model and 
he crisis model. s t he crisis period i spli to specify t hree crisis 1nodels corre-
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sponding to t he t hree phases of t he crisis, practically it is difficult to estimat th 
full model containing t he non-crisis model and t he t hre crisis n1odels tog ther. 
Thus , following the strategy applied by Dungey et al. (2011 ), the non-crisis n1odel 
is jointly estimated with one phase of the crisis at a time. 
The objective functions of the GM1VI estimators~-) ( () ) account ing for the both 
non-crisis and the three crisis phases can be specified as: 
V1(e) = G~(e)vVo(e) - 1Go(e) + G~(e)W1(e) - 1G1 (e) , 
V11(e) = G~(())vVo(e) - 1Go(e) + G~1(e)W11(e) - 1G11 (e) , 
V111(e) = G~(e)Wo(e) - 1Go(e) + G~11 (e)vV111(e) - 1G111(e) , (3 .17) 
where () is the paramet er vector. The weighting matrices, vVo ( ()) , are corrected 
for possible het eroskedasticity in the mon1ent conditions (Hamilton, 1994; N wey 
and West, 1987). Gu ( ()) are the vectors containing the differences between t h 
empirical moments and the theoretical moments of the non-crisis model and the 
model for crisis phase h where h = I , I I , I I I , given by: 
C0 ( ()) = vech ( w O ( e)) - vech ( cI:> 0 ( e) cl:>~ ( () )) , 
Gh(e) = vech(wh(e)) -vech(cI:>h(e)cI:>~(e)). (3. 18) 
In Equation (3. 18), w (,) ( () ) refers to the empirical variance-covariance n1atrice 
and cI:> (-) (())cl:>(.) ( ()) refers to the theoretical variance-covariance rnatric s for th 
non-crisis and crisis models. The empirical variance-covariance matrices for th 
non-crisis period and for crisis phase h are given by: 
respectively, vvhere Et( ()) is the 10-elem nt v ctor of hock obtain d from th 
VAR analysi , and Ne) repr sents the sarnple ize of each p riod/pha e. Th 
factors are independent with zero rn ans and unit varianc s hus the th or t ical 
3.5 GNI 1 Estimation fethod 
variance-covariance matrices can be specified as: 
E[ct(8)c~(8)]tENo = <1> 0(8) <1>;(8), 
E [ct(8)c~(8)]tENh = <1> h(8) <1> ~(8) . 
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(3.20) 
Each model contains t he non-crisis model and a crisis phase h model consist-
ing of 100 unknown paran1eters to estimate, ·while 110 empirical moments are 
available for each model. Of these empirical moments , ( 10 x 11) / 2 = 55 mo-
ments come from t he non-crisis data set and the remaining 55 come fron1 the 
crisis period data set . The GNINI estimators are obtained by equating the em-
pirical and theoretical moments. The NIAXLIK library in GAUSS version 11 is 
applied ·with the BFGS algorithm for minimizing the objective function in Equa-
t ion (3. 17) ·where t he gradients are computed numerically. The GNINI estimators 
are obtained by iterating both the parameters and weighting matrices until the 
convergence of t he empirical and t heoretical rnoments . 
If the number of t heoretical moment condit ions is equal to t he number of 
empirical mon1ent conditions t hen the first order conditions force Ge) ( 8) = 0 , 
thus the objective function Vh ( 8) = 0. However, if t he nu_mber of theoretical 
moment conditions are greater than t he number of empirical moment conditions, 
then G (,) ( 8) i- 0 and the model is said to be over-identified. This leads to an 
over-identifying restrictions test ·which assess the adequacy of the model. Over-
identifying restrictions are tested by using Hansen s ]-static given by: 
(3 .21) 
·where is the total number of observations in the full model given by rv = 
J o + J h· Jh (8) converges to the X~-z distribution asymptotically, ·where k is the 
nu1nber of moment conditions and l is the number of parameters. A rejection 
of the e restrictions suggests that the variables included in the model satisfy the 
or hogonalit condition. 
Quantifying the relative strengths of contagion The independence 
a sump ion of the factors allow for the deco1nposi ion of the unconditional 
variance into he con ribution of the common 1narket, countr , idiosyncratic 
and con agion factors. Addi ionall the rela ive strengths of contagion chan-
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nels during each phase of the crisis are identified through its contribution to 
total volatility. From the theoretical variance-covariance matrix corresponding to 
Equation (3 .10) , total volatility during the crisis can be expressed as : 
(3 .22) 
The contribution of each factor including the relative strength of contagion during 
each crisis phase can be calculated from the parameter estimates of the model. 
For example , consider excess returns on bonds in Australia during phase I of the 
cns1s. The total volatility of excess bond returns in Australia can be expressed 
as : 
( b )2 ( b )2 ( b )2 ( b )2 + K,AU,US5 + VAU + K,AU, UK b + K,AU,USb · 
Thus , the percentage contribution of equity market contagion to t he total volatil-
ity in excess returns on bonds in Australia is: 
and the percentage contribution of the idiosyncratic US equity market contagion 
on the Australian bond returns is: 
The total percentage contribution of contagion fron1 all sourc s of contagion on 
t he Australian bond returns is: 
Likewise . the p rcentage contribut ions of financial contagion can b quantified 
and investigated for ach n1arket in ach country for ach phase of t h cri i . 
3.6 Empirical Results 53 
3.6 Empirical Results 
This Section reports the results of t he empirical latent factor model of contagion 
specified in Section 3.4. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 present t he volatility decompositions of 
the components of contagion and aggregate contagion to total volatility in equity 
and bond 1narkets for the t hree phases of t he crisis, respectively. For comparison, 
the results of t he factor model for t he non-crisis period, estin1ated concurrently 
with each crisis phase, is presented in Appendix A .2 and t he percentage contri-
bution of t he non-contagion factors to total volatility during the crisis period is 
presented in Appendix A.3. 
Sections 3.6.1-3.6.3 discuss these key results in detail. Statistical significance 
of the contagion channels and structural breaks is discussed in Sections 3.6.4 and 
3.6.5, respectively. Section 3.6.6 reports t he results of two diagnostic tests , and 
Section 3.6.7 performs a sensitivity analysis of t he results to alternative European 
sources. 
3.6.1 The existence of contagion 
This Section establishes t he existence of contagion by focusing on t he total con-
tagion results reported in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. The results show that the effects 
of contagion during t he t hree phases of t he crisis of 2007-2011 are widespread 
across international financial markets in all five countries. The only exception is 
the contribution of contagion across bond markets during phase I of the crisis , 
which are found to be relatively lo-w. 
As shovvn in Table 3.2 , the UK and the European equity markets are the most 
affected during the first two phases of the crisis, indicating that the effects of 
the first tvvo phases mainly spread across the UK and Europe. Australian equity 
1narkets are also found to be highly affected from contagion effects during the first 
tvvo phases. The least affected during these two phases is the Japanese equity 
1narket (28 .51 percent and 32.06 percent , respectively) . However , t he J apanese 
equity market is found to be the hardest hit in the third phase of the crisis (57.71 
percent). The relative strengths of contagion transn1ission to the European and 
the UK equity markets weaken significantly during the third phase con1pared to 
the first two phases. The US equity market is found to be the least affected 
during the t hird phase of the crisis ( 11. 90 percent) . Thi indicates that the US 
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Table 3 .2 : Contribution of Contagion Channels to Equity IVIarket Volatility During 
Three Phases of the Crisis. P ercentage of Total Volatility. 
AU Global bond market 
Idiosyncratic 
UK/EU equity 1narket 
US equity market 
UK/EU bond market 
US bond market 
Total contagion 
EU Global bond market 
Idiosyncratic 
UK/EU equity market 
US equity market 
UK/EU bond market 
US bond market 
Total contagion 
JP Global bond market 
Idiosyncratic 
UK/EU equity market 
US equity market 
UK/EU bond market 
US bond market 
Total contagion 
UK Global bond market 
Idiosyncratic 
UK/EU equity market 
US equity market 
UK/EU bond market 
US bond 1narket 
Total contagion 
US Global bond market 
Idiosyncratic 
UK/EU equity market 
US equity market 
UK/EU bond n1arket 
S bond market 
Total contagion 
Phase I Phase II Pha e III 
6.01 3.05 1.39 
0.09 
3.35 
9.36 
56.91 
75 .72 
2.06 
0.51 
21.34 
0.15 
57.08 
81.14 
3.15 
3.46 
7.46 
0.12 
14.32 
28 .51 
2.88 
n.a. 
32.99 
0.24 
59.48 
95.59 
0.12 
24.77 
n.a. 
2. 3 
24. 0 
52.52 
7.85 
2.74 
1.30 
55.70 
70.64 
0.73 
0.52 
19.11 
0.03 
71.53 
91.92 
3.28 
2.41 
9.29 
0.13 
16.95 
32.06 
0.04 
n.a. 
10.36 
5.23 
63.31 
78.94 
0.22 
0.63 
n.a. 
0.49 
43.55 
44. 9 
2.65 
35.66 
5.87 
1.62 
47.19 
1.03 
n.a. 
18.12 
9.29 
0.02 
28.46 
1.57 
3.00 
48.96 
2.22 
1.96 
57.71 
1.71 
0.84 
29.32 
3.46 
0.61 
35.94 
0.99 
0.87 
n.a. 
5.56 
4.4 
11.90 
Note: UK ass t rnarkets are replaced by EU asset mark t · in specifying idiosyncratic 
contagion channel in cri ·is phas III. Crisis phase I covers the period fron1 July 17 
2007 to September 12; 200 i phas II cov r the period fron1 ptemb r 15 200 to 
June 30. 2009. and phas III cov rs the p riod from July 01 , 2009 to Dece1nber 30 
2011. n.a. denotes not applicable. 
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Table 3.3: Contribution of Contagion Channels to Bond IVIarket Volatility During 
Three Phases of the Crisis. P ercentage of Total Volatility. 
AU Global equity market 
Idiosyncratic 
UK/ EU equity market 
US equity market 
UK/ EU bond market 
US bond n1arket 
Total contagion 
EU Global equity market 
Idiosyncratic 
UK/ EU equity market 
US equity market 
UK/ EU bond market 
US bond n1arket 
Total contagion 
JP Global equity market 
Idiosyncratic 
UK/ EU equity 1narket 
US equity market 
UK/ EU bond market 
US bond market 
Total contagion 
UK Global equity market 
Idiosyncratic 
UK/EU equity market 
US equity 1narket 
UK/ EU bond 1narket 
US bond 1narket 
Total contagion 
US Global equity 1narket 
Idiosyncratic 
UK/ EU equity n1arket 
US equity n1arket 
UK/ EU bond 1narket 
US bond market 
Total contagion 
Phase I Phase II Phase III 
0.17 12.70 17.01 
0.10 
0.24 
2.16 
6.96 
9.63 
12.49 
0.00 
0.09 
21.72 
0.39 
34.69 
0.59 
0.05 
0.09 
1.44 
20.46 
23.43 
16.57 
0.25 
0.10 
n.a. 
0.56 
17.48 
3.03 
0.20 
0.58 
2.52 
n. a . 
6.33 
3.62 
3.56 
0.12 
18.48 
38.48 
29.00 
2.39 
7.59 
2.62 
17.85 
59 .45 
22.39 
1.29 
9.46 
0.10 -
33.49 
66 .73 
i3 .63 
9.68 
1.30 
n.a. 
6.96 
31. 57 
35.46 
12.63 
1.94 
0.50 
n. a . 
50 .53 
21.21 
0.55 
10.66 
2.32 
51.75 
4.72 
1.34 
1.31 
n.a. 
20.50 
27.87 
39.35 
2.17 
1.29 
11.74 
10.40 
64.95 
0.01 
0.17 
13.65 
41.16 
10.14 
65 .13 
45 .59 
3.34 
10.50 
1.49 
n .a. 
60 .92 
Note: UK asset markets are replaced by EU asset markets in specifying idiosyncratic 
contagion channel in crisis phase III. Crisis phase I covers the period from July 1 7, 
2007 to Septe1nber 12 2008 , phase II covers the period fron1 September 15 2008 to 
June 30 2009 , and phase III cover the period from July 01 , 2009 to December 30 , 
2011. n.a. denotes not applicable. 
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equity market tends to stabilize during the third phase of the crisis. Overall , 
t he total contagion results reported in Table 3.2 suggest that the transmission of 
contagion across international equity markets has become significantly weaker in 
phase III for all countries , except Japan. 
Total contagion results reported in Table 3.3 show that the relative contri-
bution of contagion across bond markets during the first phase of the crisis is 
relatively lovv compared to the other two phases. The least affected bond 1narket 
during phase I is the US (6 .33 percent) being primarily a transmitter of contagion 
during this phase. The hardest hit during phase I is the European bond mar-
ket (34.69 percent) , implying that the European bond market is more vulnerable 
to the shocks originating in the US financial markets than any other country 
considered in this Chapter during the first phase of the crisis. 
In contrast to the results of phase I , the contribution of contagion to the 
volatility in all five bond markets is considerably large in phases I and II of 
the crisis. The European bond market is found to be the least affected during 
the third phase (27.87 percent), when Europe is the source country. Except 
for the US idiosyncratic bond market channel ( 20. 50 percent) , no other chann 1 
significantly transmits contagion to the European bond market during this phase. 
This confirms that the European bond market is a source during the third phase 
of the crisis. 
3.6.2 Cross-market contagion 
This Section examines the relative contributions of cross-market contagion in 
explaining asset market volatility during t he three phases of the crisis. Th global 
bond n1arket effects as reported in Table 3.2 explain the transmission of contagion 
through the global bond market channel across five equity markets. Similarly, 
global equity 1narket effects as reported in Table 3.3 explain the trans1nis ion 
of contagion via the global equity market channel to the five bond mark ts. A 
co1nparison of Tables 3.2 and 3.3 shows that bond 1narkets ar pron to contagion 
effects coming through shocks arising in global equity markets but equity markets 
are found to be less affected by the shock originating in the global bond 1narkets. 
The results reported in Table 3.3 show that th UK and the Europ an bond 
1narkets are heavily affect d by th global equity mark t chann 1 during th fir t 
phase of the crisis (16.57 percent and 12.49 p re nt re p ctively) . Th r sults 
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in1ply t hat sudden shocks to t he global equity market cont ribute to increased 
bond market volatility in the UK and Europe, t riggering financial crises in t hose 
two count ries . Although Dungey et al. (2011 ) suggested that the US bond market 
is heavily affect ed through the global equity market channel during the US sub-
pri1ne crisis, t his Chapter finds only a limited effect. 
All five bond market s are found to be vulnerable to contagion transmission 
t hrough t he global equity market channel during the second phase of t he crisis. 
During this phase, the US bond market is the most affect ed (35.46 percent), fol-
lowed by Europe (29.00 percent). The least affect ed is t he Australian bond mar-
ket (12.70 percent) . Although the relative contribution decreases from phase I to 
phase II t he global equity market channel is still the main channel of t ransmit ting 
shocks t o the UK bond market. 
Notably the UK and t he European bond markets are t he least affected by t he 
global equity market channel during the third phase of t he crisis (0.01 percent 
and 4. 72 percent respectively) . These two bond markets are the highest affected 
during t he first phase. The relative i1nportance of t his global equity market 
channel has become negligible in t he case of t he UK. In cont rast , t he percentage 
cont ribut ion of t he global equity market channel increases in Australia, J apan and 
t he US. Overall , t hese results suggest t hat t he role played by t he global equity 
market channel in trans1nitting t he effects of a financial shock varies depending 
on t he phase and t he source of t he crisis . 
As can be observed from Table 3.2 , t he Australian and J apanese equity mar-
kets are more vulnerable t han other count ries to t he shocks arising in bond mar-
kets globally. However , t hese two count ries did not suffer fron1 t he 2007-2011 
crisis as badly as t he other t hree count ries considered in t his Chapter. The least 
vulnerable is t he US equity market . Although t he 2007-2011 crisis is a phe-
nomenon attributed to bond markets t he global bond market channel plays only 
a limited role in t he contagion t ransmission mechanism across equity markets . 
3.6.3 Idiosyncratic channels of contagion 
This Sec ion focuses on ident ifying t he idios ncratic channels t hrough which the 
effects of t he t hree phases of t he crisis are t ransmitted across t he equity and bond 
n1arkets examined in t hi Chapter. The empirical model of contagion specified 
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in Section 3.4 assumes that contagion is t ransmitted from t he idiosyncrati S 
and UK asset market channels during the first two phases of t he crisis and fro1n 
the idiosyncratic US and European asset market channels in t he t hird pha e. Ta-
bles 3.2 and 3.3 give t he percentage contributions of t hese idiosyncratic chann ls 
of contagion to total volatility in equity and bond markets for t he three phas s 
of the crisis, respectively. 
Contagion to equity markets Table 3.2 presents the relative irnportance 
of the idiosyncratic channels of contagion across equity markets . The most strik-
ing observation here is the contribution of the idiosyncratic contagion links fron1 
the US asset markets . The idiosyncratic link from the US bond market plays a 
dominant role in phases I and II , while the idiosyncratic US equity market chan-
nel is dominant in the contagion transmission mechanism during phase III of the 
cn s1s. 
Generally, US bonds are considered as risk free safe haven assets . However, 
t he crisis of 2007-2011 initially began in the US bond market , and the effects 
of the crisis spread across national borders , heavily affecting equity markets . 
The results clearly show this phenomenon during t he first two phas s of the 
crisis. The role of US idiosyncratic contagion channels is further evident from 
the relative contribut ion of additional links from the US equity market to equity 
market volatility in t he UK and Europe. Note t hat, apart fro1n t he US, th se 
two countries are t he most affected during t he init ial stages of the crisis. Ov rall, 
these results suggest t hat t he equity market crash during the crisis is 1nainly due 
to the contagion transmitted t hrough the shocks specific to the US ass t 1narkets. 
Except for the case of contagion to the US equity market during phase I of 
t he crisis, the contribution of the additional links from the idiosyncratic UK ( or 
Europe in phase III) equity and bond 1narkets are found to be relatively low 
during the total crisis period. In all cases, the relative contribut ion to total 
equity 111arket volatility is less than 10 percent. \t\ hile shock pecific to the 
US financial 1narkets have stronger effects on equity mark t , shock p cific 
to the UK/European financial 1nark t have only a lin1ited effect on the quity 
n1arkets in other countries . Examining 24. 0 p re nt and 43 .55 percent of the 
US quity market volatility during fir t two phas s of the crisi thi Chapt r 
provid evidenc for cro s-1nark t contagion within t h 
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Contagion to bond markets The results reported in Table 3.3 show the 
relative contribut ions of the idiosyncratic channels of contagion across the five 
bond markets considered in t his Chapter . Clearlyi no single channel dominates; 
that is , all t he idiosyncratic contagion channels are at play, depending on the 
phase and t he source of t he crisis. 
During t he first phase of the crisis, two idiosyncratic contagion channels are in 
play in two bond markets- t he idiosyncratic UK bond market channel in Europe 
and t he idiosyncratic US bond market channel in J apan. Idiosyncratic links from 
the US or t he UK financial markets are not strong in t he other three bond mar-
kets , although t he n1ain contagion effect to the Australian bond market is com-
ing through the idiosyncratic US bond market channel. However i t he J apanesei 
Australian and European bond markets are found to be susceptible to the id-
iosyncratic US bond market channel in t he second phase of the crisisi albeit to 
different degrees . Overall , it can be concluded t hat t he sho cks specific to the 
US bond market still play a significant role in t he contagion transmission mecha-
nisms in the first two phases of t he crisis. However, t he relative contribut ions are 
significantly low compared to t he cont ribut ions to the equity market volatility. 
The only other idiosyncratic channel t hat plays a significant role in transmitting 
contagion across bond markets is t he idiosyncratic UK equity market channel in 
the case of the US bond market during the second phase of the crisis. 
The relative importance of the idiosyncratic contagion channels in the third 
phase of the crisis is complex. The highest effect comes fron1 the idiosyncratic 
European bond market channel to the UK bond market. Addit ionally, shocks 
attributed to the S equity and bond markets are also important in the contagion 
ransmission to the UK bond market . In the case of the Australian bond market. 
I 
both t he idiosyncratic European equity and bond market channels are at play 
v. hile he additional links from the S bond market is at play in the European 
bond n1arket . The idiosyncratic shocks attributed to t he bond markets of the 
S and Europe are important for the contagion t ransmission to t he J apanese 
bond n1arket. Shocks specific to t he S equity market are at play in the US 
bond marke which pro-\ ide evidence for cross-market contagion in phase III. 
Howe er a careful in e t igation reveals he pread of contagion through the same 
class of a et n1arket in the case of international bond markets . 
3.6.4 Statistical significance of contagion 
The results shuw that the percentage contribut ions of channels of financial conta-
gion vary across a ·wide range , as some channels are highly contagious, while the 
others are not. Therefore , it is desirable to test t he statistical ignificance of these 
transmission mechanisms. Diagnostic tests based on the Wald test are conducted 
to test t he null hypothesis of no contagion for each phase of t he crisis against the 
alternative hypotheses of t he transmission of contagion jointly t hrough the chan-
nels of: i) equity markets; ii) bond markets; iii) idiosyncratic European, UK and 
US equity 1narkets; and iv) idiosyncratic European, UK and US bond 1nark ts. 
Finally, it tests the joint significance of all contagion channels for each phase of 
t he crisis. The results are reported in Table 3.4. 
The test statistics find strong evidence to reject t he null hypotheses of no 
contagion at the 1 percent significance level in all three phases of t he crisis for 
all the channels tested. Although the effects coming t hrough certain channels 
seem to be too small to explain t he volatilities in certain asset markets, they 
cannot be disregarded in the modeling framework , as t hey are statistically signif-
icant. Therefore, all the contagion channels have significant effect in transmitting 
financial market shocks during all three phases of t he crisis. 
3.6.5 Statistical significance of structural breaks 
This Section tests for the statistical significance of the structural breaks intro-
duced to the 1nodel of contagion. The model is specified allowing for the mark t 
and idiosyncratic factors to exhibit structural breaks between the non-crisis and 
crisis periods. Again , the vVald tests are applied to test the null hypothesis of no 
tructural breaks against the alternative hypotheses of joint tructural break 1n 
equity and bond n1arkets , separately. It also tests the statistical significanc of 
structural breaks in idiosyncratic Europe, UK and US equity and bond mark t . 
The joint significance of all of the structural br aks i also tested, and th r sults 
are reported in Table 3.5. If the test statistics find evidence to r j ct the null 
hypothesis of no structural breaks this sugge ts that the ffe ts of h param -
ters are ame as in the non-cri is period and are not affected by udden chang s 
in the factor structure in th cri is period. 
Th te t stati tics r v al that all the tructural br aks except for the id-
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Table 3.4: Statistical Significance of Contagion Channels. 
Channel DOF Phase I Phase II Phase III 
Equity market 5 18.57 (0 .002) 195.68 (0.000) 45.80 (0.000) 
r} = 0 i,s 
Bond market 5 19.43 (0.002) 565. 76 (0 .000) 116.49 (0.000) 
K,~b = 0 i, 
Idio. EU equity 9 n.a. n.a. 87.23 (0 .000) 
K,i.Eus = 0 
Idio. UK equity 9 119.48 (0 .000) 1406.26 (0.000) n.a. 
K,i.uKs = 0 
Idio. US equity 9 230.04 (0.000) 4335.59 (0 .000) 1217.52 (0.000) 
K,i.uss = 0 
Idio. EU bond 9 n.a. n.a. 2007.74 (0.000) 
K,rEUb = O 
Idio. UK bond 9 98.66 (0.000) 368.86 (0 .000) n.a. 
K,rUKb = O 
Idio. US bond 9 294.94 (0 .000) 15751.08 (0 .000) 632.82 (0.000) 
K,rusb = O 
Joint contagion 46 892.47 (0 .000) 4718.05 (0.000) 3198.37 (0.000) 
Note: Test statistics are based on the "\iVald test for all j = s, band i = AU, EU, JP, UK 
and US. In each case related to the idiosyncratic channels, there are 9 degrees of 
freedon1 (DOF) as the crisis rnodel assumes that there is no contagion effect to the 
own market. Joint contagion is tested by setting all the contagien channels equal to 
zero. p-values are in parentheses. n.a. denotes not applicable. 
iosyncratic US equity 1narket structural break in phase I and the idiosyncratic 
US bond n1arket structural break in phase III , are significant at the 5 percent 
le, el. Further the test statistics suggest that the structural breaks are jointly 
ignificant in the 1nodel. 
3.6.6 Diagnostic tests 
This Section reports the results of two diagnostic tests. Tvvo conditional moment 
tests are used to check for first order autocorrelation (AR) and heteroskedas-
ticit (ARCH) in the standardized residuals and standardized squared residuals 
of the AR, re pectively. The n1ain advantage of these two tests is the quick 
in1plen1en ation through an auxiliar regression. One lag is considered in the 
conditional 1non1ent test in order to be consistent with the VAR model that 
used to filter data for the en1pirical exercise. Table 3.6 reports the p-values of the 
test stati tics of AR(l) and ARCH(l ) te ts, which test no autocorrelation and 
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Table 3.5: Statistical Significance of Structural Breaks . 
Structural Break DOF 
Equity market 5 
/3t = 0 
Bond market 5 
Et= o 
Idio. EU equity 1 
-s 0 VEU = 
Idio. UK equity 1 
-s 0 VuK = 
Idio. US equity 1 
-s 0 Vus = 
Idio. EU bond 1 
-b 0 VEU = 
Idio. UK bond 1 
-b 0 VuK = 
Idio. US bond 1 
-b 0 Vus = 
Joint test 14 
Phase I 
731.29 (0.000) 
19.02 (0.002) 
n. a . 
11.66 (0.000) 
1.30 (0 .255) 
n. a 
23.55 (0 .000) 
58.54 (0 .000) 
1041.29 (0.000) 
Phas II 
396 .00 (0.000) 
92.92 (0.000) 
n. a . 
10.07 (0.000) 
40.81 (0.000) 
n. a . 
4.65 (0.000) 
45.96 (0 .000) 
1102.93 (0.000) 
III 
(0.000) 
23.10 (0.000) 
15.69 (0.000) 
n.a. 
51.64 (0.000) 
5.16 (0.000) 
n .a. 
0.28 (0. 599) 
824.82 (0.000) 
Note: Test statistics are based on the Wald test for all i = AU, EU, JP, UK and US. 
The joint significance is tested by setting all the structural break terms equal to zero. 
p-values are in parentheses . n.a. denotes not applicable. 
no heteroskedasticity under null hypotheses for each phase of t he crisis . Exe pt 
for a few cases, t he conditional 1noment tests fail to reject t he null hypothe es at 
the 1 percent level, suggesting t hat the standardized residuals do not suffer from 
autocorrelation or heteroskedasticity proble111s . 
3.6. 7 Sensitivity to alternative European crisis sources 
This Section checks the sensit ivity of the result of pha e III of the crisis to alt r-
native European sourc s. Germany i used in the empirical con agion analy i to 
represent the European region , and used as a source of t he crisis in th pha e III 
1nod 1. But. Germany was not affected by the European debt cri i until h end 
of 2011. rather playing a role in bailing out som cri is aff cted countri uch 
as Greece . The contagion n1odel of phase III is re-run , r placing German with 
Greece and Italy. The re ult are reported in Tabl 3. 7. 
The model \vhich u e Greece and Italy a alternative ourc al o find trong 
eYid nee for the pread of contagion aero int rnational equit and bond mark t 
\Yhich align \Yith the pha III n1pirical re ul pr nted in Tabl 3.2 and 3.3. 
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Table 3.6: Conditional Moment Tests of the Standardized VAR(l) Residuals: p-values. 
Country Test Phase I Phase II Phase III 
Equity Bond Equity Bond Equity Bond 
AU AR(l) 0.261 0.105 0.130 0.525 0.862 0.118 
ARCH(l) 0.023 0.997 0.082 0.496 0.637 0.070 
EU AR(l) 0.604 0.943 0.062 0.490 0.000 0.159 
ARCH(l) 0.002 0.852 0.042 0.070 0.335 0.007 
JP AR(l) 0.569 0.196 0.261 0.599 0.753 0.053 
ARCH(l) 0.119 0.661 0.611 0.095 0.544 0.323 
UK AR(l) 0.524 0.117 0.048 0.820 0.279 0.000 
ARCH(l) 0.034 0.061 0.070 0.037 0.617 0.095 
us AR(l) 0.822 0.516 0.003 0.185 0.003 0.063 
ARCH(l) 0.498 0.599 0.077 0.937 0.625 0.845 
All the channels are at play in transmitting contagion effects to international asset 
markets, and are statistically significant (see Appendix A.4), again consistent with 
the previously reported results for Germany. However, the results show that the 
relative contributions of total contagion, as well as the relative importance of 
each contagion channel, differ depending on Germany, Italy or Greece is used as 
the source crisis country. 
3. 7 Conclusion 
The objective of this Chapter was to investigate the evidence for contagion on 
and among equity and bond markets, and to examine variations in the contagion 
transmission mechanisms during different phases of the crisis of 2007-2011. The 
crisis of 2007-2011 provides a natural testing ground for identifying contagion 
transmission mechanisms in several phases: the US sub-prime crisis (phase I) , 
the global financial crisis (phase II), and the European debt crisis (phase III). 
The model was developed based on a latent factor model of excess asset re-
turns. In the model , each asset return was specified as a linear combination of 
common, market , country, idiosyncratic and contagion components. Contagion 
transmission mechanisms were identified through additional links from global and 
idiosyncratic asset markets, which appear only during the crisis. The assump-
tion of independent , zero mean and unit variance of factors enable a convenient 
method for decomposing the volatility of excess asset returns into the underlying 
factors, including contagion. Another important feature of the model specifica-
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Table 3 . 7: Evidence of Equity JVIarket and Bond JVIarket Contagion During Crisi 
Phase III with Alternative European Crisis Sources: Greece and Italy. P ercentag of 
Total Volatility. 
AU Global equity market 
Global bond market 
Idiosyncratic 
EU equity market 
US equity market 
EU bond market 
US bond market 
Total contagion 
EU Global equity market 
Global bond market 
Idiosyncratic 
EU equity market 
US equity market 
EU bond market 
US bond market 
Total contagion 
JP Global equity market 
Global bond market 
Idiosyncratic 
EU equity market 
US equity market 
EU bond market 
US bond market 
Total contagion 
UK Global equity market 
Global bond market 
Idiosyncratic 
EU equity market 
US equity market 
EU bond market 
US bond market 
Total contagion 
US Global equity market 
Global bond market 
Idiosyncratic 
E equity market 
US equity market 
E bond market 
S bond market 
Total contagion 
Equity market contagion 
with Greece with Italy 
n.a. n.a. 
12.72 0.07 
8.69 
12.23 
0.49 
37.43 
71.56 
n.a. 
7.25 
n.a. 
2.38 
1.49 
61.96 
73.08 
n.a. 
13.24 
17.42 
4.74 
1.07 
24.68 
61.15 
n.a. 
3.06 
4.83 
10.57 
0.06 
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79.05 
n. a. 
3.80 
1 .94 
n. a. 
0. 40 
45.66 
6 . 0 
12.09 
2.52 
4.27 
2.52 
21.47 
n.a. 
9.75 
n.a. 
2.54 
3.47 
35.52 
51.28 
n.a. 
0.05 
16.66 
2.54 
4.49 
0.11 
23.85 
n. a . 
5.18 
15.31 
9.89 
1.68 
5.33 
37.39 
n .a. 
9.70 
9.43 
n. a . 
2. 2 
0.63 
22 . 
Bond mark t contagion 
with Greece with Italy 
3.37 13.66 
n.a. n. a. 
5.15 
6.15 
12.66 
49.22 
76.55 
0.58 
n.a. 
16.45 
0.10 
n.a. 
14.75 
31.88 
11.45 
n.a. 
3.48 
0.08 
7.76 
43.95 
66.72 
0.76 
n. a . 
19.51 
11.57 
18. 8 
1.18 
51.90 
13.33 
n. a . 
0.13 
0.01 
5.73 
n .a. 
19.20 
7.34 
0.02 
10.63 
8.05 
39.70 
41.64 
n. a . 
0.15 
11.93 
n. a. 
1.88 
55.60 
37.06 
n. a. 
4.92 
0.01 
4.79 
17.03 
63.81 
1.91 
n. a . 
0.02 
35.59 
12.51 
24.42 
74.45 
51. 0 
n. a. 
14. 75 
0.01 
0.97 
n. a . 
67. 53 
ote: Contribution on non-contagion co1n ponent can b obtained from ubt racting 
total contagion fron1 100. n.a. denot not applicabl . 
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tion is that change of t he idiosyncratic channels in different phases of the crisis , 
better capturing t he effects of contagion from source asset markets in different 
phases. 
The results indicate t hat contagion was highly prevalent in both classes of 
asset markets in all t hree phases of the crisis. All five countries were affected by 
contagion , which suggest t hat developed country asset markets were vulnerable 
to t he shocks attributed to t he t hree phases of t he crisis. These results agree 
with Longstaff (2010) and Metiu (2012), who found strong evidence for contagion 
during t he crisis. Ho-wever , the results are in contrast to Bekaert et al. (2011) , 
who found only a small effect of systematic contagion from US financial 1narkets 
and from the global financial sector . 
Expanding the findings of D~ngey et al. (2011 ) who suggested that t he rela-
t ive strengths of contagion channels differ across crises , t his Chapter establishes 
that the transmission mechanism of financial contagion dynamically evolved even 
·wit hin a crisis. The results found t hat the relative contribut ion of each channel 
of contagion to the total volatility of excess returns of equities and bonds varied 
across the t hree phases of the crisis of 2007-2011. That is, the contagion trans-
mission mechanisms varied across asset markets depending on the phase ( t iming) 
and t he source (location) of t he crisis . 
The international bond 1narkets 'were found to be suscept ible to the shocks 
originated in the global equity market , however , t he reverse existed only to a lesser 
extent . This finding is in contrast to the existing studies which suggested that 
the condit ional correlation between equity and bond returns declines when equity 
markets suffer fron1 financial turmoil , as investors move capital from equities to 
government bonds- the safer assets (Boyer et al. , 2006; Kim et al. , 2006). This 
distinction may be because of the crisis of 2007-2011 originated in bond n1arkets . 
The findings of this Chapter improves t he understanding of the sources , vul-
nerabilit ies and contagion transmission mechanisms , which helps designing poli-
cies to contain the global spread of a crisis . The existence of contagion in all 
three phases of the crisis highlight the need to design and implement better pol-
icy measures , such as development of contingency plans to manage systematic 
failures. Contingency plans should consider all the aspects of the crisis , including 
contagion effects that go beyond a country 's own economy, and also the rela-
t ive importance of the channels through which contagion transmits over different 
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phases of the crisis . Therefore , t he finding of dyna1nic changes in the contagion 
transmission 111echanism in different phases of the crisis is t he mo t in1portant 
policy-relevant outcome of this Chapter. 
Given t hat t he crisis originated in t he benchmark asset market , the use of 
the US bench1nark bond rate to compute excess asset returns could be seen as 
a limitation of this Chapter. Dungey (2008) sought to capture t his phenomenon 
considering only the US sub-prime crisis, however , incorporating both the US 
originated crisis, as well as the European crisis , will be a challenge. Extending 
the en1 pirical analysis to include a set of emerging market economies will improve 
the model by enabling a distinction of the contagion effects between developed 
and emerging econo1nies . A larger country set ·will also enable identification of the 
effects of more factors, such as emerging market factors and/ or regional factors. 
Chapter 4 
Foreign Exchange Intervention 
and Volatility in Emerging 
Economies: A GARCH Approach 
4 .1 Introduction 
The motives for central banks to intervene in the foreign exchange market include 
reducing the economic cost s associat ed with exchange rat e volatility which affects 
international t rade, financial flows, foreign investment and economic growth , and 
-
accumulating international reserves t o strengthen a count ry 's macroeconomic fun-
damentals (Szakmary and l\!Iathur , 1997; Sarno and Taylor , 2001 ; Disyatat and 
Galati, 2007; Pont ines and Rajan , 2011 ) . The weight placed on each of t hese 
objectives at any point in t ime is likely to be a function of t he prevailing domes-
t ic econo1n ic environment including policy regime choices , t he external economic 
environment , as well as t he general level of development of a country. 
Foreign exchange intervent ion- t hat is, buying and selling of foreign exchange 
against t he hon1e currency - has often been used as an important policy tool in 
offsetting t he effects of currency fluctuations. W hile accepting greater flexibility 
in principle, many cent ral banks, especially in emerging 1narkets , have intervened 
in t heir foreign exchange markets frequent ly, and sometimes on a large scale 
(Guimaraes and Karacadag, 2004) . For en1erging markets , containing excessive 
volatility is particularly important as t hey are arguably 1nore prone to external 
shocks than t heir developed counterparts . Understanding t he effects of interven-
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tion is also of i111portance in managing the development proce s particularl for 
countries ·who are transit ioning to an inflation targeting monetary polic ystem 
such as Sri Lanka (Anand et al. , 2011 ). Nieanwhile, accumulating international 
reserves helps to establish the confidence of foreign investors in the dom sti 
economy by providing a positive impact on credit ratings. Addit ionally, the vul-
nerability to external shocks can be alleviated through a high level of reserve 
adequacy (NI ulder and P errelli , 2001 ; Dominguez et al. 2011). 
This Chapter ain1s to exa111ine the effectiveness of foreign exchange interven-
tion in emerging economies using Sri Lanka as an example. Although t here is a 
large body of literature on foreign exchange intervention , the majority of studies 
focus on advanced econo111ies (Dominguez and Frankel, 1993; Sarno and Taylor, 
2001 ; Kim and Sheen , 2002). There is only a little published work on t h effe t 
of intervention in emerging markets . Even though frequent intervention by the 
central bank, either through purchases or sales, is a fo cal element of the foreign 
exchange market in Sri Lanka, no studie have been formally conducted to inves-
t igate t he effectiveness of t his policy instrument .1 This Chapter fills th gap in 
t he literature. 
As officially stated, t he intention of t he cent ral bank in intervening in t h 
foreign exchange 111arket is to contain excessive volatility in the exchang rate 
in the short-term, and to accumulate international reserves in the medium-term 
(Central Bank of Sri Lanka 2007).2 Given these objectives, for interv ntion to 
be effective; it should have no significant effect on exchange rate r turn : rath r 
it hould reduce the volatility of daily returns. The full sampl p riod under 
investigation extend from J anuary 2002 to December 2010 ; and i di ided in o 
t\vo ub-period : i) :the non-crisi period:'· and ii) 'the cri i perioJ. ' The e two 
period allo-\Y an exan1ination of ho-w t he Central Bank of ri Lanka r ponded o 
,-olatility arising in global financial 111arkets con1pared to he non-cri i period. 
The en1pirical investigation i bas don Generalized utoregr ive conditional 
hetero keda ticity (GARCH) pecification . Comparing GARCH(l.1) . thr hold 
1 The only tudy relate to central bank inten-ention in ri Lanka i nand et al. (2011 ), in 
,-.-hich int n -ention i di cu ed in the context of the role of exchange rate in inflation targ ting. 
2The Central Bank of ri Lanka note that inter-.-ention i not ain1ed at targeting an exchang 
rate le,·el ( Central Bank of ri Lanka. 2007) . indicating that the int n·en ion rat gy i to ··l an 
again t the "-ind .. to reduce xchange rate Yolatility. Ho"\\-ever. the central bank do no d fin 
the rneaning of ··exce i,·e ,·olatility ... hence. there i no formal rul go,·erning wh n in rY ntion 
hould occur. 
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GARCH(l,1) and exponential GARCH(l ,1) , this Chapter finds that the expo-
nential GARCH (EGARCH) as the best 1nodel that fits the data in evaluating 
the effects of foreign exchange intervention in Sri Lanka. The empirical results 
found are supportive for the effectiveness of foreign exchange intervention in Sri 
Lanka. This Chapter reveals that intervention reduces exchange rate volatility 
rather than altering the exchange rate trend. The economically insignificant ef-
fects on daily exchange rate returns , and the significant reduction in exchange 
rate volatility is consistent with the short- and medium-term objectives of inter-
vention. However , the effect of intervention on the condit ional volatility during 
the crisis period is not as strong as that of the non-crisis period. A drawback of 
the EGARCH model is its inability to assess numerically the effect of intervention 
on the conditional volatility of exchange rate returns. Therefore, a new empir-
ical methodology is developed in the next Chapter to complement the results 
established in this Chapter. 
The remainder of this Chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 reviews 
existing literature on foreign exchange intervention. Section 4.3 provides a de-
scription of data used in this study. The GARCH methodology is specified in 
Section 4.4. The empirical results of t he efficacy of centraf bank intervention, 
during the non-crisis period and in the crisis period, are discussed in Section 4.5. 
Section 4.6 concludes . 
4.2 Literature Review 
The literature on foreign exchange intervention has mainly focused on the effects 
on exchange rate returns and its volatility. The other aspect of intervention , that 
is reserve accumulation, is now attracting attention particularly in the context of 
the role played by emerging markets in the face of the financial crisis. Important 
papers examining this issue include Dominguez (2010), Adler and Tovar (2011) , 
Dominguez et al. (2011) and Pontines and Rajan (2011). 
There is a large body of literature on the effects of foreign exchange interven-
tion on exchange rate volatility. However , the majority of these studies is related 
to advanced economies (Dominguez, 1998; Fatun1, 2003; Fatum and Hutchison, 
2006; Sarno and Taylor , 2001). With the notable exception of Disyatat and Galati 
(2007), there is a little published work on the effects of intervention in emerging 
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111arkets , although central banks , t h International 1VIonetary Fund (I 1IF ) and th 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) ai111 to fill t his gap (Pattanaik and a-
hoo , 2001 ; Niandeng, 2003; Guimaraes and Karacadag, 2004; BIS 2005· Herr ra 
and Ozbay, 2005; Kamil , 2008 ; Adler and Tovar, 2011). Edison (1993) , Sarno and 
Taylor (2001) and Disyatat and Galati (2007) provide good surveys of empirical 
11ethods and evidence to more generally evaluate intervention and its effects on 
exchange rate volatility. 
Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of foreign exchange intervention in 
advanced economies is inconclusive. That is , so111e studies find trong evidence 
in favor of foreign exchange intervention (Hung, 1997; Dominguez, 1998· Fatum, 
2003; Fatum and Hutchison , 2006), while others find that intervention is not 
effective (Bonser-Neal and Tanner , 1996 ; Hung, 1997; Dominguez, 1998· Beine 
et al. , 2002) . In contrast to the inconclusive findings of intervention in advanced 
economies, empirical studies on emerging economies are more support ive of inter-
vention being effective in reducing exchange rate volatility without affecting th 
exchange rate t rend (Disyatat and Galati, 2007) . Domac_; and Mendoza (2004) 
Shah et al. (2009) and Adler and Tovar (2011 ) also suggest t hat foreign exchange 
intervention in en1erging markets effectively reduces exchange rate volatility even 
if it does not alter t he current trend of exchange rate movements. In contrast, 
Si111waka (2011) recently found that intervention tends to increas exchang rate 
volatility, although it ignificantly changes the exchange rate trend. Ab noJa 
(2003) support this argu111ent, suggesting that persistent intervention can ac u-
ally increase exchange rate volatility, even though contemporaneou intervention 
tend to decrease vvithin-day volatility. 
In the Sri Lankan context: only one tudy, b Anand et al. (20 11) . hav 
inve tigated the effectiveness of central bank intervention. In an effort to a 
,Yhether Sri Lanka i ready for inflation targeting , nand et al. (201 1) tudied 
the role of intervention and found that the central bank attempt to alter th 
exchange rate trend. and curtail exce s , olatilit} ince Iarch 200-S. Ho,,-ev r. 
Anand et al. (2011) u ed change in official intervention to prox for int r ntion. 
A. range of analytical technique ha been u ed to in e tigat th eff ti n . 
of foreign exchange interYention including tructural approache . v nt- tud ap-
proache and G RCH fran1 ,York . tructural m thod tin1a e a t m of 
quation u ing the in trumental variable approach or appl ing th -\, o- tag 
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least-square approach (Obstfeld, 1982; Gartner , 1987; Galati et al. , 2005; Disy-
atat and Galati , 2007). The event-study approach allows users to evaluate the 
effects of every single intervention "event" on exchange rate changes, with special 
attention given to the environment in which the events are defined (Fatum, 2003; 
Fatum and Hutchison , 2006; Niandeng, 2003). However , the effectiveness of for-
eign exchange intervention is often evaluated through various forms of GARCH 
specifications (Almekinders and Eijffi.nger , 1996; Dominguez , 1998; Beine et al. , 
2002; Domac_; and Niendoza, 2004; Guimaraes and Karacadag, 2004; Hoshikawa, 
2008). The reason for the extensive use of the GARCH methodology is that 
it tests the effects of intervention on both the conditional mean and variance 
of exchange rate returns simultaneously, while capturing volatility clustering in 
financial time series, different to the other methodologies. 
4.3 Data Description 
The effectiveness of foreign exchange intervention is investigated using a unique 
data set obtained from the Central Bank of Sri Lanka. The data are of daily 
frequency and covered the period from January O 1, 2002 to December 31 , 2010. 
This period is selected due to the availability of daily foreign exchange interven-
tion data, and in order to cover the post-float era in Sri Lanka. 3 For estimation 
purposes, the sample period is divided into two sub-periods: January 01 , 2002 
to June 29, 2007 and July 02 , 2007 to December 31 , 2010. The first sub-period 
covers a relatively low volatility period in the global foreign exchange markets 
compared to the latter , in which the volatility is much higher due to the recent 
financial crisis. In the Sri Lankan context, the latter period is not only coincides 
·with the recent financial crisis , but also the final phase of the civil war in Sri 
Lanka that had prevailed for over 25 years . 
The variables employed in the analysis include exchange rate returns of the Sri 
Lankan rupee ( dlert), net foreign exchange intervention ( intt), t he interest rate 
differential ( dift) and the government bond spread ( sprt). Intervention is 1nodeled 
separating the purchases (purt) and the sales ( selt) for better explanation of t he 
effects of intervention. The exchange rate data used in this Chapter are daily 
3Daily data on official intervention in the foreign exchange rnarket is not publicly available, 
but is available for internal use of the central bank. 
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average interbank rates, t hat are expressed as Sri Lankan rupees per US dollar. 
Thus , an increase in t he exchange rate corresponds to a depreciation of th n 
Lankan rupee. Exchange rate returns are computed by taking t he first difference 
of t he natural logarithm of the exchange rates and n1ultiplying it by 100. Foreign 
exchange intervention is expressed in millions of US dollars . 
The interest rate differential is the difference between t he Sri Lankan 3-nionth 
Treasury bill rate and the US 3-month Treasury bill rate. In the context of foreign 
exchange intervention , the use of interest rate differentials in the model captures 
the possible effects of intervention on the money market . Daily foreign exchange 
interventions (purchases and sales), the daily exchange rates and t he 3-n1onth 
Treasury bill rates were obtained from the Central Bank of Sri Lanka. The US 
3-month Treasury bill rates and US government bond rates were obtained from 
the US Federal Reserve Bank's website. As the lack of a daily bond rate series 
for Sri Lanka is a major li1nitation for this exercise, a series of daily 3-year bond 
rates is generated based on the available rates and their growth rates as a proxy 
for country risk. The series of daily 3-year bond rates is calculated using linear 
interpolation: Bk= Bt-n+k(Bt- Bt-n)/n; k = 1, 2, ... ,(n- 1) where Bk i 
the bond rate on t he kth day, on which the actual bond rate is not availabl ; Bt 
is t he next available bond rate; Bt-n is the previously known bond rate on th 
day t - n; and n - 1 is the number of days t hat the actual bond rates are not 
available. 
The Sri Lankan rupee expressed in both (log) levels and returns , and net 
for ign exchange purchases (intervention) data for Sri Lanka are shown in Fig-
ure 4.1. The log of the level of the Sri Lankan rupe is present d in panel (a) , 
and the percentage returns are presented in panel (b) . The intervention data are 
plotted against each of these series , with the cale of the xchang rate variabl s 
on the left side of the respective panels, and the scale of interv ntion on the right. 
Positive values of the intervention series repre ent purchases of dollars and 
negative values represent sales . Tabl 4.1 present descriptive stati tics for h 
net intervention data for the total sample period as well a for th ub-p riod of 
non-cri is and crisis. Appendix B.1 presents ummary tatistic for th Sri Lankan 
rupee/ S dollar xchang rate the interest rate diff rential and the bond pr ad . 
Figure 4.1 and Table 4.1 how that the magnitud of volatili y for th int r-
vention data i great r during th cri i period. Th tandard d viation of int r-
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Figure 4.1: Sri Lankan Rupee Exchange Rate and Intervention Data, January 2002 
to December 2010. Notes: Panel (a) is the daily log exchange rate against the US 
dollar and net foreign exchange intervention (US$m). Panel (b) is the percentage of 
daily exchange rate returns against the US dollar and net foreign exchange intervention 
(US$m). The shaded areas indicate the crisis period from July 2, 2007 to December 
31 , 2010 (Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka). 
vention increased from 7.81 million in the low volatility period to 20.03 million 
in the global volatility period. During this time, the Central Bank of Sri Lanka 
went from being a net seller to a net purchaser as shown by t_he statistics for the 
mean across two sub-periods. Meanwhile, the figure depicted in Appendix B.2 
shows evidence of volatility clustering of exchange rate returns. 
A Dickey-Fuller test is used to test the stationarity ef the time series used in 
this Chapter. The null hypothesis tested is that the time series exhibits a unit 
root , against the alternative of stationarity. Appendix B.3 presents the results. 
As the interest rate differential and the bond spread are non-stationary at their 
level form , the first difference of these two series is used for the empirical analysis. 
4.4 G ARCH Models 
The empirical analysis of this Chapter is based on the GARCH methodology. 
Various forms of the GARCH method, such as standard GARCH (Dominguez, 
1998; Hillebrand and Schnabl , 2003; Behera et al. , 2008) , EGARCH (Hoshikawa, 
2008; Goyal and Arora, 2010; Tuna, 2011) , TGARCH (McKenzie, 2002; Suardi , 
2008) , and smooth-transition GARCH (Reitz and Taylor , 2008) have been used 
to model exchange rate volatility. Empirical studies tend to apply a GARCH(l ,1) 
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics for Intervention Data. 
Statistics 
Total sample 
No. of obs. 
Niean 
Niax 
Niin 
Std. dev. 
Non-crisis period 
No. of obs. 
Mean 
Max 
Niin 
Std. dev. 
Crisis period 
No. of obs. 
Niean 
Niax 
Niin 
Std. dev. 
Intervention 
1082 
0.11 
99.75 
-118.45 
14.99 
561 
-0.35 
39.15 
-40.00 
7.81 
521 
0.60 
99.75 
-118.45 
20.03 
Purchases Sale 
547 535 
9.71 -9.68 
99.75 -0.25 
0.25 -118.45 
11.60 11.27 
307 254 
4.80 -6.60 
39.15 -0.25 
0.25 -40.00 
4.89 5.89 
240 281 
16.00 -12.47 
99.75 -0.25 
0.50 -118.45 
14.36 13.91 
Note: The intervention data are expressed in millions of US dollars. The statistics are 
calculated for each sub-period on all days there are purchases or sales of US dollar 
(Intervention), days on which US dollars are purchased (Purchases) and days on which 
US dollars are sold (Sales). The total sample is from January 1, 2002 to December 
31 , 2010 , the non-crisis period is from J anuary 1, 2002 to June 29 , 2007 , and the crisis 
period is from July 2, 2007 to December 31, 2010. 
specification, as it provides a good fit to daily data (Baillie and Boll r 1 v 1989). 
Baseline GARCH(l,1) model This Chapter first applies the widely used 
GARCH(l ,1) specification initiated by Engle and Bollerslev (19 6) to examin 
the effect of foreign exchange intervention on the conditional mean and volatility 
of daily Sri Lankan rupee/US dollar exchange rate returns ( dlert) as follows: 
(4. 1) 
(4.2) 
(4. 3) 
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where w > 0, a > 0, 5 > 0, and Ut is t he standardized residual of exchange 
rate returns. Equation ( 4.1) is t he conditional mean equation and Equation ( 4.3) 
is t he conditional variance equation. In t his fr amework , t he returns of t he Sri 
Lankan rupee ( dlert) are explained by a vector of explanatory variables Xt , which 
includes t he purchases (purt) and sales ( selt) of foreign exchange in millions of 
US dollars , t he first difference of the interest rate different ial ( di f t), and t he first 
difference of t he government bond spread ( sprt) . The coefficient vector is /3 . 
Asymmetric responses of t he condit ional volatility t o unexpected movements 
in exchange rate returns are capt ured by the volatility equation in Equation 4.3. 
The unexpect ed return , which is represented by the error t erm Et, is used to rnodel 
t he condit ional volatility of the exchange rat e returns ht . The information set 
available at t ime t - 1 is denoted by D t-l · Volatility clustering, or news about 
volatility from the previous period is captured by f.i-i, t he lag of t he squared 
residuals from the mean equation. This t erm is also called t he ARCH term. 
This ARCH effect usually arises from the dependency caused t hrough t he second 
1noments of t he error term. Conditional volatility is captured by ht . The term 
ht-l is t he GARCH t erm , which represents t he forecast of t he variance of t he 
previous period. Further , a > 0 measures the extent to which a shock affects 
t he volatility during t he next period , while 5 > 0 capt ures t he persistence of 
volatility. The constraints w > 0, a > 0 and 5 > 0 ensure t hat ht is strictly 
posit ive . The model is stationary if ( a + 5) < 1. Finally, , is t he coefficient 
vector to be estimated in t he variance equation. 
Errors are assumed to be normally distributed. Alt hough t he distribut ion of 
exchange rate returns usually exhibit fat tails suggesting t hat t hey are not nor-
mally distributed , it has been empirically tested t hat using alternative distribu-
tions, such as t he t-distribution or t he generalized error distribut ion (GED), does 
not make a significant difference to t he para1neter estimation (Hentschel, 1995) . 
For sin1plicity t he normal distribut ion assumpt ion is used in this Chapter. If the 
daily exchange rate returns are 1nodeled correctly, t he parameter esti1nates are 
still consistent even if errors are not normally distributed (Bollerslev, 1986). 
The interest rate different ial is used to capt ure t he relationship between t he 
exchange rate and t he interest rate . The government bond spread is included as 
a proxy for count ry risk. For intervent ion to influence t he daily rupee returns 
effectively, intervent ion t hrough purchases is expected to depreciate t he rupee, 
76 Foreign Exchange Intervention and Volatility: GARCH Approach 
while intervention t hrough sales is expected to appreciate t h don1e t ic currency 
significantly. That is, the coefficient of purchases of US dollars /3p is exp cted to 
be positive and the coefficient of sales f3s is expected to be negative. A higher 
interest rate differential is expected to appreciate the exchange rate returns , and 
a higher spread in the government bond rates is expected to trigger declin 1n 
the Sri Lankan rupee/US dollar exchange rate. 
For intervention to reduce the conditional volatility of exchange rate returns , 
the parameter estimates of purchases and sales of US dollars are expected to b 
negative and significant. A reduction in the country risk given by a reduction in 
the government bond spread is assumed to reduce exchange rate volatility. How-
ever , the interest rate differential can either st abilize or destabilize the exchange 
rate. 
Augmented GARCH(l,1) model The baseline model specified above 
does not allow exchange rate dynamics and foreign exchange intervent ion to af-
fect each other simultaneously. Further , the model does not capture possible 
autocorrelation in daily exchange rate returns. Therefore, the baseline rnodel is 
aug1nented , including lagged exchange rate returns as well as lagged purchase 
and sales of foreign exchange. The inclusion of lagged intervention variables h lps 
to identify the horizon at which intervention through purchases and sales affect 
the daily rupee returns and its volatility. The effects of exchange rate returns 
that may persist over several days are captured through lagged exchange rate 
returns. The inclusion of lagged exchange rate returns is also expected to address 
the autocorrelation problem. The aug1nented form of the baselin GARCH(l ,1) 
n1odel is given by: 
k m n 
dl ert = f3o + L /3p.iPUTt-i + L f3s,i selt-i + f3ddift + /3spSPTt + L f3er,i dl Tt -i + Et 
i=O i=O i=l (4.4) 
k m 
ht = w + aE;_l + 5ht-l + L [p,iPUTt-i + L rs,i S lt -i + rddift + [spSPTt ( 4.5) 
i=O i=O 
·where the explanatory variables are t he san1 as in the ba lin model. 
Follovving a general-to-specific approach purchas and al s are included in 
one- and two-day lag with one day lagged xchange ra e r turn . Initially fiv 
lag of intervention variable and five lag of exchange rat return ar included 
4.4 GARCH fodels 77 
in the model. The lag lengths are t hen reduced until the last lag is found to 
be statistically significant at least at the 10 percent level. The selection of lag 
lengths of purchases and sales of US dollars is based on a simple ordinary least 
squares esti1nate over t he full sample period. Contemporaneous purchases and 
sales are excluded for reasons of simultaneity as the baseline GARCH estimation 
shovvs the effect of contemporaneous purchases and sales often opposite signed 
as it is in the case of simultaneity bias. After selecting t he lag lengths , the 
specification takes the form: 
2 2 
dlert = f3o + L /3p,iPUTt-i + L f3s,i selt-i + /3d dift + ,BspSPTt + f3er dlert-l + Et ( 4.6) 
i=l i=l 
2 2 
ht= w + ae;_1 + 6ht-l + L p,iPUTt-i + L s,i selt-i + ddift + r spSPTt. (4.7) 
i=l i=l 
TGARCH(l,1) model The augmented GARCH (l 1) model is t hen coin-
pared v it h a t hreshold GARC-H (TGARCH) model to test for possible asymme-
tries in t he conditional variance equation . Equation ( 4. 7) is modified by includ-
ing a dun1m variable Dt-l, to capture t he effects of past unexpected shocks on 
olatility. The conditional variance equation for t he TGARCH (l)) model has 
the form: 
2 2 
ht= +aEi-1 +5ht-l +Te;_1Dt-l + L piP'LlTt-i + L s,i selt-i + r ddift+ spSPTt; 
where Dt-l = 
1. if Et-1 < 0: 
0, if Et-1 > 0. 
i=l i=l (4.8) 
In his specification; the effect of an unexpected exchange rate appreciation on 
he conditional ariance i higher than the unexpected exchange rate depreciation 
if (a+ T) > 5 and lower otherv\-ise , gi en tha T # 0. A_ positi\ e value of T mean 
prior neg a i e re urns ha e a higher effect on \ ola tili t . 
EGARCH(l,1) model Recent empirical s udies have hown that tradi-
ional G RCH(l)) rnodel underestimate he effect of intervention on the vari-
ance of ex hange rate re urn (Beine e al. ; 2002 ; Domac; and 1 Iendoza; 200-1) . 
n impor ant requirement of ba ic G RCH n1odel is o in1po e restric ion on 
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parameters to ensure a positive condit ional variance. In an attempt to avoid th 
violation of the non-negativity condition , many studies include ab olute value 
of purchases and sales of foreign exchange ( or net intervent ion) in the varianc 
equation , while ignoring the effect of other exogenous variables that n1ight aff ct 
the volatility of the exchange rate returns. 
Although the models expressed in Equations ( 4.6)-( 4.8) are estirnated using 
absolute values of the sale of US dollars , these models also include the first dif-
ferences of the interest rate differential and the government bond spread. If the 
parameters are not restricted to be positive, there is a risk of computing a n g-
ative variance. Therefore , in estimating Equations ( 4.6)-( 4.8), one should either 
restrict the parameters to be positive or ensure that the variance is always pos-
itive. The EGARCH model proposed by Nelson (1991) allows t he incorporation 
of negative variables or parameters for the variance equation without imposing 
restrictions , still ensuring non-negativity in the variance. The EGARCH frame-
work ensures that volatility is always positive, as all the terms in the conditional 
variance equation are derived from the exponential function. The advantage of 
using the EGARCH specification is that it captures asymmetric or leveraged be-
havior of volatility. In the context of exchange rate volatility, this refers to t h 
characteristic of an unexpected negative shock to exchange rate returns that tends 
to increase exchange rate volatility disproportionately. 
In t he case of exchange rate volatility and intervention, the EGARCH 1nod 1 
allov1s t he investigation to effectively distinguish t he effect of t he int rvention 
through purchases and sales, when they are expressed in positive and n gativ 
values, and a positive variance will reside regardless of wh t her t he coefficient 
are positive or negative . Therefore, this study also estimates the variance of th 
Sri Lankan rupee returns in an EGARCH (l ,1) environment , such that: 
2 2 
ln (ht) = w+a\zt-1 \+ezt-l +5 ln (ht-1)+ L Tp,iPUTt-i+ L rs,iS lt-i+rddi.ft+rspSPTt , 
i=l i=l (4.9) 
1vvhere Zt-l =Et-i/ ~ i t he lagged standardized shock that capture asyn1n1 t-
ric effect of positive and negative shocks. If e > 0, volatility tends to ri e a t h 
lagged tandardized shock i po it iv (zt-l > 0). Th rever e hold if e < 0. Thu 
the effect of th hock i asym1ne ric if e # 0. P art icularly, if - 1 < e < 0 po itiv 
shock increa e volatility le than negativ shock . The p r i tenc of volatility 
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shocks for the EGARCH model is governed by 5. The sales are included in the 
empirical analysis in negative magnitudes to capture the effects of intervention 
when the central bank intervenes to the foreign exchange market through sales. 
The GARCH(l 1) TGARCH(l)) and EGARCH(l)) models specified above 
are estimated b using ma.,-ximum likelihood estimation. The most suitable model 
is then selected following standard model selection procedures. That is; the model 
that contains the lo,vest Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian infor-
mation criterion (BIC) values and t he largest log likelihood (LogL) value, is used 
to select the best model that fits the data in evaluating the effectiveness of for-
eign exchange intervention in Sri Lanka. Additionally, the Ljung-Box statistics 
calculated from the first 20 autocorrelation coefficients of the standardized resid-
uals and the tandardized squared residuals ( Q(20) and Q2 (20); respectively) are 
tested for remaining residual autocorrelation as it is important to have no autocor-
relation in the residuals before estin1ating the GARCH process. The Lagrangian 
1\1Iultiplier (Ll\JI) test is carried out to test for ARCH effects in residuals. 
4.5 Empirical Results 
This Section presents empirical results on how intervention by the Central Bank 
of Sri Lanka in foreign exchange market effects the exchange rate returns and its 
ola ilit . To this end, thi ud first estimates the baseline GARCH (l,l ) model 
explained b Equation ( 4.1 )- ( 4.3) o er the non-crisis period as "" ell as over the 
cri i period in Sec ion 4.5.1. Sec ion 4.5.2 e t imates the augmented GARCH (l,l ) 
model (Equation (4 .6) and (4 .7)) . the TG RCH (l,l ) rnodel (Equations (4 .6) and 
(4. )) and the EG RCH (l.1) model (Equations (4 .6) and (4 .9)) in order to select 
he best model o explain he effects of foreign exchange inter ention on exchange 
rate re urn and exchange rate -ola ili y-. The e1npirical result for the non-cri is 
period and the ri i period are di cu sed in Sections 4.5.3 and 4.5.4 . respecti-vely. 
4.5.1 Baseline model 
Table .2 pre en e in1ate of the ba eline G RCH (l.1 ) model over non-cri i 
and the cri i period . b olu e olun1e of purcha e and ale are u ed in the 
model. The para1ne er are hen e ima ed \\-ithout any con traint: en uring 
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Table 4 .2: Baseline GARCH(l,1) Model P arameter Estimat s . 
Parameter Non-crisis period Crisis period 
Conditional mean equation: coefficient (l0- 3 ) 
/30 28.10 (0.012) -10.07 (0.609) 
/3p -2 .32 (0.106) -0.18 (0.881) 
f3s -0.27 (0.824) 2.74 (0.000) 
{3d -66.79 (0.940) 23.97 (0.802) 
/3sp 0.42 (0.312) -0.17 (0.497) 
Conditional variance equation: coefficient (l0- 3) 
w 22.41 (0.000) 1.93 (0.000) 
( p -0.90 (0.000) -0.29 (0.000) 
rs -0.95 (0.000) -0.09 (0.085) 
rd 102.94 (0.362) 7.65 (0.580) 
(Sp 0.41 (0.000) -0.10 (0.003) 
ARCH and GARCH terms 
a 0.298 (0.000) 
<5 0.407 (0.000) 
Diagnostic test statistics 
Q(20) 105.14 (0.000) 
Q2 (20) 289.48 (0.000) 
LNI 31.461 (0.000) 
LogL 607. 687 
AIC -0.900 
BIC -0.853 
0.168 (0.000) 
0.550 (0.000) 
146.89 (0.000) 
89.683 (0.000) 
22.375 (0.000) 
423.968 
-0.973 
-0.906 
ote: The non-crisis period is from January 01 , 2002 to June 29 , 2007 and th cn s1s 
period is from July 02 , 2007 to December 31 , 2010 (see Equations (4 .1 )- (4 .3 )). The de-
pendent variable in t he mean equation is the Sri Lankan rupee returns ( dl ert), and th 
vector Xt in both the mean and the condit ional variance equations includ s purchas s 
(purt), absolute volume of sales (selt), the first difference of the interest rate diff ren-
tial (dift) and the first difference of the government bond spread (sprt) . P aram t r 
estimates are rnultiplied by 1000. p-values are in parentheses . 
t hat t he variance is always positive. E t imated coefficients do not exhibit a 
strong effect on the Sri Lankan rupee/US dollar exchange rate returns in both 
periods. Only the conternporaneous sale of US dollars during the crisi period 
(f3s) has a significant effect, but it is against prior exp ctations. In contra t, 
contemporaneous purchases ( rp), as well as, sales ( s) tend to reduce xchange 
rate volatility significant ly during both period even if t he magnitude of uch 
effects are mall. A change in t he intere t rate differential ha no ignificant fie t 
in reducing exchange rate volatility wh rea t he fleet of th chang in th bond 
pread. though ignificant. i mall. 
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The main problem associated wit h the baseline model is the possible corre-
lation of the error term with t he explanatory variable. Diagnostic statistics also 
show that the baseline model does not fit for the data under investigation. The 
Ljung-Box test statistics show t hat both t he standardized residuals and the stan-
dardized squared residuals reject t he null hypot hesis of no autocorrelation up to 
order 20 . The ARCH-LNI tests ·with tvvo lags suggest remaining ARCH effects 
in the residuals. 4 Therefore; t he augmented GARCH (l,1 ); TGARCH (l,1 ) and 
EGARCH(l,1) models are tested to select t he better model in examining the 
effectiveness of foreign exchange intervention in Sri Lanka. 
4.5.2 Model selection 
This Section estimates t hree specifications of GARCH models; t he augmented 
GARCH(l 1); TGARCH(l 1) and EGARCH(l,1) and t he results are reported 
in Table 4.3 for t he non-crisis period. The empirical results suggest that the 
EGARCH(l,1 ) model vvhich allovvs for asymmetric effects; is t he best fit to the 
data. The EGARCH(l,1 ) 1nodel is selected as t he best model as it contains the 
largest log likelihood (LogL) value; and t he lovvest AIC anq. BIC values . The 
t hreshold tern1 T in t he TGARCH(l 1) model is not significant; indicating that 
the t hreshold n1odel is not needed to capt ure any asymmetric effects in the data. 
The Ljung-Box test statistics calculated from the first 20 and 30 autocorrela-
tion coefficients of the standardized residuals ( Q ( 20) and Q ( 30)) of the selected 
EGARCH(l,l ) 1nodel are 31.48 (p-value = 0.05) and 35.69 (p-value = 0.22) ; re-
spec i el . The Ljung-Box test statistic for the standardized squared residuals 
(Q2 (20)) is 18.54 (p-value = 0.55) . Thus ) the selected EGARCH(l,l ) n1odel 
fails o reject t he null h pothesis of no autocorrelation in residuals in longer lags 
at he 5 percent le el. The p-value of the ARCH-LNI test (0 .08) suggests that 
here are no addit ional ARCH effects remaining in the residuals at the 5 percent 
le el. 0 erall he standardized diagnostic statistics show t hat the EGARCH(l,1) 
n1odel i t he bes n1odel as in comparison to the al ernative models ; is able to cor-
rec for he eroskedas ici in t he exchange rate data and provides less evidence 
of au ocorrela ion in t he standardized residuals . 
4The R H-L1I e is carried out with two le -els of lags based on the optimal lag length 
ugge ed for he inter -en ion model. 
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Table 4.3: GARCH (1,1), TGARCH (1,1) and EGARCH (1,1) Mod 1 Paramet r 
Estimates . 
P arameter GARCH (1,1) TGARCH (1,1) 
Eq. (4 .6),(4.7) Eq. (4 .6),(4.8) 
Conditional mean equation: coefficient (10- 3 ) 
/30 -3.41 (0.807) 8.33 (0.657) 
/3p, l 3.31 (0.119) 0.05 (0.989) 
/3p,2 1.97 (0.128) 3.54 (0.135) 
/3s, l 3.33 (0.022) -0.49 (0.791) 
/3s,2 2.11 (0.131) -1.13 (0.652) 
(3d -116.11 (0.893) -152.58 (0.909) 
/3sp 0. 98 (0.127) 0.49 (0. 713) 
/3er 313.83 (0.000) 270.4 7 (0.000) 
Conditional variance equation: coefficient(10- 3) 
w 25.16 (0.000) 29.00 (0.000) 
(p, l -0.78 (0 .000) -0.88 (0.15) 
(p,2 -0.74 (0.003) -0.89 (0.015) 
rs,l -0. 42 (0 .036) 0.64 (0.013) 
rs, 2 -1.08 (0.000) -1.15 (0.000) 
rd -148.20 (0.379) 50.25 (0.815) 
rsp 0.37 (0.000) -0.022 (0.881) 
ARCH and GARCH terms 
a 0.264 (0.000) 
5 0.454 (0.000) 
T 
e 
Diagnostic test statistics 
Q(20) 20.867 (0.090) 
Q2 (20) 280.120 (0.000) 
11\II 35.232 (0.000) 
LogL 543 . 066 
AIC -0.795 
BIC -0.729 
0.152 (0.011 ) 
0.558 (0.000) 
0.057 (0.400) 
26. 504 (0.150) 
299.470 (0 .000) 
44.1 (0 .000) 
400. 583 
-0.578 
-0 .508 
EGARCH (1,1) 
Eq. (4 .6),(4.9) 
2 .11 ( 0 .145) 
-0 .99 (0.063 ) 
2.55 (0.000) 
0.23 (0.721 ) 
0.08 (0.913) 
-237.24 (0.017) 
-0.21 (0.001 ) 
216.55 (0.000 ) 
-540.98 (0.000) 
-16.13 (0.129) 
-21.91 (0.020) 
-17.48 (0.006) 
-4.57 (0. 484) 
5063.51 (0.012) 
5.70 (0 .000) 
0.523 (0 .000) 
0.964 (0.000) 
-0.041 (0. 001 ) 
31.483 (0.049) 
18.542 (0.552) 
2.533 (0 .0 0) 
1271.525 
-1. 95 
-1. 24 
ote: Niodels are estimated over the non-crisis p riod, J anuary 01 , 2002 to Jun 29 
2007 (see Equations (4.6) and (4. 7) , (4 .6) and (4 .8), and (4 .6) and (4 .9 ), r p ctively). 
The dependent variabl in the 1nean equation i the Sri Lankan rupe return ( dl er). 
Absolute values of sales (selt) are included in the GARCH(l,l) and TGARCH(l,1) 
1nodels, ·while total volumes of sales are used in the EGARCH(l,l) model. P ara1neter 
estimates are multiplied by 1000. p-values ar in parenthese . 
4.5.3 Effects of intervention during the non-crisis period 
This Section analyze the effect of for ign exchange int rvention on xchang 
rate returns. and it vola ility during the non-cri i period ba ed on h r ult 
of the lect d EG RCH (l.1 ) mod 1 in Tabl 4.3. 
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Effect on exchange rate returns The esti1nated coefficients for the inter-
vention variables indicate that the effects of intervention on the conditional mean 
of the exchange rate returns are ambiguous. Interestingly, the results reveal that 
intervention through purchases is effective in influencing the daily exchange rate 
returns during the non-crisis period , but not intervent ion through sales. Al-
though intervention through purchases is significant , the effect is not totally in 
line with prior expectations. If t he purchases of US dollars are to influence the 
daily exchange rate returns, the coefficients /3p,1 and /3p, 2 should be positive and 
significant. The results reveal t hat one-day lagged purchases /3p,l tend to appre-
ciate the Sri Lankan rupee against the prior expectations , while two-day lagged 
purchases /3p, 2 tend to depreciate the exchange rate as expected. 
Accordingly, a purchase of US dollars 100 million leads t he rupee to depreci-
ate by 0.16 percent in two days. In this context, the average and the maximum 
amounts of purchases of US dollars during the non-crisis period as presented in 
Table 4.1 tend to depreciate the domestic currency by 0.008 percent and 0.063 
percent , respectively, within two days. Clearly, t hese effects are small and cannot 
be considered economically substantial , that is t hey have no significant influence 
on the average daily return of the Sri Lankan rupee/US dollar rate (-0.01 percent). 
This indicates that the central bank intervenes in the foreign exchange market 
through purchases 1nainly to build up international reserves, but not to alter the 
exchange rate trend. Further more , intervention t hrough sales tends to depreciate 
the rupee , but both coefficients are insignificant. Economically and statistically 
insignificant coefficient estimates imply that foreign exchange intervention con-
ducted by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka is consistent with its intention of not 
altering daily exchange rate returns. The view that the Central Bank of Sri Lanka 
does not focuss on a particular exchange rate target is further evident from the 
·weak correlation between foreign exchange intervention with the exchange rate 
returns , as shown in the top panel of Appendix B.4. 
Instead, the empirical estimates of the conditional mean equation suggests 
that the change in exchange rate returns is mainly determined by its own lagged 
value and the interest rate differential. A depreciation of the Sri Lankan rupee 
rate tends to further depreciate the exchange rate the next day. The coefficient of 
lagged exchange rate returns (Per ) is not only highly significant at the 1 percent 
level, but the magnitude is also relatively large (0.2 percent). Hussain and Jalil 
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(2007) and Shah et al. (2009), among oth rs , found similar re ult for n1 rg1ng 
economies. An increase in the first difference of t he interest rate differential (f3d) 
leads the exchange rate to appreciate significantly. This is in line with th fact 
that t he high interest rate differential should have attracted more capital inflovvs 
resulting in an appreciation of the exchange rate . Finally, an increa e in th 
difference of the government bond spread is associated with an appreciation of 
the Sri Lankan rupee against prior expectations, but the magnitude is relatively 
small. 
Effect on volatility of exchange rate returns All coefficients attached to 
intervention variables in the conditional volatility equation are negatively signed. 
It suggests that foreign exchange intervention by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka 
tends to reduce exchange rate volatility during the non-crisis period. However, 
only two-day lagged purchases and one-day lagged sales significantly reduce the 
volatility of exchange rat e returns. Whether or not the Central Bank of Sri Lanka 
has been successful in curtailing excessive volatility in the rupee returns were only 
assessed through the signs and the statistical significance of the parameter sti-
mates , as the economic significance of the effect of intervention on the conditional 
volatility is difficult to assess numerically under EGARCH model. The limitation 
is t he non-differentiability of the absolute function lzt-i I at zero . 
Although a rise in the interest rate differential is expected to reduce xchange 
rate volatility as a consequence of an increase in capital flows, t he int rest rate dif-
ferential has a significant perverse effect, increasing the volatility of the exchange 
rate . This may be a result of investors' expectations on t h overall macroeconorni 
environment of the country. Another possible r ason is that a risk premium ab-
sorbing any appreciation pressur arises from positive inter st rate differentials. 
Goyal and Arora (2010) found si111ilar results for India when analyzing t h fleets 
of intervention. The bond spr ad, which reflects country risk, increa. s volatility 
in the domestic currency 111arket. 
The condit ional variance of exchange rate r turns is also aff ct d by the di-
rection of the shocks. The coefficient of () the a ymm try and 1 v rag effec 
is negative and statistically significant at the 1 perc nt 1 vel an l i b twe n 
-1 < () < 0. This uggests t hat po it ive hock 1ncrea volatili y 1 than neg-
ative shock . The decay rate that mea ure t h per i tent eff t of the hocks 
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5 is close to 1, suggesting that shocks to the volatility of the exchange rate are 
persis ent for a longer tin1e during the non-crisis period , even if the central bank 
inter enes. The half-life statistic (Reyes , 2001) that estimates t he t i1ne it takes 
to olatili to 1no-\ e halfway back to its mean level following a deviation fro1n 
mean shows hat a shock to the , ariance of t he returns of the Sri Lankan rupee 
takes a mini1num of 19 da s (ln(0 .5) / ln ( 5)) to halve its original size . 
Joint significance of intervention through purchases and sales The 
\iVald est in estigates the joint significance of a subset of coefficients included in a 
n1odel. Here a \ iVald test is carried out to exan1ine whether intervention through 
purchase and sale are jointly significant. Interestingly, the test statist ics find 
trong e idence rejecting all null hypotheses , as shov\ n in Table 4.4, suggesting 
that all inter, ention variables are jointl - significant in explaining exchange rate 
returns as well as the olatility of exchange rate returns during the non-crisis 
period. The only exception is he test of joint significance of the sale of -s 
dollar on exchange rate returns. These findings are in line with the parameter 
e in1ate pre ented in Table 4.3 , where the coefficients of sales variables in the 
mean Equation, s 1 and ,Bs 2 , are found to be insignificant . -This confinns that 
intervention through sales does not have a significant effect on daily exchange 
rate return . 
Table 4.4: Joint Significance of Intervention through Purchases and Sales During the 
N on-crisi Period. 
Null hypothe i 
_All inter, ention variable do not j ointlJ affect daily returns 
,Bp .l = ,Bp .2 = ,B-,1 = Ps .2 = 0 
Intervention through purcha e does not jointly affect daily returns 
p .1 = Bp .2 = 0 
Intervention t hrough ale does not jointl - affect dail - return 
8 ,1 = ,2 = 0 
.A.11 interyention variable do not jointly affect , olatility 
1p .1 = 1p.2 = / .1 = , .2 = 0 
Inter, ention through purcha e doe not jointly affect volatility 
p.l = p.2 = 0 
In er, ention through ale doe not jointly affect ,;-olatilitY 
.2 = 0 
Test stat 
(p-value) 
9.080 
(0.000) 
18.031 
(0.000) 
0.122 
(0. 5) 
31.67-:1 
(0.000) 
3.513 
(0.030) 
4 . 27 
(0.000) 
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Effectiveness of intervention The overall results suggest that for ign 
exchange intervention conducted by the C ntral Bank of Sri Lanka, exan1in cl 
through purchases and sales of US dollars, does not influ nee daily exchang 
rate returns , but reduce the conditional volatility of daily rupee returns during 
the non-crisis period. The empirical results reveal that the effect of int rv ntion 
through purchases or sales on the conditional mean is not economically substan-
tial. This , together with the effects of intervention on the conditional variance , 
which indicate that intervention reduces volatility in the daily rupee r turns , 
suggest that the central bank has been successful in achieving its short- and 
medium-term targets of curtailing excess volatility and accumulating reserves, 
respectively. In summary, the empirical results suggest that foreign exchange 
intervention has been effective in Sri Lanka during the non-crisis period, and i 
consistent with the "leaning against the wind" policy to reduce volatility. 
4.5.4 Effects of intervention during the crisis period 
This Section examines the effectiveness of foreign exchange intervention by th 
Central Bank of Sri Lanka during the crisis period from July 02 , 2007 to Decen1ber 
31 , 2010, and the results are presented in Table 4.5. 
Effect on exchange rate returns P arameter estimates of th conditional 
mean equation suggest that foreign exchange intervention through purchases and 
sales has statistically significant effects on daily exchange rate r turns during th 
crisis p riod. Except for one-day lagged purchases (/3p,l), all oth r interv ntion 
para1neters are against the prior expectation of the effect s of intervention on 
exchange rate returns. However, this interpretation may be misleading as t he 
effects of intervention are too 1nall. As the value of param t r estimates uggests; 
a purchase of US dollars 100 n1illion appreciates the Sri Lankan rupe /US dollar 
exchange rate by 0.009 percent ·within two days (/3p,l + /3p, 2 ) . Asal of S dollar 
100 n1illion depreciates the rupee by 0.16 percent within two days (/3s,l + f3s,2). 
In this context. intervention through purcha es appr ciate daily r turns by an 
average of 0.001 percent , and intervent ion through ales cl preciat s the curr ncy 
by an averag of 0.02 perc nt within two day (See Table 4.1). How v r , th 
correlation between exchange r turn and foreign x hang int rvention during 
the crisis period pres nted in the bottom pan 1 of App ndix B.4 is weak , again 
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suggesting that the central bank does not target a particular level of the exchange 
rate. 
As in the case of the non-crisis period, Sri Lankan rupee returns are mainly 
determined by the lagged value of exchange rate returns. Surprisingly, this Sec-
tion finds no evidence to show that the interest rate differential has a significant 
effect on exchange rate returns during the crisis period. The reason for this may 
be partly attributed to the political and economic environment prevailing in the 
country which discouraged the inflow of foreign exchange in addition to the fi-
nancial crisis. However, increasing govern1nent bond spreads tends to depreciate 
the exchange rate during this period. 
Effect on volatility of exchange rate returns The effect of interventions 
conducted by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka on the conditional volatility of the Sri 
Lankan rupee returns is not clear . In contrast to the effects during the non-crisis 
period one-day lagged purchases ( rp,1) and one-day lagged sales ( ,s,1) tend to 
increase exchange rate volatility. Though one-day lagged purchases do not have 
a significant effect on the conditional volatility, one-day lagged sales significantly 
increase volatility. Both two-day lagged purchases ( rp,2 ) and two-day lagged sales 
-
( s. 2 ) reduce volatility in Sri Lankan rupee returns. These coefficients are found to 
be significan at the 1 percent level reflecting the high explanatory power of this 
specifica ion for the conditional vola ility. This in turn s~ggests that intervention 
(bo h sales and purchases) reduces the volatilitJ of daily rupee returns with lags 
of wo da s although in er, ention through sales tends to increase volatility ,;vit h 
one-da lag . 
The interest ra e differential does not play a significant role in the conditional 
, olatili J equation during t he crisis period. Again j this n1ay be due to t he re-
due ion in foreign exchange inflows as a resul of domestic and global economic 
condi ions pre alent during t his period. The go, ernment bond spreads is still 
po it i elJ igned j ugges ing that an increase in country risk increases volatility 
in he dome t ic foreign exchange market. The le er age effect tenn e is positi, e 
and significan a t he 10 percent level indicating t hat t he i1npact of a shock is 
a mine ric. The deca - rate c5 is less t han that of the non-crisis period suggesting 
t hat he hock to -ola ilitJ of exchange rate returns are less persistent when the 
cen ral bank increases its in er en ion in t he foreign exchange market. 5 The half-
hown in ppendix B.1 ) the average intervention through purchase ha increased from 
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Table 4.5: EGARCH (1)) JVIodel Parameter Estimate of the Cri i P eriod. 
P arameter 
Conditional mean equation: 
Po 
Pp,1 
Pp,2 
Ps,1 
Ps,2 
Pd 
Psp 
Per 
EGARCH (1 ,1) 
Eq. ( 4.6), ( 4.9) 
coefficient ( 10- 3) 
0.24 (0.883) 
0.18 (0.000) 
-0.27 (0.000) 
0.19 (0.000) 
1.43 (0.000) 
-4.29 (0.616) 
0.29 (0.002) 
107.07 (0.019) 
Conditional variance equation: coefficient ( 1 o-3 ) 
w 
[p,1 
[p,2 
rs,1 
rs,2 
rd 
[Sp 
ARCH and GARCH tenns 
a 
5 
() 
Diagnostic test statistics 
Q(20) 
Q2 (20) 
LM 
LogL 
AIC 
BIC 
-820.82 (0.000) 
4.44 (0 .109) 
-16.78 (0.000) 
31.38 (0.000) 
-43 .4 7 (0.000) 
162.62 (0.308) 
2.56 (0.018) 
0.758 (0.000) 
0.930 (0.000) 
0.039 (0.089) 
37.683 (0 .010) 
15.931 (0.721) 
0. 700 (0.497) 
917.031 
-2.122 
-2.022 
Note: The mod 1 is estimated over the period from July 02 , 2007 to December 31 , 2010 
(see Equations (4 .6 ) and (4 .9)). The dependent variable in th mean equation i the 
Sri Lankan rupee returns. Total volumes of sales (selt) are included as negative values. 
Pararneter estimates are multipli d by 1000. p-values are in parenthes s. 
life statistic indicates that a shock to volatility now takes only 9 days to reach 
half of its initial size. 
Effectiveness of intervention Wheth r foreign exchange intervention on-
ducted by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka has b en uc e sful during the crisi 
S dollar 4. 111illion in the non-cri i period o dollar 16 million in th crisi period , while 
intervention through sales ha increa ed fr0111 S dollar 6.6 million to dollar· 12.5 111illion. 
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period is an interesting question . As in t he non-crisis period foreign exchange 
intervent ion has not been influent ial in managing daily exchange rate returns dur-
ing t his period. The ambiguity is about t he effect on condit ional volatility. The 
fact t hat condit ional volatility tends t o increase by one-day lagged sales cannot be 
used to conclude t hat intervent ion is ineffective during t his period. A significant 
reduction in volatility by two-day lagged purchases and two-day lagged sales may 
have a higher effect in offsetting t he effects of one-day lagged sales . 
Increased activit ies in t he foreign exchange 1narket suggest t hat t he Cent ral 
Bank of Sri Lanka has used intervention as a precautionary measure t o prevent 
possible effects that could arise as a consequence of externally sourced nega-
t ive shocks in t he foreign exchange market during this period. The behavior of 
economic fundan1entals t hat affect t he foreign exchange market in t he face of 
financial 1nar ket t unnoil 1nay have undennined t he effect of intervent ion during 
t his period . Although t he effect in reducing exchange rate volatility is not very 
strong in general foreign exchange intervent ion has been effective in Sri Lanka. 
4 .6 Conclusion 
sing a unique data set on dailJ foreign exchange intervent ion , t his Chapter in-
' es iga ed efficac of foreign exchange intervent ion in emerging economies taking 
Sri Lanka a an example. For t he estimation purpose t he total sample period 
,i\ as di ided in o v. o sub-periods: i) J anuary 01 ) 2002 to June 29) 2007-"the non-
crisis period' and ii) Jul 02 ) 2007 t o December 31 , 2010-"t he crisis period" . In 
t he ca e of Sri Lanka) t he cri is period corre ponds to both t he recent t urbulence 
in global financial markets and t he final stage of t he countrJ i civil war . 
Con1paring e, eral GARCH specifications) t he EGARCH(l ,l ) model vvas found 
to be he 1no t appropriate framevvork to n1odel t he effects of fo reign exchange 
inter, ention in Sri Lanka . The E GARCH 1nethodolog provides a convenient 
fran1e\"\ ork to gauge t he effec of central bank inter, ention on the conditional 
mean and the variance of t he Sri Lankan rupee/ -s dollar exchange rate. Addi-
ionall , i i not neces ar to impose a non-negati, ity constraint on the para1ne-
er \i\ hen he EG RCH n1e hodology i applied. Hov. ever. t he main lin1itation of 
hi 1ne hodolo~ i being unable to quant ify the effect on conditional volatility. 
The e1n pirical re ul found po i i e e idence on t he effecti, ene s of foreign 
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exchange intervention in Sri Lanka. The results indicate t hat foreign exchang 
intervention in Sri Lanka is consistent with th 'l aning against t he ,;vind policy 
to reduce volatility. This is true for both sub-periods; alt hough t he eff ct vva 
not strong during t he crisis period. Intervention , either t hrough purcha es or 
sales, has not been influential in n1anaging daily returns of the Sri Lankan rup e 
returns. Thus, overall effect of foreign exchange intervention is consist nt with 
the policy emphasis of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka that is, accumulating 
international reserves and curtailing excessive volatility in the don1estic foreign 
exchange n1arket, vvithout affecting the exchange rate trend. 
The e1npirical findings of this Chapter are in line with Anand et al. (2011) 
vvho suggested that the Central bank of Sri Lanka atten1pts to curtail xce s 
volatility, but are in contrast with their suggestion that intervention affects t h 
exchange rate trend. The results are in line with Disyatat and Galati (2007), who 
revealed that foreign exchange intervention in emerging economies has little, if 
any, effect on exchange rate returns , but they have significant effects on curtailing 
excessive volatility. 
The study found that t he n1oven1ents of Sri Lankan rupee return ar mainly 
deten11ined by the lagged value of exchange rate returns. The effect of the gov-
ernn1ent bond spread on exchange rate returns , t hough s1nall , tends to increase 
exchange rate volatility during both sub-periods. The interest rate differential 
tends to appreciate t he rupee during t he non-crisis period , but do not have a 
significant effect during the crisis period. In the case of conditional volatilit i 
the intere t rate differential ha a positi, e effect to increas volatility in th non-
crisis period . but does has no ignificant effect in the cri i period. Additionall . 
the results found evidence for the existenc of as) 1nmetric volatilit and le, erag 
effect for the Sri Lanka rupe / S dollar exchange rat returns. 
The en1 pirical results ugge t that interv ntion 111ay be u ful in containing 
unexpected short-ten11 volatilit 1n ri Lankan rupee/ dollar xchang rat 
return sten1n1ing fron1 external hock . The fr quenc_ of int r · ntion and i 
ucce in reducing YolatilitY ugge t that th re i a cop for 1n rging mark t 
to op rate flexible exchange rat reg1n1 ,vithout having adopt a pur floa . 
Future re earch in thi field can be ext nded to tirnat an xp ct d lo 
function that depend on th d Yiation of th x hang rat fron1 it long-t rn1 
fundan1ental ,·alu . a ,Y 11 a on conditional , olatility d n d fron1 th GAR H 
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process. If the estimated loss function enables forecasts of out-of-sample interven-
tion periods , it can be used as an effective rule for foreign exchange intervention 
by the central bank. 

Chapter 5 
Foreign Exchange Intervention 
and Volatility in Emerging 
Economies: A Latent Factor 
Approach 
5.1 Introduction 
This Chapter develops a new empirical framework based on the latent factor 
-
methodology to further investigate the effects of intervention for exchange rate 
volatility and reserve accumulation for emerging markets, using the case of Sri 
Lanka. The latent factor framework has not been previously applied to model 
foreign exchange intervention. 1 This class of models is often used to decompose 
financial market asset returns, particularly in currency and equity markets , into 
specified sources of volatility (Diebold and Nerlove, 1989; Niahieu and Schotman, 
1994; Dungey, 1999). 
This Chapter takes a set of currency returns of Sri Lanka and its major trading 
partners, as well as Sri Lankan intervention data from January 2002 to December 
2010, as in Chapter 4, and models the variables as a function of global , idiosyn-
cratic and intervention factors. The global factor affects all currency returns 
in the model but possibly in different ways. It captures movements in global 
1 Only one other manuscript, Aruman (2003) has considered intervention in a latent factor 
framework but uses a factor structure different to that adopted in this Chapter. 
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rnarket fundamentals encompassing concepts such as, but not exclusively global 
liquidity condit ions and general trader risk aversion. An idio yncratic factor i 
specified for each exchange rate return and captures movements specific to each of 
them. An intervention factor is specified in t he Sri Lankan currency equation for 
days on ·which the Central Bank of Sri Lanka intervenes . Estimation is t hrough 
Generalized l\!Iethod of Mon1ents ( G lVIlVI) . 
The volatility decon1positions are analyzed to understand t he effects of inter-
vention on Sri Lankan currency returns. If the contribution of the global and 
idiosyncratic factors is found to be the same across days with and without in-
tervention , this suggests that foreign exchange intervention by the Central Bank 
of Sri Lanka is not effective in explaining the currency market volatility over t he 
period under investigation. Alternatively, if the 111echanisms vary across t he two 
models: then the effectiveness of intervention can be assessed. Especially t he 
proposed model supple111ents the e111pirical analysis presented in Chapter 4 by 
assessing the effects of intervention on exchange rate return volatility, and exam-
ining its economic significance in the sense that the effect of intervention is large 
enough to explain currency market volatility. 
The e111pirical results suggest that the central bank is successful in achieving 
its short - and medium-term objectives of containing exchange rate volatility and 
accumulating reserves , respectively. The central bank is able to influence overall 
foreign exchange return volatility by 5.5 percent during the period of relatively 
low volatility in foreign exchange markets before the recent crisis. On further 
delving into the effects of intervention, t he data are split into day on which 
intervention occurs through purchases or sales of US dollar . Int rvention is 
n1ost effectiv when the bank purchases US dollars , suggesting that the Central 
Bank of Sri Lanka is uccessful in accumulating international reserves in lin with 
the 111ediu111-tenn target as expected during a period of calm. The ame 111odel 
estin1ated for the cri is period presents strikingly different r sult . ale of US 
dollars i 1nore important thi ti111e with the central bank int rvening o mitigate 
the xchange rate volatility in line vvith the hort-term objectiv . o abl , he 
central bank tends to intervene in re pon e to global factor rather than dom 1c 
( idio yncratic) factor . 
The re t of the Chapter proc ed a follow . ction - .2 pre en th x-
change rate and int r-.-ention data that are u ed in h empiri al appli ation. 
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The modeling framework is developed in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 discusses the 
GMM estimation methodology that is adopted in this Chapter. The empirical 
results of the effect of foreign exchange intervention on exchange rate volatility 
are discussed in Section 5.5. This Section first focuses on the volatility decompo-
sition for a factor model of exchange rate returns, and then extends this model 
to include intervention. The relative effect of purchases and sales of US dollars 
on currency return volatility is then examined. Finally, the model distinguishing 
purchases and sales is estimated for the crisis period corresponding to the recent 
crisis. Section 5.6 concludes. 
5.2 Exchange Rates and Intervention Data 
This Section presents a preliminary analysis of the data used in the model of 
foreign exchange intervention in Sri Lanka. The data comprise of n = 5 daily ex-
change rate returns of the euro (EU Rt), the Indian rupee (IN Rt), the Japanese 
yen (JPYt), the British pound (GBPt) and the Sri Lankan rupee (SLRt), ex-
pressed in US dollars, as well as daily net foreign exchange purchases by the 
Central Bank of Sri Lanka (I NTt). As in Chapter 4, excliange rate returns are 
computed by taking the first difference of the natural logarithm of the exchange 
rates and multiplying it by 100. Net foreign exchange purchases are in millions 
of US dollars. All series are demeaned and scaled by their respective standard 
deviations to express in standardized units. 
The selection of exchange rates is based on Sri Lanka's main trading partner 
countries according to the weights assigned by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka in 
calculating the 24-currency real effective exchange rate . The top six countries ' 
trade weights in the calculation of the real effective exchange rate are the US 
(19 .74 percent) , India (15.57 percent) , the UK (9.86 percent) , China (6.41 per-
cent) , Germany ( 5.88 percent) and Japan ( 4. 99 percent) , which form the basis of 
the sample selection. 2 As the focus is on countries with floating exchange rate 
regimes , some major trading partner currencies are excluded from the data set , 
including the Chinese yuan and the Malaysian ringgit , which operate under man-
aged floating exchange rate regimes , and the Hong Kong dollar which is directly 
2See Box Article 12 of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka Annual Report 2010 , R evi-
sion of Effective Exchange Rate Indices, http: //www.cbsl.gov.1k/ pics_n_docs/ l0_pub/ _docs/ 
efr/annuaLreport/ AR2010/ English/ 9_Chapter_05.pdf (accessed June 5, 2011). 
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linked to the US dollar. 3 The sa111 ple consists of a election of d veloped-n1arket 
exchange rates, as ·well as t he emerging-market exchange rate of the Indian rup 
which provides a convenient point of comparison with t he Sri Lankan rupee in t h 
model. The exchange rates and returns for Sri Lanka's 111ajor trading partn r 
wit h floating exchange rates are shown in Figure 5.1. The out liers in t h euro 
on 1\tl arch 1 and 2, 2005 , as depicted in Figure 5.1 , are re111oved using a du111my 
variable in the empirical analysis. An increase in the value of the exchange rate 
indicates an appreciation of the US dollar against the local currency. 
As in Chapter 4, the sa111ple period of this Chapter also extends from J anuary 
1, 2002 to December 31 , 2010. For the estimation of the main empirical model 
in Section 5.5 , the sample period is chosen to end on June 29 , 2007 to avoid 
conta111inating t he analysis with the volatility in currency markets a sociated 
·with the recent crisis in global financial markets . The model is then re-run for t he 
high-volatility period in Section 5.5.4 to explore the effectiveness of intervention 
for emerging markets during periods of extreme volatility. Following t he same 
terminology in Chapter 4, the first sub-period is labeled t he "non-crisis p riod ' 
and t he latter "crisis period" . The crisis sample period extends from July 2, 2007 
to Dece111ber 31 , 2010 , and is highlighted in t he figures by t he shaded region . 
Table 5.1 presents descriptive statistics on t he Sri Lankan rupee and oth r 
exchange rate returns in t he model for t he total sample period as well as for 
t he two sub-periods. Table 4. 1 in Chapter 4 pre ents imilar tatistic for th net 
intervention data. To re-cap , the intervention stati t ics are calculated for day on 
·which the central bank intervenes in t he currency n1arket in any form . Graphical 
repre entations of t he Sri Lankan rupee expre sed in bot h (log) level and return ; 
and net foreign exchange purchases data (intervention) for Sri Lanka are ho,vn 
Figure -1.1 in Chapter 4. The greater volatilitJ in magnitude of int rv ntion 
during the cri i period a hown in Table 4.1 and Figure 4. 1 probabl re ul 
fron1 don1e tic and external factor a this period i not only coincid ·with th 
recent financial cri i . but al o the final pha e of the 25 ar ci il ,var in ri Lanka. 
3The Hong h ong :\Ionetary . uthority ha guaranteed upp r and lo"· r bound on 
th currency of lJ . l:HK. 7.75 - 7. . ince :\Iay 1 . 2005 ( ource: Hong Kong i\Ione-
tary Authority. http: //"·,n..-.hkma.gm·.hk/ ng/ key-function / mon tary- tabilit -/hi ory-hong-
kong -exchange-rate- y t 111. htn1l (acce ed June 5. 2011)). 
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Figure 5.1: Daily Log Exchange R ates and P ercentage Exchange R ate Ret urns , J an-
uary 2002 t o December 2010. Notes: Returns are for t he euro, t he Indian rupee , the 
J apanese yen and t he Brit ish pound against the US dollar . The shaded area indicates 
the crisis period from July 2, 2007 to December 31, 2010 (Source: Cent ral Bank of Sri 
Lanka) . 
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics of the Exchange Rate Returns (percent). c..o 
Total sarnplc Non-crisis period Crisis period 
B SLal.jsti c:s Vari c1:I ) 1 c All N 011-iut Int All Non-int Int All Non-int Int 
""1 
No. of obs. 1089 1082 1324 763 561 847 326 521 CD 2171 ....... o-q 
NJax EUll 7.53 7.53 3.65 7.53 7.53 2.55 3.65 2.99 3.65 :::::s trj 
INH. 3.40 1.93 3.40 1.93 1.93 0.98 3.40 1.74 3.40 X 0 
JPY 4.41 3.44 4.41 3.44 3.44 1.29 4.41 2.47 4.41 p--~ 
:::::s Gl3P 4.68 2.61 4.68 2.61 2.61 1.47 4.68 2.39 4.68 o-q CD 
SLR. 1.25 1.15 1.25 1.15 1.15 0.77 1.25 1.14 1.25 1----1 
:::::s 
-3.80 -4 .73 rt 1\ll l 11 EUR. -G .69 -6 .69 -4.73 -6.69 -6.69 -2.19 -4.73 CD 
""1 
INR. -3.25 -3 .25 -2.58 -2 .26 -2.26 -1.57 -3.25 -3.25 -2.56 < CD 
:::::s 
JPY -4.73 -2 .71 -4.73 -2.71 -2.71 -2 .56 -4.73 -2.21 -4.73 rt ....... 0 
GBP -4.58 -2.71 -4.58 -2.46 -2 .46 -2 .08 -4.58 -2.71 -4.58 :::::s 
PJ SLR, -2.04 -2.04 -1.06 -2.04 -2.04 -1.06 -1.67 -1.67 -1 .04 :::::s p_. 
l\llcan EUR, -0 .02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 0.00 0.02 -0 .01 ~ INR, -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0 .02 0.01 -0.00 0.02 f---' ~ 
rt JPY -0.02 0.02 -0.06 -0.01 0.02 -0 .04 -0.05 0.02 -0.09 ....... f---' ....... 
rt Gl3P -0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.01 0.04 '--< 
SLR, 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0 .01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.00 r ~ 
Stcl. dcv. EUR, 0.75 0.77 0.73 0.69 0.75 0.59 0.84 0.81 0.85 rt CD 
:::::s INR. 0.43 0.44 0. 42 0.31 0.35 0.24 0.57 0.58 0.56 rt 
JPY 0.69 0.64 0.59 0.61 0.55 0.82 0.72 0.88 
rrj 
0.73 ~ 0 
Gl3P 0.69 0.64 0.74 0.56 0.60 0.50 0.86 0.75 0.93 rt 0 
""1 
SLR 0.17 0.21 0.14 0.19 0.21 0.15 0.16 0.20 0.12 >--
Note: The exchange rates arc expressed in tcnn::; of US dollars. The statistics are calculated for each sub-period for all days (All) , days on which 'u 'u 
""1 
there is uo intervention (Non-int) and clay::; on which there is intervention (Int). The total sa1nple period is fro1n January 1, 2002 to Dece1nber 0 ~ 
31, 20LO, the non-crisis period is fron1 January 1, 2002 to June 29 , 2007, and the crisis period is fron1 July 2, 2007 to Decen1ber 31 , 2010. 0 p--
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Net daily foreign exchange purchases are conducted only in the US dollar 
market; however, by doing so, the central bank indirectly influences the exchange 
rates of other currencies against the Sri Lankan rupee. 4 Table 5.1 shovvs that 
t he Central Bank of Sri Lanka intervenes frequently. Over the sample period, 
intervention takes place on approximately 50 percent of all days, with a fairly 
even split between net purchases (547 days) and sales (535 days), as shown in 
Table 4.1. There is more intervention in the crisis period ( 62 percent of days) 
compared to the non-crisis period ( 43 percent of days) . 
P articular interest here is that, on days during the crisis period when the cen-
tral bank intervenes , volatility is higher on intervention days than on days of no 
intervention for all countries excluding India and Sri Lanka. For example, on non-
intervention days, the standard deviation of the euro is 0.81 percent compared 
to 0. 85 percent on the intervention days, and increases from 0.75 percent to 0.93 
percent for the pound. In contrast, the standard deviation for the Sri Lankan 
rupee falls from 0.20 percent to 0.12 percent perhaps suggesting that t he central 
bank is effective in containing exchange rate return volatility through interven-
tion when volatility is high , or perhaps reflecting the improve1nent of domestic 
conditions. 
5.3 Factor Model Specification _ 
The analytical framework employed in this paper is a latent factor model of ex-
change rate returns in the tradition of Diebold and Nerlove (1989) , Mahieu and 
Schotman (1994), and Dungey (1999), where exchange rate returns are presented 
as functions of a set of independent latent factors. The factors in this applica-
t ion capture 1novements t hat are common to all exchange rate returns (global 
factors) , idiosyncratic to each asset , and related to intervention. Adopting a 
factor structure has several advantages . First, the approach provides a parsimo-
nious representation of the data. Second, observable variables do not have to be 
identified or modeled. Third, t he approach is convenient to use , as the model 
implicitly takes into account all disturbances affecting the system of exchange 
rate returns. Finally, i .i .d and unit variance assumpt ions on the factor structure 
4 ote that changes in cross rates, for example between the Sri Lankan rupee and the euro , 
are not fonnally modeled in this Chapter, with all exchange rates expressed against the US 
dollar. 
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allovv t he decomposition of exchange rate returns into the contribut ion that each 
of the factors makes to overall volatility. The volatility decompositions are t h 
rnain vehicle for this analysis. 
In finalizing the factor model of central bank intervention , the n1odel is built 
up in two stages. Section 5.3.1 specifies a factor model of exchange rate return 
vvithout formally rnodeling the effect of intervention. However, t he model dis-
tinguishes between non-intervention and intervention days. On non-int rv ntion 
days, exchange rate returns are a function of global and idiosyncratic factors. On 
intervention days , the exchange rate returns are a function of the same factors; 
however , the effect of each factor on each exchange rate return, as given by t h 
factor loadings , is allowed to change through the formal modeling of structural 
breaks. These are designed to capture changes in the international and domestic 
dependence structures among the exchange rate returns which may be prevalent 
on the days that a central bank chooses to intervene in the foreign exchang 
n1ar ket . The modeling of only the exchange rate returns in the first stage is to 
provide a sense of these dependence structures before the formal introduction of 
intervention. 
In the second stage of modeling in Section 5.3.2 , care is again taken to distin-
guish between non-intervention and intervention days . The intervent ion variable 
is introduced into the model of exchange rate returns and follows t he sa1ne fac-
tor structure as t he exchange rates , in that it is specified as a function of global 
and idiosyncratic factors. However , on intervention days , t he Sri Lankan rupee 
exchange rate returns are allowed to be a function of t he idiosyncratic factor a so-
ciated vvith the intervention data. This model is able to provide evid nee on th 
effectiveness of intervention by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, as the contribution 
of intervention to the volatility of the exchange rate returns in comparison to th 
global and idiosyncratic factors is able to be assessed. 
5.3.1 Model of exchange rate returns 
Thi Section specifie a latent factor model of exchange rat return , for int rven-
tion and non-intervention days while suppre sing the form al rol for interv ntion. 
The 1110d 1 consist of n zero 1nean daily bilat ral exchange rate return xpr s d 
against the S dollar . Th data s t is parated into two par whi h aid id n-
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t ification as outlined in Section 5.4. Let e~ denote the exchange rate returns on 
non-intervention days (j = 0) , and let eI denote the exchange rate returns on 
intervention days (j = 1) , such that : 
e{ = {EURi, I NRi,JPY/,GBPj,SLR{} j = 0, 1. (5.1) 
Non-intervention days The dynamics of the ith exchange rate returns on 
non-intervention days (j = 0) is governed by a set of independent latent factors: 
0 \ 0 0 e . t = /\ . Wt + rv. Ui t i, 'I, /1, , i = 1, 2, ... ,n;j = 0. (5 .2) 
There is a global factor in the model ( Wt) that captures common shocks affecting 
each of then exchange rate returns in the model with t heir own parameter loading 
A~. These global shocks are implicit in t he data and capture global 1narket funda-
mentals driving average currency returns and global financial market conditions 
such as liquidity or trader risk aversion in the global foreign exchange system. 5 
The final factor ui,t is an idiosyncratic factor t hat captures shocks specific to each 
currency market , and reflects own-country fundamentals that are independent of 
global condit ions. The loadings on the idiosyncratic factors are ryf . 
Intervention days On intervention days (j = 1) , it is assumed that there is 
a possibility of higher volatility in the exchange rate market , perhaps prompting 
intervention. To allo-w for this, structural breaks in the factor structure are speci-
fied for intervention days. The dynamics of exchange rate returns for intervention 
days (j = 1) can be expressed as: 
i =l ,2, ... ,n;j= l (5 .3) 
where ,\} and ryl are the structural breaks in the parameters on the global, nu-
meraire and idiosyncratic factors. 
5 An alternative structure is to formally model a conunon numeraire factor to show that 
all returns are expressed in US dollars. This factor would affect each exchange rate return 
with a fixed loading in each equation. The presence of the numeraire factor imposes a no-
arbitrage condition on the rnodel, as shown in Dungey (1999) . However, computationally, this 
specification did not work for this application. 
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In matrix form , t he 1nodel of exchange rate returns can be expressed a : 
(5 .4) 
where for intervention days j = l 
EUR} (A~ + AD 
I NR1 t (Ao+ A1 ) 2 2 
JPY/ (A~+ A§) Wt 
GBP1 t (A~+ Ai) 
SLR} (A~+A~) 
( , f + ,t) 0 0 0 0 U1 t ) 
0 (,~ + ,J) 0 0 0 U2t 
' 
+ 0 0 (,~ +,J) 0 0 U3t (5.5) 
' 
0 0 0 (,2 + fLD 0 U4t 
' 
0 0 0 0 (,~ + ,J) U5t ) 
Variance decompositions Using the assumption that the factors are i .i .d. (0, 1) 
random variables , Equations (5.2) and (5 .3) can be used to express t he volatility 
of each of t he currency returns into its component factors. For intervention days: 
Var ( ef,t ) E[ ( e1 )f,t] 
( A~ + Ai) 2 + ( ,P + ,l) 2 . ( 5. 6) 
The proportion of the volatility of t he return of exchange rate i when j l 
explain d by the global factor Wt, is: 
( A~ + A}) 2 + ( ,p + rl) 2 . (5. 7) 
The proportion of the volatility of the return of exchange rate i xplain d by th 
idio yncratic factor ui.t, is: 
(5. ) 
On non-intervention days (j = 0) i the varianc decompo ition are th , a1n ; but 
,Yith the tructural break tenn suppre d. 
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5.3.2 Model of central bank intervention 
To examine the effectiveness of central bank intervent ion, t he model in Section 
5.3.1 is extended by introducing intervention (net purchases of US dollars) as an 
endogenous variable. The data set is again separated into two parts (j = 0, 1) , 
facilitating the identification of the effects of non-intervention vis-a-vis interven-
tion days. Redefining ei to consist of n = 6 series of zero mean bilateral exchange 
rates expressed against the US dollar , and a series of demeaned net intervention 
in 111illions of US dollars , the data set is: 
e{ = { EUR{, INRi, JPY/, GBPJ , SLR{, I NTJ} j = 0, 1. (5 .9) 
The model for intervention in the Sri Lankan rupee exchange rate market rests 
on the assu1nption that intervention in Sri Lanka does not directly affect the 
exchange rate returns for the remaining exchange rates in the sa1nple. Hence, t he 
equations for the exchange rate returns for n = l , 2, .. . , 4 are the sa1ne as t hose 
stated in Equations (5 .2) and (5 .3). 
The new variable, intervention ( I NTJ) , is explained by the first global factor 
. . 
Wt with para111eter loading Aint, and an idiosyncratic factor Vt with loading rlnt 
such t hat when j = 0 
(5. 10) 
and vvhen j = l · 
The endogenous treatment of intervention and its inclusion when j = 0 provides 
a natural test of t he model, as t he variation in intervention is expected to be 
explained only by its own idiosyncratic factor , vvith no effect from the global 
factors. 
The equation for t he Sri Lankan rupee returns is the same as in Equation 
(5 .2) for non-intervention days but differs from Equation (5 .3) for intervention 
days ,vhere: 
1 _ ( ' o _J_ , 1) ( o 1) 1 
e5 ,t - /\5 1 /\5 Wt + 5 + 5 U5 t + (JintVt · (5.11) 
The Sri Lankan rupee returns are now explained by the global factor Wt , and tvvo 
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idiosyncratic factors , u5,t and Vt. On intervention days the factor Vt beco1n s 
an intervention factor , with the effectiveness of foreign exchange intervention by 
the central bank measured by the loading on the intervention factor in t he Sri 
Lankan rupee exchange rate returns equation , crfnt · 
In matrix form: 
(5. 12) 
and the model of exchange rate returns can be expressed as: 
EUR1 t (A~+ Ai) 
I NR 1 t (Ag+ A~) 
JPYJ t (A~+ A!) 
GBP/ (A~+ Ai) 
Wt 
SLR1 t (A~+ A~) 
I NT 1 t ( Af nt + Af nt) 
( l ~ + 1i) 0 0 0 0 0 U1 t 
' 
0 (1~ + 1i) 0 0 0 0 U2t 
' 
0 0 (1~ +- 1l) 0 0 0 U3t 
+ ' 
0 0 0 (1g + 1l ) 0 0 U 4t 
' 
0 0 0 0 (1~ + 1l) 1 U5t er int 
' 
0 0 0 0 0 ( 1fnt + 1lnt) Vt 
(5 .13) 
when j = l. 
Volatility decompositions Analogous to the factor model of xchange rate 
returns, the volatility decompositions for the factor model of central bank int r-
vention can be calculated using the expressions for the total variance for each 
type of variable: 
Var(e:_t) 
Var( e§.t) 
Var(! Tf) 
( A~ + A§) 2 + ( ~ + g) 2 + ( cr;ntv) 2 , 
( , o A 1 )2 ( o 1 )2 A int + int + lint + lint · (5 .14) 
For the ri Lankan rupe returns; t h proportion of the volatility of h r turns 
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explained by the global factor Wt is: 
(5.15) 
The proportion of the volatility of the returns explained by its own idiosyncratic 
factor u5 t is: 
' 
(;\~ + ;\} )2 + ( ,f + ,l )2 + (alntv) 2 . (5.16) 
Finally, the proportion of the volatility of t he returns explained by the interven-
tion factor Vt is: 
(;\~ + ;\} )2 + ( ,f + ,l )2 + ( alntv) 2 . (5. 17) 
In the same manner , the proportion of the volatility of intervention is decom-
posed into global ( Wt) and idiosyncratic ( Vt) factors , as: 
(5.18) 
and: 
(5. 19) 
resp ecti vel y. 
5.4 GMM Estimation Method 
As in Chapter 3, the factor models of exchange rate returns and central bank 
intervention specified in the previous Section use a GJVIJVI estimator . As alluded to 
in Section 5.3, the model of intervention is identified and estimated by exploit ing 
the feature of the data that intervention did not occur on some days and did occur 
on others . 6 In the case of the factor model of central bank intervent ion , which 
contains n = 6 variables, there are a total of 42 moment conditions with which to 
identify 27 parameters by equating the empirical and theoretical moments of the 
model. Of the 1nornent condit ions, ((6 x 7)/2) = 21 derive fro1n non-intervention 
day data, with the addit ional 21 derived from intervention day data. 
The difference between the empirical moments and the theoretical moments 
6Dungey et al. (2011) use the regimes of a non-crisis and a crisis period to identify models 
of contagion in much t he same way that intervention is identified through the two regimes here 
of non-intervention days and intervention days. 
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of the 1nodel for each of t he (non-intervention and intervention) r gimes is: 
Mo= vech (D0 ) - vech (A0 A0') , (5 .20) 
and 
(5.21) 
where OJ refers to the empirical variance-covariance matrices for non-intervention 
and intervention days , and AJ AJ' refers to the corresponding theoretical variance-
covariance 1natrices for the two regimes . The AJ derives from equation (5. 12) 
and uses the assumption that the factors are zero mean and unit varianc , t he 
empirical variance-covariance matrices are: 
DJ = ~ '\;' ei e{ , T · L..,; 
J tET· J 
where Tj represents the sample size of the non-intervention and intervention day 
regimes. 7 
The objective function of the GM1VI estimator Q accounting jointly for both 
non-intervention days and intervention days is minimized according to: 
(5 .22) 
·where vVj are t he optimal weighting matrices t hat correct for heterosc dasticity 
corresponding to j = 0, 1. Note t hat in estimating the model , init ial estimat s of 
the variance-covariance matrices are obtained using identity weighting matrice . 
That is, Wj = I .8 All calculations, including over-identification te t (Hans n's 
J statistics), are undertaken using t he same procedure de cribed in Section 3.5 
of Chapter 3. 
7 Attempts to identify the model described in Section 5.3 using the variance-covariance ma-
trices of the total data set is infeasible, a this would generate only 21 empirical moment. to 
identify 27 parameters in the theoretical model leaving the model unidentifi d. 
For sorne variants of the rnodel , the u e of optimal weighting matrice wa · infeasible; thu 
for consi tency, results using the identity-weighting matrix for all models are report d . 
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5.5 Empirical Results 
This section examines the effect of foreign exchange intervention by estimating 
the 1nodels outlined in Section 5.3. The first set of n1odels are estimated for the 
low volatility period. Before estimating the fully specified 1nodel of central bank 
intervention in 5.5 .2 , a model of exchange rate returns ·without a fon11al role for 
intervention is first estimated in 5. 5 .1. The role of intervention is fon11ally in-
troduced in Sections 5.5.2 and 5.5.3 . Section 5.5.2 evaluates the effectiveness of 
intervention in general, and Section 5.5.3 evaluates the differences in the effective-
ness of intervention when the Central Bank of Sri Lanka intervenes by purchasing 
US dollars vis-a-vis when intervention occurs through sales. Finally, in Section 
5.5.4, the model of central bank intervention distinguishing between purchases 
and sales is re-run over the global volatility sa1nple period. 
5.5.1 A factor model of exchange rate returns 
The results of the factor 1nodel of exchange rate returns outlined in Section 5.3 .1 
are presented in Table 5.2 . To recap, t his 1nodel does not formally model inter-
vention, but it does separate the data into non-intervention clays and intervention 
days. The factor model of exchange rate returns is then estin1ated to examine 
the contribut ion of the global and idiosyncratic factors to the overall volatility in 
. 
exchange rate returns for Sri Lanka ( and other currencies) in the two sub-periods. 
The top panel of Table 5.2 provides the percentage contribution of the global and 
idiosyncratic factors to overall volatility on non-intervention days. The second 
panel provides the percentage contribution of the global and idiosyncratic fac-
tors to overall volatility on intervention days. The ]-test for this model with 10 
degrees of freedom is satisfied with a value of 13.481 and a p-value of 0.198. 
The results provide interesting insights into overall 1nove1nents in currency 
n1arkets during the two regi1nes. On days when there is no intervention , the Sri 
Lankan rupee returns are dominated by the idiosyncratic factor with almost 100 
percent of volatility purely don1estic. Table 5.3 presents the para1neter estimates 
for the factor n1odel along with the p-values . On days when there is intervention. 
the volatility decon1position for Sri Lanka changes substantially. As shown in 
the second panel of Table 5.2 , on intervention da ·s , the global factor increases in 
importance from 0.2 percent to 15 percent. Thi suggests that Sri Lankan policJ 
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Table 5.2: Volatility Deco1nposition of th Factor Model of Exchange Rate Return . 
Factors 
Global Idiosyncratic 
Non-intervention days (j = 0) 
EU Rt 41.983 58.017 
I N Rt 7.001 92.999 
Y ENt 41.614 58.386 
GBPt 70.751 29.249 
SLRt 0.245 99.755 
Intervention days (j = 1) 
EURt 39.999 
I N Rt 25.010 
Y E lVt 45.028 
GBPt 53.091 
SLRt 15.445 
60.001 
74.990 
54.972 
46 .909 
84.555 
ote: Contribution to total volatility, in percent. The 1nodel is estimated over the 
period J anuary 1, 2002 to June 29 , 2007 (see Equations (5.7) and (5 .8)) . 
makers respond to global movements rather than domestic (idiosyncratic) market 
specific movements , when intervening in currency n1arkets . Providing furth r 
support to this view is that, on non-intervention days, the only insignificant 
para1neter is the global factor for the Sri Lankan rupee returns (,\~). Similarly, 
on intervent ion days, the only significant structural break parameter is t he global 
factor for Sri Lanka( ,\~) (see Table 5.2). The analysis in Section 5.5.2 will provide 
further evidence on whether this is actually the case when intervention is formally 
introduced into t he n1odel. 
On non-intervention and intervention days , t he emerging economy of India is 
most similar to Sri Lanka with 93 percent of its volatility a result of idio yncratic 
factors on non-intervention days . On intervention days, the weight of the global 
factor is also larger for India, at 25 percent compared to 7 percent for non-
intervention days . Global factors play a larger role for develop d countries, with 
around 42 percent of volatility for the euro and yen returns , and 71 percent for 
the pound on non-intervention days. 
5.5.2 A factor model of central bank intervention 
The effects of intervention E t imating t h factor model of c ntral bank int r-
v ntion. \Yhich add an equation for intervention to the factor model of xchang 
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Table 5.3: Parameter Estimates of the Factor :Niodel of Exchange Rate Returns. 
Global factors Idiosyncratic factors 
P aramet ers Estimates P aran1eters Estimates 
Non-intervention days (j = 0) 
EU Rt ,\ 0 1 0.646 1~ 0.760 
(0.000) (0.000) 
I R t ,\ 0 0.234 0 0. 855 2 1 2 
(0.000) (0.000) 
JPYt, ,\ 0 3 0.668 1~ 0.791 
(0.000) (0.000) 
GBPt ,\ 0 4 0.854 lg 0.549 
(0.000) (0.000) 
SLRt ,\Q b -0.043 19 b 0. 873 
(0.460) (0.000) 
Intervention days (j = 1) 
E U R t ,\ 1 -0.289 1 0.250 1 1 
(0.9 14) (0.627) 
I "f\f R t ,\ 1 -0.093 1 -0.016 2 1 2 
(0.381) (0.975) 
JPYt, ,\ 1 -0.036 1 0.379 3 3 
(0.878) (0. 577) 
GBPt ,\ 1 -0.178 1 -0.003 4 4 
(0.358) (0.986) 
S LRt ,\! -1. 185 1 -0.087 0 5 
(0.000) (0. 889) 
1 ote: The n1odel is e t imated over the period January 1, 2002 to June 29; 2007 (see 
Equations (5 .2) and (5 .3)) . p-values are in parentheses . 
rate returns does not change t he volatility decon1posit ion too dramatically) as 
hovvn b co1nparing Table 5.4 and Table 5.2 . The equations for t he currencJ 
returns in he factor model of cent ral bank intervent ion remain t he sa1ne as those 
in t he fac or n1odel of exchange rate returns for all currencies apart fron1 t he Sri 
Lankan rupee (see Sec ion 5.3.2). In pection of t he second panel of the , olatility 
decompo it ion in Table 5.4 hows hat t he central bank is able to influence t he 
ola ili outcomes b 5. 5 percen t hrough inter ent ion . Thi is an economically 
ub tan ial n1agnit ude gi, en t hat t he n1odel i expres ed in terms of dail) rettffns . 
A comparison of hi n1agnit ude wit h t he san1ple variance of t he Sri Lankan ru-
pee re urns during his period (0.036 percen ) provides ftfft her support for this 
iev.. Table 5.5 repor s t he result of "\i\ ald test on he inter\ ention parameters 
and the inter en ion enns are also a i icall ignificant. Comparing t he re-
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Table 5.4: Volatility Decomposition of the Factor Niodel of Central Bank Interv ntion. 
Factors 
Global Idiosyncratic Intervention 
Non-intervention days (j = 0) 
EURt 44.039 55 .961 
I N Rt 18.367 81.633 
YElVt 41. 7 41 58.259 
GBPt 64.577 35.423 
SLRt 5.455 94.545 
INTt 0.010 99.990 
Intervention days (j = 1) 
EURt 37.796 62.204 
IN Rt 30.425 69.575 
YENt 40.812 59.188 
GBPt 48.183 51.817 
SLRt 16.782 77.697 5.521 
INTt 3.265 96.735 
Contribution to total volatility, in percent. The model is estimated over the period 
J anuary 1, 2002 to June 29 , 2007 (see Equation (5. 13)) . 
sults from the factor model of exchange rate returns (Table 5.2) to the 111odel of 
central bank intervention (Table 5.4) for Sri Lanka shows t hat in both models 
global factors contribute around 16 percent to Sri Lankan rupee return volatility. 
The intervention factor absorbs some of the volatility that is attributed to th 
idiosyncratic factor in t he previous model. Note t hat all of the structural break 
paran1eters in the model are joint ly significant as shown in Table 5.5. 
The biggest difference in the results for t he currency returns betw en the two 
models is in the contribution of the global factor on non-intervention days to the 
returns of India and Sri Lanka. For India, the contribution of th global fa tor 
rises from 7 percent to 18 percent ; for Sri Lanka, it rises from 0.2 p re nt to 5.5 
p rcent. These increases in magnitude suggest that the inclusion of Sri Lankan 
central bank intervention in the model now places great r weight on the m rging 
market in the global factor and allude to some linkages between India and ri 
Lanka. 
The inclusion of an intervention equation provide a natural est of the model. 
On non-intervention days , it is expected that the idio yncratic factor for the in-
t rv ntion equation hould dominate , a nothing i happening in th int rv ntion 
data on the e da . Thi i ind ed the ca , with the idio ncratic in rv n-
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ion factor explaining 99.99 percent of the volatility in inter\ ention data on non-
intervention days. Finally the model of central bank intervention provides a good 
overall fit to the data vvith the value of the ] -test of 0.120. 
Table 5.5: i\Tald Tests of Intervention and Structural Breaks in the Factor Niodel of 
Central Bank Intervention. 
H pothesis 
Joint intervention parameters 
H . /Tl - 1 - 0 0 · v int - int -
Joint idios ncratic and inter\ ention parameters 
H . 0 - /T l - 1 - 0 0 · int - v int - int -
Joint structural break parameters 
H 0 : A}= l = Oj i = 1 2 ... , 6 
DOF 
2 
3 
12 
Test statistic p-value 
90.248 0.000 
69 .368 0.000 
2270 .097 0.000 
I ote: The n1odel is esti1nated over the period January 1, 2002 to June 29 , 2007 (see 
Equation (5.13)). 
5.5.3 Purchases versus sales 
To fur her investigate the effecti, eness of intervention, the intervention data are 
plit into da -s v\ hen the Central Bank of Sri Lanka intervenes by purchasing 
US dollar , and da s when intervention occurs through sales. The model for 
in er ention da s is vvri ten as: 
"Where + denote da of S dollar purcha es; and: 
Q J 
51 
(5.23) 
( 5.24) 
,, here - deno e da of S dollar ales. Hence; the fac or model is jointly 
s imated in hree par s rather han t , o. and this model again satisfies the J-
e "i h 25 degree of freedom and a p-, alue of 0.921. 
Table 5.6 pre en the ola ili decon1po ition for the three regime . The 
re ul clearh indica e tha he central bank i 111ore effective on daYs of US 
dollar purcha e ( sale of Sri Lankan rupee) j vYith 11 percent of , ola ilitv in the 
Sri Lankan rupee return being due o he central bank Yolatilit:y. In contra t . on 
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Table 5.6: Volatility Decomposition of the Factor Model of Central Bank Int rv ntion 
Distinguishing Between Intervention through Purchase and Sales of US Dollars During 
the on-crisis period .. 
Factors 
Global Idiosyncratic Intervention 
Non-intervention days (j = 0) 
EURt 44.386 55 .614 
I N Rt 18.349 81.651 
YENt 41.547 58 .453 
GBPt 63.083 36.917 
S LRt 5.698 94.302 
I NTt 0.000 100.000 
Days of purchases (j = +) 
EURt 28. 033 71.967 
I N Rt 41.976 58.024 
YENt 39.258 60.742 
GBPt 39.272 60.728 
S LRt 22.183 67.004 10.813 
I NTt 2.583 97.417 
Days of sales (j = - ) 
EURt 36.253 63.747 
I N Rt 28.499 71.501 
YENt 41.472 58.528 
GBPt 0.000 100.000 
SLRt 17.225 80 .722 2.053 
INTt 4.104 95.896 
ote: Contribution to total volatility, in percent. The model is estirnated ov r th 
period January 1, 2002 to June 29 , 2007. 
days of sales of US dollars (purchases of Sri Lankan rupee), intervention is 1 ss 
effective and explains only 2 percent of volatility. This re ult is con istent wit h 
t he empirical findings for the non-crisis period presented in Chapter 4, wher 
intervention t hrough purchases has more fleet in reducing Sri lankan rup e/ S 
dollar exchange r t urn volatility compared t o int rvent ion t hrough al s. Thi 
suggests t hat t he Cent ral Bank of Sri Lanka is more succ ssful in influ n ing 
t he exchang rate ·when t he pre sure in currency markets i to appr ciate t he Sri 
Lankan rupee. This result also indicat s t hat t he C ntral Bank of ri Lanka i 
al o focus ed on achieving it 111edium-term target of accumulating int rnational 
reserve . 
It i vvorth co1n 111 nt ing on t he hanging role of t he Indian rup e in t hi mod 1. 
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On days when intervention occurs through either purchases or sales; t he global 
factor affects Indian rupee returns by substantially more than on non-intervention 
days ; again alluding to a possible common factor bet-ween India and Sri Lanka. 
5.5.4 Intervention in the crisis p eriod 
The first objective of the central bank is to contain excessive volatility in the 
exchange rate in the short-run. This objective is exan1ined in this Section us-
ing the crisis period corresponding to the recent financial crisis. Intuitively; it is 
expected that increased volatility in currency markets will lead to more interven-
tion as monetary authorities move to curb some of the volatility. This is verified 
in Table 5.1 j which presents statistics on intervention during the crisis period of 
July 2, 2007 to December 31 2010 . There are proportionately more days when 
inter ention took place in the crisis period ; and the standard deviation of inter-
vention is also higher. N otablyj the number of intervention days through sales of 
US dollars is higher than the numb er of days of purchases ; suggesting that the 
central bank aims to prevent excess currenc market \ olatility arising from neg-
ati e hort-run shocks ( or those placing pressure on the cur~ency to depreciate) , 
uch as those of the recent financial crisis. 
The model in Section 5.5.3 which dis inguishes the effects of inter\ ent ion 
hrough he purchase and sales of S dollars is estima ed for t he period July 2 j 
2007 to December 31 , 2010. The results reinforce t he sugge tion that t he Central 
Bank of Sri Lanka is succes ful in meeting it first objective of containing excessive 
currenc 111arke olatility in t he short-run, part icularl when pressure is for a 
rupee depreciation. Table 5.7 shows he volatilit:; decon1position corre ponding to 
t hi period , and it clearl - indicates that central bank intervention is n1ore effective 
on da of S dollar ales t han on da of purchases , wi h 11 percent of volatility 
in Sri Lankan rupee re urn due o central bank inter -ention. In contra t . on da -s 
of purcha e . inter en ion explain onl 3 percen of total \ olatilit -. The sample 
ariance of he Sri Lankan rupee re urn during the cri is period i 0.026 percent. 
re -ealing ha cen ral bank in er ention explain a ub tantial portion of the 
currenc - mar ke variance. The e finding further confirm the re ult pre ented 
in Chap er 4. 
The re ul for t he cri i period are in con ra o he non-cri i period; where 
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Table 5. 7: Volatility Decomposition of the Factor Niodel of Central Bank Int rv ntion 
Distinguishing Between Intervention through Purchases and Sales of US Dollars during 
the Crisis Period. 
Global 
Non-intervention days (j = 0) 
EU Rt 79.921 
I JV Rt 12.583 
YENt 3.641 
GB Pt 59.704 
SLRt 3.898 
INTt 4.093 
Days of purchases (j = +) 
EU Rt 65.314 
IN Rt 29.451 
YENt 2.650 
GB Pt 51.721 
SLRt 15.384 
I NTt 0.823 
Days of sales (j = - ) 
EURt 
IN Rt 
YENt 
GBPt 
SLRt 
INTt 
58.055 
24.616 
2.042 
0.000 
4.170 
3.399 
Factors 
Idiosyncratic 
20.079 
87.417 
96.359 
40.296 
96.102 
95.907 
34.686 
70549 
97.350 
48.279 
82.210 
99.177 
41.945 
75.384 
97.958 
100.000 
84.649 
96.601 
Intervention 
2.406 
11.181 
Note: Contribution to total volatility, in p ercent. The model is estimated over th 
period July 2, 2007 to December 31, 2010. 
purchases of US dollars are n1ore effective than sales. Intervention during th cns1 
period on days of purchases is con istent with the 1nodel for the non- risis period , 
which see the global factor increa e in importance for overall volatility co1npared 
with non-intervention days. On days of purchases , th global factor do s not 
change by n1uch , with most of the intervention absorbed from the idio yncrati 
factor. ·which falls from around 96 p rcent to 85 perc nt during this tim . 9 
9 Although this paper does not focus on changes to t h decompositions for the remaining 
countrie in th arnple, it is to glean an insight into th crisis p riod and the dynamic of th 
curr ncy 111arkets during this time. The re ults differ 111arkedly in tenn of decon1position for 
1no t currencies in the model in the crisis period , particularly for he euro and yen . Th global 
factor now contribut s O perc nt to the euro exchange rate volatility on non-intervention day 
reflecting that the euro dollar relation hip is a key ource of volatili ty. imilarly th yen i 
now con1pl tel:v driven by idio yncratic factor (96 percent). 
5. 6 Con cl us ion 115 
5.6 Conclusion 
Foreign exchange intervention by central banks in emerging economies has only 
been studied to a limited extent , and the effects of such intervention is not well un-
derstood. This Chapter contributes to this literature by estimating a latent factor 
model of central bank intervention for the emerging economy of Sri Lanka. The 
factor structure provides a convenient method of identifying sources of currency 
market volatility by decomposing currency returns of Sri Lanka and its major 
trading partners into a set of factors that includes global, idiosyncratic and in-
tervention factors. An advantage of latent factors is t hat observable variables 
do not need to correspond particularly to global and idiosyncratic factors. The 
effectiveness of intervention was assessed over two periods: first is the non-crisis 
period corresponding to the relatively tranquil period in global financial markets , 
from January 2002 to June 2007; second is the crisis period corresponding to the 
recent financial crisis, from July 2007 to December 2010. 
The empirical results are supportive of intervention being effective in Sri Lanka 
over the two periods, albeit in different ways . The results during both periods 
show that the Central Bank of Sri Lanka responds to glob01 movements in cur-
rency markets when they intervene, rather than movements specific to the domes-
tic foreign exchange market, suggesting that the central bank attempts to shield 
the domestic economy from externally sourced fluctuations. Comparing volatility 
decompositions of the factor models of exchange rate returns and central bank 
intervention for Sri Lanka suggests that, through intervention the central bank 
has been able to influence volatility by 5.5 percent of the total over the non-crisis 
period. 
Extending the analysis to capture the varying effects of intervention through 
purchases or sale of US dollars clearly shows that the central bank is more effec-
tive on days of US dollar purchases during the non-crisis period. Eleven percent of 
total volatility is explained by intervention through purchases , compared to only 2 
percent of volatility in the case of intervention through sales of US dollars. These 
findings are consistent with the medium-term objective of the Central Bank of Sri 
Lanka of accun1ulating foreign exchange reserves , suggesting successful reserves 
management between 2002 and 2007. 
In contrast to the dominance of intervention through purchases relative to 
116 Foreign Exchange Intervention and Volatility: Latent Factor Approach 
sales for the non-crisis period , t he central bank is focused on mit igating xc s 
currency market volatility arising from perceived short-run shocks such as those 
of t he recent global financial crisis. The variance decomposit ions calculat d for 
t he period from 2007 to 2010 clearly show t hat 11 percent of Sri Lankan currency 
market volatility is explained by sales of US dollars as t he cent ral bank atten1pted 
to absorb some of t he global t urmoil in currency markets t hrough exchang rat 
management . 
A comparison of t he relative cont ribut ions of t he intervent ion factor wit h t he 
sa1nple variances furt her reveals t hat t he effect of intervent ion by t he Central 
Bank of Sri Lanka in reducing excess volatility of t he Sri Lankan rupee return is 
economically substant ial in both sample periods, complimenting t he results found 
in Chapter 4. 
In t he policy context, understanding t he sources of exchange rate volatility 
specific to t he domestic currency market enables t he central bank to use its in-
tervent ion policy effectively. For example, if t he cent ral bank limits int rvention 
to specific moments, such as in periods of financial market t urmoil , intervention 
could play a useful role in containing t he adverse effects of transitory shocks on 
financial stability. Alt hough intervent ion is found to be effective , it will be in-
teresting to examine whether official reserves have been effectively used by th 
Central Bank of Sri Lanka when intervening in t he foreign exchange 1nark t . 
Chapter 6 
Concluding Remarks 
6.1 Summary 
The main objective of this thesis was to study the analytical and empirical as-
pects of t he financial market volatility during the crisis of 2007-2011. The ·world 
econom has become increasingly integrated during the last fevv decades. There-
fore ; a shock tha occurs in one part of the global economy quickly transmits 
o he other markets aero s na ional borders through multiple channels; both 
direc and indirect. The crisis of 2007-2011 is one such event . Although past 
experience led a financial crisis to be thought of as a phenomenon attached to 
emerging economies ; the recent crisis; which originated in the core of the world 
econom ) has changed hat belief. The financial crisis; which first unfolded in 
he S sub-prime mortgage marke in n1id-2007 i spread across asset markets in 
de eloped countries; and quickl} reached unprecedented levels ; generally leaving 
ernerging n1arkets a a success stor . The transmission of the effects of the crisis 
"a largel unforeseen. and has forced a rethinking of financial n1arket olatility 
and global financial linkage . These circum tances con t ituted the motivation for 
hi he i . 
Thi the i con i ted of \\-o par . The fir part i compri ed of Chapters 2 and 3. 
in\ e iga ed he mechani m of olatilit transmi ion aero financial market in 
de, eloped coun rie . Specificall i Chap er 2 captured the tran mis ion mecha-
ni m of he recen cri i ) dri en b - he change in carr rader : behavior ) b,.-
u ing a global game approach. Chap er 3 in, estiga ed the volatility tran mi sion 
n1echani m during he cri i of 2007-2011 by using a latent factor model of cro -
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country and cross-n1arket financial contagion. The second part co1npri d of 
Chapters 4 and 5, evaluated the efficacy of foreign exchange intervention, which 
is one of the primary policy tools used by central banks to shield again t x-
ternal shocks, particularly in emerging econon1ies . Additionally, the sources of 
exchange rate volatility with and without central bank intervention were identi-
fied; and the economic significance of the effects of foreign exchange interv ntion 
was assessed. Two macroeconometric methodologies, the generalized autoregres-
sive heteroskedasticity (GARCH) and the latent factor methodology were applied 
in this context. 
6.2 Main Findings 
This Section summarizes the main findings that emerged fron1 this in terms of 
three different themes : herd behavior of international investors, financial market 
contagion and foreign exchange intervention. 
Herd behavior Herding is one among several explanations given for the 
spread of market turmoil. Chapter 2 developed an analytical model to investi-
gate how the r cent crisis was realized in an investment recipient country as a 
result of unwinding of carry trades, which were induced by credit crunche in 
major funding countries . However, this framework is not limited to the crisi 
of 2007-2011 , or the carry traders ' behavior , rather , can be used as a model to 
explain shocks attributed to any financial crisis. The n1odel shows that carry 
traders receive signals about margin constraints or the haircut. As this informa-
tion is not perfect, these noisy signals lead some carry traders to unwind their 
positions. Consequently, the cost for the other carry traders to roll over their 
investment increases, resulting increased nun1ber of withdrawals. This ugg ts 
that carry traders adjust their decisions depending on the information d rived 
fro1n observing others' actions. 
This study found t hat there i a thre hold level of the "haircut'' or margin 
constraint , on which investors decisions on unwinding carry po ition are made. 
Sudden changes in t he behavior of carry trad r 1 ad the invest1n nt country to 
sell its illiquid a ets, forcing th exchange rate to depreciate. The more the arry 
traders unwind t h ir position th 1nore the sale of a et in the recipi nt ountr . 
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This tends o decline t he asset prices sharply; while repayment to carry traders 
forces the exchange rate to depreciate . Finally; the model shows how a financial 
crisis transmitted to the investment recipient country shifting its economy to a 
bad equilibrium even though it was not init ially threatened by the crisis. That 
i ; due to the herding behavior of carry traders and feedback effects of asset 
prices and exchange rates holding during the financial crisis; t he financial markets 
increasingl become destabilized. 
Financial contagion The presence of con1mon international investors who 
change their inves men posi ions in t he face of a financial market t urmoil is 
one channel of the volatilit transmission mechanism from one asse market to 
another. Existing literature on financial crises has often suggested that there 
are o her mechanisn1s for contagion hrough which financial market turbulence 
preads acros na ional borders. Thi argumen cons ituted the basis for studying 
he rela i e importance of the contagion transmission mechanisms across coun-
ries and marke s j during the recent crisis. 
Chap er 3 e., ended the anal) sis of t he transmission of the financial crisis to 
1n e iga e he contagion ransn1i sion mechanism across equit) and bond mar-
ke in an empirical e ting. A laten fac or model was de, eloped o decompose 
ola ili of exce as e re urns in o common; marke ; coun r ) idiosyncratic and 
con agion fac ors , a urning hat con agion effects v\ ere spreading hrough the 
addi ional ran mis ion mechani 111s genera ed in the market and idios3 ncratic 
con1ponen during the cri i period. Fi e cow1tries- Australia; Europe. Japan. 
he K and he 8- ere included in the empirical tud3 in order to cover a 
range of de, eloped financial n1arke . 
The empirical re ul found hat the cri i of 2007-2011 \\-a highly contagious. 
Inve tiga ion of the hree pha e of the cri i - the S ub-prime crisis. the global 
finan ial cri i and he European debt cri is- found that contagion \\ras highl3 
preYalent in bo h cla es of a e market in all hree pha e of the cri i . That 
i : deYeloped countr - a e market \\-ere vulnerable to shock attributed to all 
hree pha e of he cri i Ho\\-e er. he contagion tran mi ion mechanisn1 dy-
nami all - changed during he three pha e . and \\ ere found to ar - depending on 
the pha e and he ource of the cri i . Bond n1arket \\-ere affected b - the hock 
originated in he global equi - market. ho\\-ever ; he re, er e exi t onlY to a le er 
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extent. In line wit h t he leading role play by the US financial market in th 
global economy, the additional links from t he US financial markets contribut d 
to t he financial market contagion. However, the relative importance of these US 
idiosyncratic asset market channels changed across rnarkets and across the t hr e 
phases of the crisis . 
Foreign exchange intervention Investigation of the effectivenes of pol-
icy instruments that aim to stabilize the foreign exchange markets is anoth r 
important aspect of studying the crisis transn1ission. Chapters 4 and 5 analyzed 
the effectiveness of foreign exchange intervention, with the focus on ernerging 
economies . The experience of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka provided t he basis 
for these analyses . Chapter 4 applied the GARCH methodology, which is com-
monly used in modeling financial time series that exhibit time-varying volatility 
clustering to understanding the effects of intervention on the exchange rate and 
also on the volatility of the exchange rate. The en1pirical results found evidence 
for the existence of asymmetric volatility and leverage effect for the Sri Lankan 
rupee/US dollar exchange rate returns. Further , it found that the C ntral Bank 
of Sri Lanka has enacted a "leaning against the wind" policy to reduce cur-
rency market volatility, rather than influencing the exchange rate trend. IVIo t 
importantly, t he results showed that the Central Bank of Sri Lanka was succe -
ful in achieving its short-tern1 objective of curtailing excessive volatility in the 
currency market , and its medium-term objective of accumulating international 
reserves. Although the effect of intervention in reducing volatility seem d to be 
lower during the crisis period compared to t he non-crisis period , this conclusion 
requires further quantification and explanation, as difficulties arise in measuring 
the economic significance of the effects of intervention , which is a 1nain limitation 
of this study. 
Chapter 5 extended the analy is to further explore the effectiveness of foreign 
xchange intervention by identifying the sources of exchange rat volatility, and 
also investigating the econo1nic significance of th fleets on th for ign exchange 
market as the central bank intervenes . This tudy was novel in that it appli d 
a latent factor fra1n work in the context of exchange rate vola ility with for ign 
exchange intervention. The empirical result give ev ral in. ights. Although 
the domestic market sp cific factor w re found to b dominant in explaining 
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exchange rate volatility the results suggest that Sri Lankan policy1nakers were 
responding to the global n1ovements in currency markets when intervening, rather 
than n1ovements specific to the domestic foreign exchange market. By comparing 
the relative sizes of the intervention factor with t he variance of daily exchange 
rate returns this analysis further suggest t hat t he effects of foreign exchange 
intervention constit uted an economically substantial effect on t he currency market 
volatilit . Importantly t he results claim that foreign exchange intervention was 
ucce sful in accumulating international reserves during t he non-crisis period , 
while reducing volatility during the crisis period. 
6.3 Policy Implications 
ith he effects of t he recent financial crisis which are still unfolding t he find-
ings of this t hesis highlight a number of policy implications. Overall , the results 
presented in Chapters 2 and 3 suggest some policies for the stabilization of the 
in ernational financial s s eih. The results reveal that n1ature financial mar-
ke s are also vulnerable o financial crises , t hough such crises ,;vere previously 
hough o be a fea me onl - of en1erging markets. The res11lts tha emerged in 
Chap er 2 highlight the need to implement adequate supervisory and regulatory 
mechanism , and emphasize the need to con rol the extent of currency and n1a-
un 1ni matche of financial in it u ions in order to prevent the adverse effects 
of udden capi al fligh s tha is a charac eris ic of he unwinding of carry trades. 
The , ulnerabili of developed as e marke s to financial con agion, and the 
d nan1ic of he con agion ran mission 1nechanis1ns aero s different phases of 
he crisis- as highligh ed in Chapter 3- emphasize he need to develop better 
on ingenc plan to n1anage s e1na ic failures. Such contingenc r plans should 
account for all the a pee of he crisi , including contagion effects that 1nay go 
be ond a countr ' o n econom . The - should also take into account the rela-
i e impor ance of the channel through which contagion transmi over different 
pha e of the cri i . 
The conclu ion drawn in Chap er 4 and 5 lead to some i1nportant polic} 
i1nplica· ion in rela ion o exchange ra e and central bank inter ention . par-
icularl - in the on ext of emerging economie . The re ul in both Chapter 
found e -idence for he effec i -ene of foreign exchange in ervention in Sri Lanka. 
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The empirical results suggest t hat intervention is useful in containing un xpect d 
short-term volatility stemrning from external shocks, while accun1ulating interna-
tional reserves in t he medium-term. The frequency of intervention and it succ s 
in reducing volatility suggest t hat t here is some possibility for en1erging mark t 
to operate flexible exchange rate regimes without having to adopt a pure float . 
Furt her, designing appropriate policies to reduce excess volatility in t he for ign 
exchange market ·wit h t he understanding of t he sources specific to t he domestic 
currency market will enable t he cent ral bank to use its intervent ion policy ef-
fectively. For example, if t he cent ral bank intervene at specific events- such a 
recent crisis in global financial markets- intervent ion could play a useful rol 1n 
containing t he adverse effects of t ransitory shocks on financial stability. 
6.4 Future Research Directions 
The findings of t his t hesis open new avenues for fut ure research. Chapter 2 of 
t he t hesis developed an analytical fr arnework to analyze t he t ransn1ission of the 
recent financial crisis t hrough of unwinding of carry trades driven by t he change 
in investors' behavior. The proposed model could be furt her validated by testing 
on t he real financial n1arket data, alt hough , collecting data on margins or haircut 
might be a challenge. Another potent ial direction for fut ure research is extending 
the analytical fran1evvork to int roduce dynarnical behavior of exchange rate and 
asset price. 
The empirical analysis on financial market contagion presented in Chapter 3 
can be further extended by capturing how t he relative strength of financial con-
tagion affected vvhen the benchn1ark asset 1narket is the source of the hock. 
Focusing on the period of the S sub-prime mortgage crisis, Dungey (200 ) ha 
atten1pted to captur this pheno1nenon by developing a factor model. The future 
research along this line could be extended vvith the basi provid d by Dunge 
(200 ) : although incorporating both the US originated cri i as well a th Euro-
pean debt crisi '"vill be chall nging. Extending the empirical anal i o includ 
a set of e1nerging 1narket economies will improve the 1nodel b nabling a di -
tinction of the contagion effect b tvve n de loped and emerging econo1ni . It 
could be used to a se s wheth r the merging market wer immun to th ff ct 
of contagion during th cri is of 2007-2011. larger coun ry vvill al o en-
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able identification of the effects of more factors , such as emerging market factors 
and/ or regional factors. 
The findings in Chapters 4 and 5 suggest some potential areas of research in 
the context of foreign exchange intervention. An interesting exercise in this con-
text would be to estimate an expected loss function that depends on the deviations 
of the exchange rate from its long-term fundamental value, and the conditional 
volatility of the exchange rate. When "excessive exchange rate volatility" is not 
defined explicitly, this estimated loss function could be used as the effective rule 
governing foreign exchange intervention by the central bank, if it is able to pro-
duce out-of-sample forecasts. As intervention is a costly measure for any central 
bank, another potential area of research would be to investigate whether foreign 
exchange reserves are effectively used when intervening in the foreign exchange 
market. 

Appendix A 
Chapter 3 Appendices 
A.1 Data Description and Sources 
CountrJ 
Gennan 
Greece 
ItalJ 
J apan 
K 
s 
Descript ion 
S P / ASX 200 stock 1narke index 
10 ears benchn1ark bond yield 
Australian dollars per S dollar 
Gennan DAX price index 
10 ears go ern1nent bond ield 
Euro per S dollar 
FTSE/ ATHEX 20 price index 
10 ear bench1nark bond yield 
FTSE 1v1IB price index 
10 ear benchn1ark bond J ield 
N ikkei 225 stock price index 
10 year benchn1ark bond ield 
J apane e Jen per -s dollar 
K FTSE all hare price index 
10 iear govern1nent bond J ield 
Bri i h pound per -s dollar 
DO,iV JO_ ES industrial price index 
Corporate B bond iield 
Ri k free 10 -ear benchmark bond yield 
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Datastream Code 
ASX200I 
AUBRYLD 
AUSTDO$ 
DA_XINDX 
G-BBDlOY 
El\!IUSDSP 
FTASE20 (PI) 
GRBRYLD 
FTSE_ 1IIB (PI) 
ITBRYLD 
JAPDO,iVA 
JPBRYLD 
JAPYl - -s 
FTALLSH (PI) 
GB -KlOY 
BRITP S 
DJIND S(PI) 
FRCBBAA 
-sBDlOY 
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A.2 Non-crisis Factor Contributions 
Country Factor Phase I Phase II Phase III 
Equity Bond Equity Bond Equity Bond 
AU Common 20.82 63.58 15.67 70.11 19.46 65.54 
Equity market 29.93 n .a . 37.09 n .a . 33 .23 n. a . 
Bond market n.a 3.27 n .a. 0.05 n. a . 2. 47 
Country 8.80 3.56 2.88 14.47 24.57 1.21 
Idiosyncratic 40.45 29.59 44.36 15 .37 22.74 30.78 
EU Common 21.57 37.04 16.70 49.52 18.26 36.61 
Equity market 45.16 n .a. 50.38 n. a . 50.92 n. a . 
Bond market n.a 45.65 n .a . 36 .91 n. a . 49 .17 
Country 1.02 17.30 1.22 10.24 4.46 5.34 
Idiosyncratic 32.25 0.01 31.69 3.33 26.36 8.88 
JP Common 12.20 62.91 8.46 68 .94 10.66 65.21 
Equity market 22.03 n.a. 31.28 n. a . 24.91 n.a. 
Bond market n .a . 8.98 n.a. 3.05 n .a. 7.05 
Country 48.88 4.67 41.75 4.61 49.09 4.05 
Idiosyncratic 16.89 23.44 18.51 23.39 15.35 23.70 
UK Common 16.59 25 .47 13.51 37.30 14.72 26.81 
Equity market 69.67 n. a . 70.08 n. a . 67.58 n.a. 
Bond market n.a 50.55 n. a . 32.25 n.a. 42.96 
Country 0.71 23.66 0.29 30.43 2.26 8.81 
Idiosyncratic 13.03 0.32 16.11 0.02 15.44 21.42 
us Comrnon 40.52 82 .85 34.74 84.19 38.06 79.29 
Equity rnarket 11.10 n. a . 15.61 n. a . 12.80 n.a. 
Bond market n .a 4.43 n.a. 0. 41 n.a. 3.94 
Country 0.47 12.72 0.12 15.34 34.84 0.62 
Idiosyncratic 47 .91 0.00 49.53 0.02 14.30 16.15 
Note : The volatility decomposition is presented as a percentage of total volatility. n.a. 
denotes not applicable. 
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A.3 Volatility Decomposition of Non-contagion 
Components During the Crisis Period 
Country Channel Phase I Phase II Phase III 
Equity Bond Equity Bond Equity Bond 
AU Non-contagion 24.28 90.37 29.36 61.52 52.81 48.25 
Common 4.40 31.33 0.59 12.13 1.48 28.49 
Equity market 9.48 n.a. 27.01 n.a. 47 .74 n.a. 
Bond 111ar ket n .a . 42 .71 n.a. 44.23 n.a. 5.86 
Country 1.86 1.75 0.11 2.50 1.86 0.53 
Idiosyncratic 8.54 14.58 1.66 2.66 1.73 13.38 
EU Non-contagion 18.86 65.31 8.08 40.55 71.54 72.13 
Common 7.38 16.75 0.85 6.32 1.79 23.02 
Equity market 0.10 n.a. 5.55 n .a . 68.93 n.a. 
Bond market n.a 40.74 n.a. 32 .50 n .a. 19.37 
Country 0.35 7.82 0.06 1.31 0.44 3.36 
Idiosyncratic 11.03 0.00 1.61 0.42 0.17 26.39 
JP Non-contagion 71.49 76.37 67.94 33.27 42.29 35.05 
Common 5.59 29 .78 0.69 8.65 1.98 23 .38 
Equity market 33.86 n .a . 62.30 n.a. 28.30 n .a . 
Bond 1narket n.a. 34.29 n.a. 21.11 n.a. 1.72 
Country 23.59 2.21 3.42 0.58 9.15 1.45 
Idiosyncratic 8.15 11.09 1.52 2.94 - 2.86 8.50 
UK Non-contagion 4.41 82.52 21.06 68.43 64.06 34.87 
Com1non 3.29 9.87 0.37 5.29 0.74 12.56 
Equity n1arket 0.05 n.a. 12.69 n.a. 62.43 n .a . 
Bond market n.a. 39.56 n.a. 52 .60 n .a . 8.13 
Countr) · 0.14 9.17 0.01 4.32 0.11 4.13 
Idiosyncratic 0.93 23.92 7.81 6.21 0.78 10.04 
us Non-contagion 47.48 93.67 55.11 49.47 88.10 39.08 
Comn1on 14.10 37.01 1.66 5.54 2.71 14.08 
Equit) 111arket 28.92 n.a. 52.41 n.a. 25.02 n.a. 
Bond 111arke n.a. 23 .60 n.a. 20.15 n.a. 1.47 
Countr) 0.16 5.6 0.01 1.01 2.48 0.11 
Idiosyncratic 4.29 27.38 0.72 22.75 57.50 23.42 
ote: The , olatilit - decon1position is presented as a percentage of total volatility. n.a. 
denotes not applicable. 
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A.4 Statistical Significance of Contagion and Struc-
tural Breaks: Models with Alternative Eu-
ropean Crisis Sources 
DOF Model with Greece 1odel with Italy 
Contagion 
Equity market 5 23.015 (0.000) 1932.147 (0.000) 
Bond market 5 5336.029 (0.000) 573 .435 (0 .000) 
Idio. EU equity 9 513.493 (0.000) 1134.012 (0 .000) 
Idio. US equity 9 2820.451 (0.000) 263.676 (0. 000) 
Idio. EU bond 9 855.986 (0.000) 541.546 (0. 000) 
Idio. US bond 9 12369.210 (0.000) 265. 778 (0 .000) 
Joint contagion 46 24985.417 (0.000) 1285 .140 (0. 000) 
Structural breaks 
Equity market 5 298.379 (0.000) 598.458 (0.000) 
Bond n1arket 5 2439.534 (0.000) 711. 517 (0.000) 
Idio. EU equity 1 141.953 (0.000) 86. 172 (0 .000) 
Idio. US equity 1 4.540 (0.033) 0.205 (0.65 1) 
Idio. EU bond 1 9.789 (0.002) 5.337 (0.021) 
Idio. US bond 1 205.202 (0.000) 0. 551 (0.458) 
Joint structural breaks 14 4139.297 (0.000) 1932.147 (0 .000) 
Note : Test statistics are based on the Wald test. p-values are in parentheses . 
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B.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Max Niin Niean Std. No of 
dev. obs. 
Total sample 
Exchange rate returns 1.25 -2.04 0.01 0.17 2171 
Gvt. bond spread (bps) 1423.90 229.01 787.47 334.42 2172 
Int.rate differential (%) 19.30 4.51 9.76 4.11 2172 
Non-crisis period 
Exchange rate returns 1.15 -2.04 -0.01 0.19 1324 
Gvt bond spread (bps) 1023.0 229.01 -621.79 243.71 1325 
Int.rate differential (%) 19.30 4.51 8.59 3.79 1325 
Crisis period 
Exchange rate returns 1.25 -1.67 4.9 X 10- 4 0.16 847 
Gvt bond spread (bps) 1423.90 382.04 1046.15 289.79 848 
Int.rate differential (%) 18.20 6.70 11.58 3.94 848 
Note: The exchange rate is expressed in terms of US dollars. The total sa1nple is from 
January 1, 2002 to December 31 , 2010. The non-crisis period is from January 1, 2002 
to June 29 , 2007 , and the crisis period is from July 2, 2007 to Decen1ber 31, 2010. 
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B.2 Unconditional Volatility of the Exchange Rate 
Against the US dollar and Net Foreign Ex-
change Intervention (USD mn). 
7 120 
6 - 80 
5 - 40 
4 0 
3 - -40 
2 - -80 
1 - 120 
0 I I I I I - 160 
N ~ "tj" t.n \,C) r-- 00 0\ 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ,.......; 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
N N N N N N N N N 
- Unconditional volatility of SLR/USD exchange rate(%) (left) 
- Net foreign exchange intervention USD rnn. (right) 
Note: Unconditional volatility is measured by the square of t he percentage chang 
in the daily log exchange rate. The shaded area indicates t he crisis period fron1 
July 02 , 2007 to December 31 , 2010 (Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka). 
B.3 Unit Root Tests 
Exchange rate returns 
Int . rate differential 
Gov rnment bond spread 
Net intervention (US$1n) 
Purcha e (US$m) 
Sale (US 111) 
ADF test statistics(a) 
level first difference 
-11.12 *** 
-0 .89 -9.90 *** 
-1. 46 
-11. 91 *** 
-6.62 *** 
-6. 73 *** 
-7.2 *** 
ote: (a) denotes the Augrnented Dickey-Full r test with a trend term and a maximu1n 
nun1ber of 15 lags selected according to the BIC. *** indicates that the null hypothesi 
of a unit root is rej cted at the 1 per cent level. 
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B.4 Correlation between Sri Lankan Rupee Re-
turns and Foreign Exchange Intervention 
SLR returns 
One-day lagged SLR returns 
Net purchases of US dollars 
Purchase of US dollars 
Sale of US dollars 
SLR returns 
1.000 
0.302 
-0.170 
-0.168 
-0.094 
One-day lagged 
SLR returns 
0.302 
1.000 
-0.126 
-0.138 
-0.058 
Note: Correlation between Sri Lankan Rupee (SLR) Returns and Foreign Exchange 
Intervention During the Non-crisis Period: January 01, 2002 to June 29 , 2007. 
SLR returns 
One-day lagged SLR returns 
Net purchases of US dollars 
Purchase of US dollars 
Sale of US dollars 
SLR returns 
1.000 
0.458 
-0.181 
-0.106 
-0 .173 
One-day lagged 
SLR returns 
0.458 
1.000 
-0.125 
-0.105 
-0.086 
Note: Correlation between Sri Lankan Rupee (SLR) Returns and Foreign Exchange 
Intervention During the Crisis Period: July 01 , 2007 to December 31 , 2010. 
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